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Abstract 
This is a study of Chinese local legislatures, the Local People’s Congresses (LPCs), 
and their accountability function within the one-party regime. The focus is to what 
extent, how, and why LPCs can promote political accountability in the face of the 
dominant Communist Party Committee as well as powerful government institutions in 
the reform era.   
Studies of accountability relationships usually are concerned with (1) vertical 
relations between voters and elected representatives and (2) horizontal relations 
between legislatures and governments. However, we should also distinguish between 
relationships in different policy areas; for instance, accountability in budgetary 
matters compared to other policy areas. This study views the accountability function 
of LPCs from a holistic perspective, based on an in-depth fieldwork of four LPCs in 
East and middle China.  
  Starting with a “zero-based-monopoly model,” where LPCs exert minimal 
influence, this study finds that LPCs in recent years have strengthened all of the 
different aspects of accountability that were scrutinized. Compared to the previous 
monopoly model of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), controllability, 
transparency, and answerability have increased over time, although electoral 
accountability has been relatively limited due to its political sensitivity in the eyes of 
the CCP and governments. Significant progress has been made in other accountability 
aspects, however. The main strategies adopted by LPCs and congress deputies to 
increase influence have been to persuade the CCP to provide support, to strategically 
communicate with governments, to motivate the involvement of multiple forces such 
as the public, social organizations, and media, and to assert influential power 
instruments. At the same time, the analysis indicates great variation among the LPCs, 
something that might be attributed to factors such as distinctive power structures 
among the CCP, governments, and LPCs, personality traits of the elites, political 
promotion from social organizations and the public, and the subsequent institutional 
innovations at a micro level.  
  One important finding of this study is that LPCs have succeeded in pioneering new 
mechanisms, such as the creation of a series of co-governance oriented institutional 
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reforms in the budgetary arena, to enhance influence and to ensure accountability. 
Given the dominant technical attributes and implicit political attributes of the public 
budget, it seems a promising route to assert accountability, compared with the 
sensitive electoral issue under China’s current political circumstances. However, 
electoral accountability serves the function of potentially affecting the chain the 
accountability in other aspects; thus, the long-term performance of the LPC 
accountability still relies on the holistic development of multiple aspects. This is one 
crucially important accountability aspect that has been neglected in previous research.  
  With that said, this study also finds that the CCP still plays a key role in defining 
and influencing accountability functions. Stronger LPCs do not necessarily weaken 
the legitimacy of the CCP—quite the contrary. Concessions may actually strengthen 
its legitimacy by providing a more flexible system. Indeed, the CCP has supported 
and inspired the changes in the accountability function of the LPCs. At the same time, 
the CCP does not shy away from imposing constraints when reforms are seen to 
challenge its dominance. 
 To conclude, then, the obvious deviation from zero-base monopoly model that has 
happened in the Chinese local scene, where current authoritarian institutions have not 
dislodged CCP dominance. That is to say, the accountability function of LPCs is 
moving forward for real, but not at an overwhelming pace. In this sense, we can say 
that neither conservative nor fundamental changes are happening, but rather, the 
changes are necessary for responding to increasing governance problems as well as a 
way of enhancing the legitimacy of the established political system in conjunction 
within intensified public political consciousness.  
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Introduction 
Legislatures in Asia are especially worthy of study. They have been relatively 
neglected in the field of academic inquiry. Through we know a great deal about 
Western legislatures, and there is a growing body of literature on the legislatures of 
the new democracies of central and Eastern Europe, we know little about Asian 
legislatures. 
                                                      
                                                 —Norton Philip1
 
One basic characteristic of modern democratic governance is the development of 
strong legislatures. These are the main institutions securing accountability across the 
world. The presence of powerful and effective legislatures that represent the 
preferences of the electorates guarantees control and balance and prevents abuse of 
executive power.2 Legislatures also channel the demands and interests of wide and 
diverse populations, thereby giving overall governance a more acceptable content. 
China has made unprecedented reforms during the past 30 years in the economic as 
well as in the political arena. One significant political change concerns the rise of 
China’s legislatures—the people’s congresses—from an existence that previously was 
just to serve as rubber stamps until becoming active institutions with new and 
important tasks, especially in the local arenas. However, due to the specific political 
contexts characteristic of the one-party system, China’s people’s congresses cannot act 
similarly to their corresponding institutions in liberal democracies.  
The role of the Communist Party (CCP) in China today, and during recent years, 
confronts us with a particular challenge in studying the gradual development towards a 
more accountable regime. The “opening” of Chinese LPCs as a combination of 
“top-down” and “bottom up” ruling is a very interesting theoretical problem to tackle 
and it involves very important problems for empirical research. Three distinctive 
features characterize the situation and this challenge:   
 
1 Philip Norton, Nizam Ahmed, “Legislatures in Asia: Exploring diversity,” the Journal of Legislative Studies, 
Vol.4,No.4(1998):1-12, P1. 
2 One representative work can be seen from M. Steven Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies,” 
Journal of Democracy, Vol.17, No.1(2006):5-20.  
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Firstly, the rise or the development of China’s people’s congresses still is 
accompanied by the constraints of an authoritarian regime. In contrast to the stronger 
role of legislatures in most liberal democracies, the legislatures in authoritarian 
regimes have traditionally been understood as weaker institutions, due to the absence 
of any of the usual power checks and the tendency for power to be concentrated in the 
hands of a few individuals or personalistic factions and to be fatally misused by them. 
This results typically in misgovernment, corruption, weak norms of conduct, and a 
deterioration of legitimacy among the governing elites.3 Similar constraints also exist 
in China—a country with a one-party authoritarian regime. The monopoly power of the 
CCP usually has been deemed as the most obvious obstacle that prevents legislatures 
from playing a positive role. Cabestan describes this kind of constraint from two 
aspects: on the one hand, in his opinion, the CCP still tightly controls the various 
elections of its membership; while, on the other hand, it makes sure that the leading 
bodies of these congresses are dominated by CCP leaders at the same level. 4 Faced 
with the dominant Communist party and stronger government, the legislatures at both 
national and local levels have tended to be quite weak in the past. They were probably 
fairly marginal players or just served as ritualized rubber stamps for the executive’s 
proposals or decisions. Although changes have been made to the Chinese people’s 
congresses, the path dependencies on the authoritarian regime still exist, and cannot be 
ignored when endeavoring to understand the development of people’s congresses.  
Secondly, despite the generally increasing importance of China’s people’s 
congresses, their growth paths, marked with Chinese characteristics, are bound to be 
different from those of other authoritarian states or liberal democracies. The crux is to 
discern a developmental path that matches China’s situation, rather than blindly 
following a western pluralistic and liberalized reform model. This popular political 
idea in China can be clearly observed in the selected works of one of China’s 
paramount CCP leaders—Deng Xiaoping: 
As far as democracy is concerned, we have a socialist democracy on the Chinese mainland, 
which is different in concept from a bourgeois democracy. Western democracy includes, 
among other features, the separation of the three powers and multiparty elections. We have 
no objection to the Western countries doing it that way, but we on the Chinese mainland do 
 
3 Gilley, Bruce, “The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.1(2003):18. 
4 Cabestan Jean-Pierre, “More Power to the People’s Congresses? Parliaments and Parliamentarianism in the 
People’s Republic of China,” Asian 99( April 2006): S.42-69. 
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not have such elections, nor do we separate the three powers or have a bicameral legislature. 
We have a unicameral legislature, the National People’s Congress, which best reflects 
China’s realities. As long as it keeps to the right policies and direction, such a legislative 
body greatly helps to make the country prosper and avoid much wrangling. Of course, if the 
policies are wrong, any kind of legislative body is useless.5  
 
Thirdly, in the rapid economic development seen today in China, the signs of 
development to more accountable legislatures may be more visible in the local arenas 
than at the national level. One of the most salient phenomena is the increasing number 
of institutionalized innovations initiated by local people’s congresses (LCPs). This has 
been partly due to the rise in diversity interest demands in China’s local affairs, along 
with the introduction of a market economy. In addition, reforms at the local level are 
easier to carry out and control than at a national level within a united administrative 
system.  
The development of the Chinese people’s congresses has recently begun to attract 
more attention from scholars. At present, two main concerns can be identified. On the 
one hand, the Chinese people’s congresses are increasingly recognized as asserting 
their prerogatives and acting as potential challengers to the CCP’s monopoly of power 
in many respects, including legislation, the selection of leaders, and supervision of the 
conduct of government etc. 6  On the other hand, some scholars argue that new 
phenomena that happen within China’s people’s congresses do not trigger substantive 
political development. As Gilley describes it, “in China, local and national legislatures 
still suffer a lot in their attempts to assert their role in supervising government work 
under tight party control. Since the Chinese party-state does not accept the idea of 
devolved political power, these legislatures are invariably weak. In those rare instances 
where they manage, for example, to reject a law, a nominee for office, or a government 
report, there is almost comical confusion about what to do.”7  
 
5 Deng Xiaoping (Core of second generation of Chinese Communist Party - the architect of China’s Reform and 
Opening Policy), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol.3, The People’s Publishing House in China,1993:220. 
6 See Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition, Cambridge University 
Press (2009); Melanie Manion, “When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Role of 
Local People’s Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China,” The China Quarterly(2008):607-629; O’Brien KJ, 
“Local People’s Congresses and Governing China,” The China Journal (Review Essay), No.61, January 2009. 
7 Gilley, Bruce, “The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.1(2003):18-26. 
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Since the development of Chinese people’s congresses has had a close bearing on 
the dramatic demands of good governance in both economic and political arenas 
during the past decade, this study mainly focuses on these from the perspective of 
accountability, rather than embarking on the direct link between the Chinese legislature 
and political democratization that was the concern of the scholars mentioned above. 
The emphasis of this study is to assess the function of LPCs in promoting political 
accountability and providing good governance within the one-party authoritarian 
regime. Specifically, this study attempts to answer the following questions: 
1 To what extent have local people’s congresses in China—representative bodies of 
public interest—promoted development in performing the accountability function?  
2 How do Chinese local people’s congresses ensure the accountability to the public 
within a one-party regime, including the incentives, accountability forms, 
mechanisms, and strategies employed by them? 
3 What are the driving forces that promote the development of an accountability 
function or that weaken the performance of accountability of local people’s 
congresses? 
 
Research motivations 
Without a doubt, the theory and practice of accountability is a Western product rooted 
in Western history and culture. It is also commonplace to state electoral accountability 
or to declare that the government should be accountable to legislature with regard to 
the principal-delegate relationship in the western democracies. Yet, what is actually 
meant is not always clear, as the accountability travels to a non-democratic context 
characteristic of distinctive institutional logic and political culture. Is the concept of 
accountability relevant for China? 
Indeed, from the outset, focusing research on the accountability function of Chinese 
local people’s congresses might seem a bit strange when, within a one party system, 
the power hierarchy and main actors are expected to follow the party lines vertically 
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and horizontally, rather than abiding by the basic power principle-delegate chain 
highlighted in the western democracy context.  
However, my data show that more accountability is present now than before in the 
Chinese local scene even if the CCP is now stronger. Along with rapid economic 
development and increasing public awareness in China since 1978, LPCs, with their 
closer connection with the public than the National People’s Congress (NPC), have 
gradually become more active in responding to problems relating to the demands for 
more accountability and governance. Correspondingly, many reforms and experiments 
have been introduced. Nevertheless, neither of these new practices and their influence 
on the function of LPCs in political process received due attention from scholars.   
  This study clearly observes the development and dilemmas of the accountability 
function of LPCs in China’s one-party regime, starting with a “zero-base-model,” 
which may be useful to illustrate the gradual development and operational process of 
Chinese local governance. This model portrays the situation where complete control 
exists within one party state, based on Marxist ideology and communist party 
doctrines. The idea in this type of a model simply states that the election, supervision 
of government activities, and internal operation of LPCs are tightly controlled by the 
party leadership, without a disturbing involvement. My considerations will therefore be 
to demonstrate deviations from this model and to investigate the circumstances and the 
factors that contribute to these deviations. It is indeed a paradox that these important 
deviations can take place while few or no signals indicate that the zero-based-model 
has been relinquished.  
 
A review of previous studies 
Previous research on Chinese people’s congresses has revealed four evolving 
paradigms: institution explanation-centered studies, legislative development within 
established regimes, democratization-centered research, and governance-oriented 
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research. This review on previous research helps to clarify the subsequent efforts of my 
work.  
 
Institutional perspective 
This was a quite common paradigm in the initial studies on people’s congresses in the 
Chinese literature. Along the line of Leninist parliaments, related research paid more 
attention to the theoretical foundation, legal regulations, new institutional 
arrangements, operational mechanisms, and legislature development etc. For example, 
Dingjian Cai describes in detail the origin, organizational settings, functions, and 
development of the Chinese People’s Congress in his monograph published in 1992. 8 
Subsequently, Zhe Sun investigates the remodeling process of Chinese National 
People’s Congress, centering on its institutional development and the functional 
changes of legislation, supervision, and representation during 1979 to 2000.9 Based on 
this macro-level research, Junzhi He goes further to explore the operational 
mechanisms and to develop a model inside the Chinese county people’s congress by 
focusing on its plenary meeting as well as its standing committee. The recovery of this 
institution in 1979, the establishment of the standing committee, and the influence of 
the new electoral rules are regarded as key variables in the promotion of the growth of 
the county people’s congresses since 1979. His emphasis on the power relationship 
among local people’s congress, party and government as well as institutional 
connection between LPCs at lower level and higher level is also instructive. 10
These studies undoubtedly lay a foundation for the general understanding of the 
Chinese legislature institution and its embedded political contexts. However, they are 
limited to reflecting the actual operation of institutions at the grass roots level. 
 
 
8 Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu (Chinese People’s Congress system), Law Press 
China,1992. 
9 See Sun Zhe, Quanguo Renda Zhidu Yanjiu ( A Study of the National People’s Congress of China), Law Press 
China, 2004. 
10 He Junzhi, Zhidu Dengdai Liyi: Zhongguo Xianji Renda Zhidu Moshi Yanjiu(System that waiting for interests: A 
Study on Institutional Models of Chinese county people’s congress) (Chongqing Press China,2005),3. 
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Legislative development within established regime 
Due to the existing gaps regarding the development of specific people’s congresses 
under new reform circumstances, scholars began to shift their attention to legislature 
development within the established regime.  
Based on power structure embedded within the Chinese legislatures, Chen An 
examines the functional evolution of the three major institutions by the criterion of 
“checks and balances”—the Communist Party, government, and People’s Congresses 
at central as well as local levels—in the Chinese political structure between 1978-1998. 
He then further measures the effect of political reforms over local legislation and 
policymaking during this period, the status of a legislature in hierarchical power 
structure and its changes over time.11 In contrast, Oscar explores how and to what 
extent the local people’s congress can constrain the powers of the local party 
committee and the local government, using the “rule of law” criterion. Two aspects of 
the local people’s congresses have been examined in detail: political participation and 
the exercise of political power.12
The emphasis on institutional variables and their influence on power structure by 
these studies is insightful. However, some challenges are inevitably encountered by 
presuming that this legislature operates as a western-style “checks and balances” 
institution in a Chinese context, whereas the legislature has not grown into a 
full-fledged institution with strong autonomy due to the CCP’s dominant role in terms 
of personnel, organization, and policy. Oscar’s academic work shows that the selection 
of a “rule of law” gauge also has limitations in grasping the essence of Chinese politics 
with its deep tradition of the “rule of man..”   
Proper strategies and skillful interactions with other political institutions under 
structural power relationships are regarded by many researchers as critical for the 
development of Chinese legislatures. Among these researchers, Xia Ming probes into 
 
11 See Chen An, Restructuring Political Power in China Alliances and Opposition, 1978-1998(Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers,1999),14-20. 
12 Almen Oscar, “Autoritarianis Constrained: The Role of Local People’s Congresses in China”( PhD dissertation, 
Goteborg University, 2005), 5-31 
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the developmental process of provincial-level legislatures, emphasizing the network 
development and strategic calculations adopted by local legislatures to institutionalize 
themselves and to expand their power.13 Young Nam Cho identifies the increasing 
law-making and supervisory power of Chinese local people’s congresses, and 
emphasizes the multiple strategies adopted by local legislatures to promote their 
power. He points out that sophisticated development strategies, the introduction of a 
market economy, and the legalization policy have been the primary determinants for 
enhancing Chinese legislatures.14 While this provides vivid evidence to elaborate how 
local legislatures become meaningful players, including power expanded processes and 
interactive behaviors inside states, this research pays little attention to the 
representation arena and actors in electoral link, where remarkable changes have 
happened in recent years.  
In addition, the improvement in organizational capabilities is argued to be one kind 
of indirect strategy for legislature power expansion. These improvements include, for 
example, the introduction of highly-qualified leaders into standing committees, the 
rapid growth of professional staff, the entrance of relatively young and well educated 
deputies, the establishment on expert consulting groups, and so on.15
 
Democratization-oriented research 
By asking “whether the development of Chinese people’s congresses will lead to 
China’s transition towards democracy,” scholars tend to seek a direct connection 
between the development of Chinese legislatures and their connection with a 
democratic transition from different aspects. For instance, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, McCormick predicted that China might follow a collapse path of regime 
 
13 Xia Ming, “Political Contestation and the Emergence of the Provincial People’s Congresses as Power Players in 
Chinese Politics: a Network Explanation,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.9, No.24 (2000):185-214. 
14 Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 4-14. 
15 See Pei Minxin, “Is China Democratizing?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.1 (1998):68-82; KJ.O’ Brien and Li 
Lianjiang, “Chinese Political Reform and the Question of ‘deputy quality,’’ China Information, V2, Vol.3 
(1993):20-31. 
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change, after investigating China’s electoral reforms and people’s congresses. 
Although he tries to illustrate a critical dilemma of Leninist state power by citing 
election as an example—the inconsistency between what it claims to represent and 
what it actually does—it is obvious, in the author’s opinion, that the ritualization of the 
Chinese Leninist parliament is bound to take China far away from the route towards 
democratization. The reason is that states tightly regulate both who may speak publicly 
and what they may say, while the states organize “the people” to participate in 
elections and to make a public display of parliamentary government. 16 However, 
Womack discusses that more competitive factors and more mass opinions will give 
impetus to democratic development, after examining the new election law revised in 
1979 and its operation. 17 Tanner et al. pay more attention to the enhancement of the 
legislative function of the National People’s Congress and its influence on China’s 
constitutional development.18  
O’Brien adopts an “integrated historical-structural approach” to investigate the 
altered involvement of Chinese national legislature in law-making, supervision, 
representation, and regime support in his monograph published in 1990. According to 
three indicators—liberalization, rationalization, and inclusion—that can measure the 
change in the National People’s Congress, he finds that reforms increase inclusion 
(referring to institutionally acknowledged social diversity and the granting of limited 
access and influence to nonparty forces) and rationalization (involving legalized 
political power and circumscribed authority of individual leaders), although these are 
less far-reaching than liberalization (indicating championed electoral reform and elite 
accountability).19  
 
16 McCormick, Barrett L,“ Chinese Leninist parliament and public sphere: A comparative analysis,” in China after 
Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia? Edited byBarrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger. 
Armonk (NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1996), 29-53. 
17 Brantly Womack, “ The 1980 County-Level Elections in China: Experiment in Democratic Modernization,” 
Asian Survey, Vol.22, No.3( 1982):261-277. 
18 See Tanner Murray Scot, “ The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China,” The China 
Quarterly, No.138(1994):381-403; Michael W. Dowdle, “The Constitutional Development and Operations of the 
National People’s Congress,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol.11, No.1(1997):1-125. 
19 O’ Brien, Kevin J, Reform without Liberalization, China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics of 
Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press,1990), 3-8, 157-179.  
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These studies provide insights that allow understanding of the development of 
Chinese legislatures. However, directly connecting the development of Chinese 
legislatures with democracy transition may seem too ambitious, as indicated by the 
comment from Cho, “legislative development in China is much more important than 
the former understanding in terms of institutionalization of the polity. But it has limited 
significance to act as a harbinger of China’s democratization.” 20
 
Governance-oriented research 
The discussions of legislative development within an established regime will make 
more sense when they are used to evaluate specific system performance or the 
influence on power structure. In this respect, governance-oriented research has 
received more attention recently, although it is only in its infancy.  
This research paradigm emphasizes the connection between the development of 
Chinese legislatures and local governance practices. On the one hand, the governance 
challenge has been treated as one emerging factor promoting legislature development. 
Chen An argues that strengthening the people’s congress is a key strategy for the Party 
committee for responding to the governance challenge in the era of political and 
economic reform, which is characteristic of increasing opposition and public demands 
for participation. 21 O’Brien also indicates that public demands for congress delegates 
to solve problems of governance increase along with rising economic inequality and 
official corruption in a political climate that tolerates more outspokenness.22 On the 
other hand, the contribution of legislature development to local governance has been 
noticed. Xia Ming keenly realizes that provincial people’s congresses have become 
essential to the transformation and maintenance of governance in China.23 O’Brien 
 
20 Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (Cambridge University 
Press,2009):168. 
21 See Chen An, Restructuring Political Power in China Alliances and Opposition, 1978-1998 (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers,1999), 63-75. 
22 O’Brien.Kevin J, “ Agents and Remonstrator: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies”, 
China Quarterly 138(1994):359-380 
23 Xia Ming, The People’s Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance 
(Routledge,2008),xiv. 
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simplifies this matter by asking “what do local people’s congresses do, what do they 
not do, and what does their mixture of activism and quiescence say about how 
governance is changing?” Law-making, supervision, and representation are three 
variables that he chose for examining the matter. 24  
 
The perspectives of this research 
While a governance-oriented paradigm has the potential to reflect the reality of 
Chinese politics, it is too rough to equate the development of LPCs directly with the 
transformation of local governance. In fact, we are in the middle of the road. The 
influence of the development of LPCs still awaits further academic assessment. 
Against this background, this study chooses the accountability function of LPCs as an 
entry point to evaluate the legislature development, as well as its influence on the 
change of local governance in China.  
Two reasons led to the choice of the perspective of accountability: one is based on 
the explicit demonstration of the accountability function of legislature by Mill, where 
the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; 
to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification 
of all acts that might be considered questionable; to censure the government if acts 
were found condemnable.25 Another is supported by popular argument at present, 
where accountability is claimed as the core element of good governance, and 
legislature accountability is treated as the bedrock of good governance.26
 In general, this study will differ from previous research in the following aspects:  
 First, compared with the four theoretical paradigms mentioned above, this study 
adopts a different perspective by assessing the holistic development of the 
accountability function of Chinese local people’s congresses under contemporary 
 
24 O’Brien. Kevin J, “ Review Essay: Local People’s Congresses and Governing China,” The China Journal, No.61, 
2009:131-141. 
25 Mill.J.S, Considerations on Representative Government (Oxford University Press,1988),282. 
26 See A. Leftwich, “Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World,” Third World Quarterly, No.14 
(1993):605-624; World Bank, Bangladesh Government That Works: Reforming the Public Sector (Dhaka: The 
University Press Limited,1996): XXII. 
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governance circumstances, instead of randomly selecting some roles involved in the 
LPC development. Accountability relationships embedded by the LPC accountability 
function can be mapped along with holistic governance structures. They are: 1) as 
elected representative bodies, LPCs are the interface between the voters and 
governmental politics and bear the accountability subject to the electoral results and 
input the voters’ demands into the political system. 2) As the component department of 
the political process, LPCs take charge of the accountability for holding the executive 
accountable to the public. More importantly, they also control the interaction with the 
ruling Communist party in actual political operation. 3) The arrangement and operation 
of accountability structures within LPCs also have a bearing on the performance of the 
LPC accountability function, which should not be neglected. These accountability 
relationships are not mutually exclusive and neither are they necessarily exhaustive.  
  Second, given the fact that the decisional/influence function is perceived to be of 
greatest importance for assessing the strength of the legislatures’ accountability,27 this 
study pays more attention to the investigation of the accountability function of Chinese 
local people’s congress in budgetary decision-making processes. This is one crucial 
arena for legislatures to perform constitutional accountability function in terms of the 
public purse. Budgetary decision-making processes usually involve main actors from 
multidimensional accountability arenas; for instance, the public as taxpayers, 
legislatures as purse guardians, administrative departments as budgetary applicants, 
ruling parties as key decision-makers to allocate the public purse, and so on. However, 
budgetary processes have largely been neglected in previous research on Chinese local 
people’s congresses.  
 Thirdly, this study complements previous studies by providing additional first-hand 
data on Chinese local people’s congress up to the year 2010, especially the data on 
latest reforms initiated by some local people’s congresses in China. 
 
27 Wang Vibeke, “The Accountability Function of Parliament in New Democracies: Tanzanian Perspectives,” CMI 
Working Paper, 2005; Norton Philip, Does Parliament Matter? (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993),8. 
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Structure of the thesis    
The whole thesis is composed of nine chapters. In addition to the first introductory 
part, it is organized into the following chapters to respond to the research questions 
described above, as follows: 
Chapter two explores core concepts and theoretical framework used in this study. In 
this chapter, It firstly clarifies the concept of accountability and political 
accountability. After that, combining O’Donnell’s distinction (vertical accountability 
and horizontal accountability) with the current literature, holistic accountability 
mechanisms are identified in terms of vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, 
and co-governance for accountability. The main variables explaining performance 
differences in accountability across different empirical settings are presented.  
Chapter three has a special focus on the methods and strategies that allowed me to 
enter into fieldwork and collect data in Chinese localities where official skepticism still 
remains about interviews and surveys that touch on politics. Of course, this is 
organized around the theoretical framework identified in Chapter two.   
Chapter four serves as background information that supports the main empirical 
chapters, involving historical evolution, the institutional structure, and the power 
connection between the Chinese legislature and other main power actors within a 
multi-dimensional political context.  
The subsequent empirical chapters consist of the main parts of this thesis. These 
chapters are formed in terms of main accountability relationships and accountability 
arenas.  
Chapters five and six present an in-depth study of electoral accountability at the 
vertical level from two interrelated aspects: the elections of deputies and the 
accountability linkage between congress deputies and constituents after election, 
respectively. Chapter five states that while the sanction ability of election is limited in 
CCP-centered electoral institutions, the introduction of semi-contested rules and the 
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expansion of direct election under the initiative of CCP since 1979 provide space for 
the entry of non-CCP nominated candidates. In turn, the strategic campaigning or the 
election dedicated by these independent candidates bring challenges to closed electoral 
processes, as well as the authorities who used to control the nominating and voting 
process. It is an obvious deviation from the election completely controlled by CCP 
organizations.  
The accountability connection between congress deputies and the constituents under 
new governance circumstances is then elaborated in chapter 6. Unlike conventional 
wisdom, congress deputies tend to show more accountability to their constituents even 
without the fear of electoral sanctions. Empirical evidence indicates that role driven, 
interest driven, and institutional constraints, rather than re-election under western 
circumstances, are the main incentives for congress deputies to contact constituents in 
a responsible manner. Among these three types of incentives, institutional factors 
become prominent in shaping the responsive behavior both in terms of individual 
deputies and LPCs as organizations. This can be seen as one kind of supplement for 
limited electoral accountability.  
Chapter seven mainly focuses on the accountability relationship between LPCs and 
governments at the horizontal level. Without a doubt, the Chinese Communist Party is 
a factor that should not be ignored during this process. The LPCs hold the executive 
and the judicial accountable and move toward a more transparent and answerable 
accountability regime, while the obstacles to carry out sanctions still exist. At the same 
time, the performance of LPCs varies in terms of institutional arrangements, the 
strength of standing committees, the power structure and influence among main 
leaders, and the Congress deputies’ perceptions, respectively.  
Chapter eight does with budgetary accountability touching on vertical and horizontal 
accountability relationships. After comparing early legal settings and empirical 
budgetary processes under new reforms background, the main finding is that LPCs 
have gradually increased their accountability function along with the institutionalized 
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innovations. Although LPCs in China still are unfledged, they can successfully press 
government to change improper budgeting proposals on some occasions by first 
gaining CCP support, thereby carrying out legal powers as well as adopting 
co-governance strategy to motivate more stakeholders. As a result, their increasing 
accountability function in budgetary matters contributes to the enhancement of 
political accountability by closely connecting electoral accountability with horizontal 
power checks. 
To conclude, chapter nine summarizes the obvious deviation from zero-base 
monopoly model that has happened in the Chinese local scene, where current 
authoritarian institutions have not dislodged CCP dominance. That is to say, the 
accountability function of LPCs is moving forward for real, but not at an 
overwhelming pace. In this sense, we can say that neither conservative nor 
fundamental changes are happening, but rather, the changes are necessary for 
responding to the increasing governance problems as well as for preserving the 
established political regime. 
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2．Concepts and theoretical framework                      
As an essential part of democratic politics and a hallmark of good governance, 
accountability has become a hot topic both in liberal democracies and in new emerging 
countries during the past decades. 28  Nevertheless ， despite its importance, 
accountability is not well defined and understood. As Schedler put it, “accountability 
represents an underexplored concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose 
boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing.”29 Current academic 
discussions leave more spaces to excavate the essence of this concept.  
On the one hand, discussions on the concept of accountability are too diverse to 
grasp the precise meanings. The term “accountability” is often characterized by 
“control,” emphasizing the continuing concern for oversight and institutional 
constraints on the exercise of power;30 Sometimes accountability is defined in terms of 
“responsiveness,” regarding it, for instance, as “the means by which individuals and 
organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible 
for their actions”;31 This term is also used to stand for the “public dialogue” in modern 
governance context. It asserts that political deliberation between the various actors is at 
the heart of accountability. 32  
 
28 See e.g., O’Donnell G, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.9, 
No.3(1998):112-126; Przeworski.A eds, Democracy, Accountability and Representation (Cambridge University 
Press:1999); Schedler A, Diamond L and Plattner M, F (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability 
in New Democracies(Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1999); Strøm.K, “Delegation and Accountability in 
Parliamentary Democracies”, European Journal of Political Research,No.37(2000):261-289; Lawson Audrew & 
Rakner Lise, “Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania”, OPM, Chr. Michelsen Institute and REPOA, 
2005; Bovens.M, “New Forms of Accountability and EU-governance,” Comparative European Politics, 
Vol.5(2007):104-120. 
29 Schedler, A, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in.New 
Democracies, eds by Schedler A, Diamond L and Plattner M, F. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1999:13. 
30 See Persson T, Roland G and Tabellini G, “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics(1997):1163-1199; Schedler, A, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in The Self-Restraining State: 
Power and Accountability in New Democracies, eds by Schedler A, Diamond L and Plattner M, F. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc, 1999:13-19. 
31  Fox,J.A & Brown L.D (ed), The struggle for accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and grassroots 
movements(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998),12. In essence, there has obvious difference between the  
accountability and the responsibility. One representative distinction states accountability relates externally to policy 
justification and public explanation; responsibility relates more directly to the tasks of governing to the inner 
operation of offices of responsibility, see Joseph G. Jabbra and Dwivedi, O.P, eds, Public Service Accountability: A 
Comparative Perspective(West Hartford, Conn, Kumarian Press,1988), 24-26.  
32 Day P and R Klein, Accountabilities: five public services(London: Tavistock,1987), 244. Similar discussions can 
be observed from Mulgan R, “Accountability: an Ever-expanding Concept?” Public Administration, Vol.78, 
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On the other hand, the discussions for achieving accountability in the past decades 
seem solely to be connected to electoral constraints and constitutional 
check-and-balance problems, which are deficient for uncovering new trends in the 
current practice of accountability. For instance, some liberal democracies suffer from 
increasing accountability deficits in new governance practices, although electoral 
accountability is available there. This makes strengthening of the existing 
accountability arrangements necessary, as well as the design or addition of new ones. 
33 Correspondingly, some non-democracies have chosen non-election routes to achieve 
accountability. Their practices offer opportunities to observe how accountability 
without election can be achieved.34
Without clear theoretical demonstrations on diverse features and new trends of 
accountability, as explained above, empirical explanations will also fail to be precise. 
Given this consideration, this chapter gives a brief but concise review of the theoretical 
positions of the accountability problems.  
The chapter will be organized as follows: Firstly, it begins with a brief review of the 
literature on concepts of accountability in general and specifically on political 
accountability. Secondly, multiple accountability mechanisms will be identified, with 
emphasis on the relationships, instruments, strengths, and weakness within the present 
discussion of accountability. Thirdly, the factors explaining different accountability 
performance will be examined. The final section concludes with a discussion of how 
the theoretical views have implications for the accountability practices observed in 
non-democracies.   
 
2.1 The Definition of Political Accountability 
 
No.3(2000),555-573; Nancy C Roberts, “Keeping Public Officials Accountable through Dialogue: Resolving the 
Accountability Paradox,” Public Administration Review,Vol.62,No.6(2002):658-669; Erkkila Tero, “Governance 
And Accountability- A Shift in Conceptualization,” Public Administration Quarterly(2007):1-39. 
33 See Bovens, M, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework,” European Law Journal, 
Vol.13, No.4 (2007):447-468; Bovens M, Schillemans T and Thart.P, “Does Public Accountability Work? An 
Assessment Tool”, Public Administration, Vol.86, No.1(2008):225-242. 
34 Some scholars from Latin American and Asian tend to summarize new accountability mechanisms from their 
own practices rather than just abide by the popular election accountability embedded in western democracies.  
Represented literature may be seen from: Wampler.B,“Expanding Accountability through Participatory 
Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting in Three Brazilian Municipalities”, Latin American Politics and    
Society, Vol.46, No.2 (2004):73-99; Smulovitz G and Peruzzotti E, “Societal accountability in Latin America, ” 
Journal of Democracy,Vol.11,No.4(2000):147–158; Jun M, “The Dilemma of Developing Financial 
Accountability without Election— A Study of China’s Budget Reform”, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol.68, No.S1 (2009):S62-S72. 
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Historically, the concept originated from bookkeeping activities and financial 
accounting. In Dubnick’s description, the contemporary conceptualization is traceable 
to England in the century following the 1066 Norman Conquest. With the intention of 
establishing and legitimizing the rule over conquered realm in England, William I 
ordered a detailed enumeration of all property. He demanded that every subject provide 
access to royal archives with lists and valuations of all holdings. Property holders were 
required to “render a count” of what they possessed of the sovereign’s realm in the 
terms set by the king’s agents.35  This accounting relationship—holding property 
holders’ subjects accountable to the monarchy—was gradually reversed to the strict 
control of parliamentary and popular government expenditure after several centuries’ 
evolution. The background came partly from the rulers’ unwillingness to produce clear 
statements on the increasing revenues from the taxpayers. From this point, the concept 
of financial (budget) accountability gained new political meaning. It emphasized 
holding authorities accountable to the representative bodies and the taxpayers. It also 
contained a requirement of explaining financial performance.  
With the professional development of administration and politics, the definition of 
accountability expanded. Today, it is not limited to the initial financial or accounting 
practices. For example, the concept of managerial accountability became popular at 
the beginning of 1980s as a response to citizens’ complaints of low efficiency and 
inappropriate government activities. This kind of accountability emphasizes efficiency 
and transparency properties in providing public goods and services for the citizens. In 
contrast, the concept of democratic accountability obtained an extended meaning when 
it is used to call for citizens to be closer to the government and its policy-making 
process, usually through participatory institutions. 36  In addition, Romzek and 
Ingraham have constructed four sub-definitions of accountability, with emphasis on 
forms to hold public agents and managers accountable. They concentrated on two 
variables: source of control (internal or external) and the degree of autonomy (low or 
high). These accountability forms have been labeled as: i) hierarchical accountability 
 
35 Dubnick.M.J. “Seeking Salvation for Accountability” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Boston, August 29-September 1, 2002). 
36 The distinction between managerial accountability and democratic accountability was quoted from Philip Hsu.S, 
“The Search of Public Accountability: The ‘Wenling Model’ in China,” The Australian Journal of Public    
Administration, Vol.68, No.S1 (2009): S40-S50. It also can be seen from Bovens.Mark, “ Public Accountability” in 
Ferlie.E, Lynne.L&Pollitt.C(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press:2005) 
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(effectively obedience to organizational directives); ii) professional accountability 
(deference to individual judgment and expertise); iii) legal accountability (compliance 
with external mandates); and iv) political accountability (responsiveness to key 
external stakeholders).37  
We could observe that definitions outlined above are mostly organized around the 
power principal-agent principle, even if they have a different focus on accountability 
contents as well as emphasis on diverse accountability relationships. Specifically, three 
general characteristics can be recognized from the concept development of 
accountability. First, the existence of power and the separation between power owners 
and power users make up the basis of accountability. Otherwise, accountability would 
lose its roots. Second, accountability should not be solely limited to conventional 
control on improper power use. More importantly, it also includes positive 
answerability of power users for power owners’ interests. Third, examining any 
accountability activity through the lens of a principal agent requires identification of 
multiple principals, multiple agents, accountability domains, and the means for 
principals to control agents.  
In this sense, Lindberg argues that five elements are necessary in the definition of all 
forms of accountability: 1) an agent or institution who is to give an account (A for 
agent); 2) an area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D for domain); 
3) an agent or institution to whom A is to give account (P for principal); 4) the right of 
P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to D; and 5) the right 
of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or explain/justify decisions with regard to D. 
38 That is to say, an obligation has to exist for an agent—to inform, explain, justify 
decisions, and receive the sanction for failed performance—to ensure complete 
accountability.  
Looking at political accountability in terms of a principal-agent relationship, 
Schedler further probes into the criteria regarding how principals carry out restraints on 
the actions of agents. He argues that accountability should embrace three different 
ways of preventing and redressing abuse of political power. He implies that power use 
 
37 Romzek BS and Ingraham PW, “Cross Pressures of Accountability: Initiative, Command and Failure in the Ron 
Brown Plan Crash,” Public Administration Review, Vol.60, No.3 (2000):240-253 
38 Lindberg, Staffan, “Accountability: the Core Concept and its Subtypes”, Working Paper 1. London: Africa Power 
and Politics Programme(2009):15-16. 
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be subjected to the threat of sanctions (the capacity of principals to impose sanctions 
on agents who have violated their public duties), thereby obliging it to be exercised in 
transparent ways, and forcing it to justify its acts (the obligation of agents to inform 
about and to explain what they are doing).39 Therefore, political accountability can be 
regarded as closely associated with three critical criteria: controllability, transparency, 
and answerability, which Shedler summarizes as punishment, information, and 
reasoning.40 These criteria can serve as the scales for construction or assessment of 
accountability within a given setting. The core elements are shown in table 2.1: 
Table 2.1  Core Elements of Political Accountability 
●Controllability: the capacity and possibility of accounting agencies to impose sanctions (including 
the exertion of influence) on power holders who have violated their public duties.  
●Transparency: the visibility of power agencies’ policy-making process, positive dissemination of 
public information, available channels for information access, and public participation. 
●Answerability: the obligation of public officials to inform the public or their representatives about 
what has been done and to explain how it was accomplished, including the gap between achieved 
performance and power delegators’ expectations.      
Source: Based on Schedler (1999:14), Hyden(2010:2), Przeworski(1999:8-9), Lawson&Rakner(2005:10). 
To summarize, when it comes to political accountability, the priority matter is to assess 
if public power is held by power users on the behalf of public interests. Thus, we can 
separate power owners (the principals) and power users (the agents), so that political 
accountability will be described as “the authorities are obliged to act in some 
transparent ways on behalf of the public, and the public, with their representatives, can 
use empowered institutions, or informal rules, to get explanation or justification, and 
                                              
39 Schedler A, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in.New 
Democracies, edited by Schedler A, Diamond L and Plattner M, F (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1999),14. 
40 Scholars have much discussion on predominant connotations or central criteria of the concept of accountability. 
More interesting, their interpretations are largely overlapping even if diverse labels are used. For instance, 
“answerability (transparency and justification) and enforcement (sanction)” named by Schedler; “responsiveness 
and transparency” listed by RahmanT; “responsiveness and answerability” tagged by Hyden G; “sanctions” given 
by PrzeworskiA, eds; “answerability” emphasized by Dwivedi OP. Because the answerability covers the main 
meaning of responsiveness, I will use the former instead of the latter. Comparing the evolution logic of the 
accountability concept with Schedler’s representative explanations, “controllability (sanction or influence), 
transparency and answerability” will be chosen as critical connotations. The related literature can be see 
respectively: Schedler A, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in.New Democracies, eds by Schedler A, Diamond L and Plattner M, F( Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc, 1999):14-17;Rahman.T, Parliamentary Control and Government Accountability in South 
Asia(Routledge,2008):11; Hyden G, “Political accountability in Africa: is the glass half-full or half-empty?” 
Working paper, January, 2010; Przeworski A, eds, Democracy, Accountability and Representation (Cambridge 
University Press:1999):8-9; Dwivedi OP, “Ethics and Values of Public Accountability and Accountability,” 
International Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol51, No.1(1985):61-66. 
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sanction those who misuse public power or deviate from public interests.” Important 
questions then arise: Who is accountable? To whom? For what? And how? These basic 
questions must be taken into account in any mapping of accountability. In line with 
these questions, political accountability highlights holding bureaucrats and politicians 
accountable to the public in policy-making process and substantive policies through a 
series of mechanisms.     
 
2.2. The Multiple Mechanisms of Achieving Accountability 
What kinds of mechanisms are available for achieving accountability? O’Donnell’s 
distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms has received 
broad attention.41 The “vertical” refers to power relationships between the government 
(state) and the public, here termed as including electoral accountability and societal 
accountability. The “horizontal” is associated with institutional oversight, with checks 
and balances within the state.42 However, vertical and horizontal accountability are not 
absolutely separated. Although some literature has noted an emerging hybrid 
accountability or co-governance for accountability, this remains as yet poorly explored. 
43
Combining O’Donnell’s distinction with the current literature, mechanisms can be 
identified in terms of accountability relationships and accountability instruments. 
These points can be summarized as shown in Table 2.2: 
 
 
 
 
 
41 See Schedler A, Diamond L&Plattner.M, The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
Democracies(Lynne Rienner Publishers,1999); Kenney.C, “Horizontal Accountability: Concepts and Conflicts”, In 
Democratic Accountability in Latin American, edited by Scott Mainwaring&Christopher Welna(Oxford University 
Press,2003); Anderson LE, “The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua,” 
Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.48, No.2 (2006):141-169. 
42 O’Donnell G, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, In The Self-Restraining State, eds Schedler A, 
Diamond L and Platterner M (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999),30-46.  
43 Representative literature can be seen from Goetz.A.M and Jenkins R, “Hybrid Forms of Accountability: Citizen 
Engagement in Institutions of Public-sector oversight in India,” Public Management Review,Vol.3, 
No.3(2001):363-383;Ackerman J, “Co-governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice,” World 
Development, Vol.32, No.3(2004):447-463. 
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Table 2.2 Main Types of Accountability Mechanisms 
Types                  Who Holds whom          Instruments to Control         Strength  
Accountable?               Bureaucrats               and  
and Politicians             weakness 
 
V  Electoral Accountability   The Voters (the public)         Voting            S: ●Votes have some  
                          or their representatives       political representation     deterrent power to 
E                         hold government accountable    Referendum            unresponsive   
                                                      Recall etc.            bureaucrats and  
politicians 
R                                                                      W:● Occurring at widely  
                                                                             spaced intervals 
T                                                                         ●Addressing only        
                                                                           broader issues  
I                                                                           rather than specific  
                                                                            preferences 
 
 
C  Societal Accountability    The public, civil society,       Voice             S: ●Bringing pressures  
         mass media, interest groups    Exposure                to bureaucrats and  
Lobbying                 politicians 
A                         Ombudsmen etc.make        Litigation              ●Voice for specific 
                     government accountable        Investigation             public demands  
at any time 
L                                                                      W:● It could not carry out 
                                                                             eventual sanction 
                                                                             without the support      
                                                                             of empowered 
 supervisory organs 
H                            
O  Horizontal Accountability  ＊The legally or empowered    Investigation    S: ● Powerful to enforce 
R                            supervisory agencies        Decision making        eventual sanctions                      
Z                            (legislature, Judicial branch,   Oversight           ● It can carry out  
O                        professional agencies，      Personnel Nomination    continuous control 
N                     Ombudsmen ）hold         and Demotion    W:● Limited capability 
T              government accountable     Judicial Review         to monitor infinite   
A                                                    Impeachment           government activities 
L                                                                        ● Weaker motivations 
 
C 
O                           Multiple stakeholders      Accountability fora    S: ● Bringing jointly  
M Co-governance accountability both in vertical space        in the Public sphere        pressures               
B                          and in horizontal space     (Deliberative dialogues    ● Producing compatible  
I                          joint together to pressure    Participating, Policy networks     incentives 
N                         government accountable      Public hearings, 
E                                                  Influential debates etc.)    W: ●It still calls for the  
D                                                                           support from  
                                                                           empowered                            
4                                                                          supervisory organs 
Source: Based on Smulovitz& Peruzzotti (2000:153), O’Donnell (1999:30-38), Ackerman (2003:451), Jonathan 
(2000:1-19). 
＊Note: To focus on the basic characteristics and differences among multiple accountability mechanisms, here, the 
author omitted executive branches’ anti-control over politicians and bureaucrats (for instance, the President’s veto 
power over Congress’s decisions) under the Presidential system.   
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Electoral Accountability  
The most typical vertical accountability mechanism is electoral accountability. 
Conceptually, it is closely linked with representative democracy at large. 
Representative democracy points to the formal legal distinction where the established 
link between voters and the elected representatives is the necessary condition for 
employment of the sanctions. This differs from participatory democracy, a concept that 
is often used to describe individual behavior activity connected to the representative 
system as such. Participatory democracy is a means for vitalizing the representative 
system. The principal can act vigorously to have the agent properly run delegated 
affairs. In Strom’s view, the delegation chain—from voters to elected representatives, 
from the legislators to the head of government and the heads of different executive 
departments—is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the 
reverse direction. 44 Therefore, elections might work either as a sanctioning device that 
induces politicians to choose to rule in the public interest so they can retain their jobs, 
or as a selection device that allows the public to choose leaders who will, of their own 
accord, do what the public wants.45
In this sense, this concept can be described as: 
 
Those who govern have to answer for their actions to a wider public directly, during political 
contest when elected or appointed, or indirectly in acting as subordinates of the politically 
elected bodies. If they fail to do so they can be substituted in democratic elections. This 
constant threat forces the ruling government to respond to the demands of a constituency, who 
can thus hold their government to account.46  
 
As O’Donnell further puts it, citizens can punish or reward incumbents by voting 
for or against them or the candidates they endorse in the next upcoming election. 47  
 
44 Strøm K, “Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies,” European Journal of Political Research, 
Vol.37 (2000):261-289.
45 Przeworski Adam, Stokes Susan C and Manin Bernard, Democracy, Accountability and Representation 
(Cambridge University Press,1999),70. 
46 Dwivedi, O.P. & Jabbra, J, Introduction: Public Service Responsibility and Accountability. In Public Service 
Accountability. A Comparative Perspective, edited by Jabbra J; Dwivedi O.P, Kumarian Press: Hartford,1988; 
Romzek  B & Dubnick M, “Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy,” Public 
Administration Review, Vol.47(1987): 229.  
47 O’Donnell G, “ Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” In The Self-Restraining State, eds Schedler A, 
Diamond L and Platterner M( Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 1999), 29. 
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Voting is thus the salient instrument for making politicians and bureaucrats 
accountable. Other related forms of institutional mechanisms, like recall, dissolution of 
legislature, government, the role of people initiatives, or referenda are supplements that 
ensure true electoral accountability. 
What are the limits of electoral accountability? Will unfaithful agents be bound to 
suffer punishments from voters within non-democracies? Will the election mechanism 
be sufficient to guarantee real accountability in established democracies? In both 
contexts, the answers depend on the voters’ access to information on incumbents’ 
erroneous or bad performance. We can easily see that no necessary connection may 
exist between bad performance and punishment, or between good performance and 
re-election, especially in some developing countries without sound electoral systems.  
Theoretically, some predominant weaknesses of this traditional accountability 
mechanism have been noticed by scholars. For instance, Adam Przeworski stresses that 
one of the problems facing democratic regimes is that the electoral instruments 
designed to control politicians are inadequate to control bureaucrats.48 In the same 
vein, Harry Blair argues that elections are crude instruments of popular control, since 
they occur at widely spaced intervals, and address only the broadest issues. Citizens 
cannot depend on voting to indicate their likes and dislikes between elections, as well 
as their views on specific proposals. Thus, varied accountability arrangements are 
necessary for citizens to find ways to publicize their views and uncover power users’ 
wrongdoings in local government.49  
 
Horizontal Accountability      
In view of the weaknesses of electoral accountability, another kind of 
mechanism—“horizontal accountability”—will be added as a potential to control 
bureaucrats and ensure continuous accountability especially in off-election periods. To 
 
48  Przeworski.A, “Democratization Revisited,” Newsletter of Social Sciences Research, Items 51(March 
1997):10-11. 
49 Harry.B, “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries,” 
World Development, Vol.28, No.1 (2000):27. 
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use the opinion of O’Donnell, while elections are a “vertical mechanism” of 
accountability, democratic institutions are supposed to offer “horizontal mechanisms”: 
the separation of powers of government responds to and renders accounts to citizens as 
well as to one another.50 O’Donnell’s pioneering emphasis on horizontal accountability 
stems from its absence and inactivity in new democracies. He defines it as follows: 
It is the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or 
impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that 
may be qualified as unlawful.51
 
We can see that this form of accountability pertains to the horizontal power 
relationship within the political system. The legal powers possessed by the principals 
are the necessary weapon to hold the agents accountable. The classical power division 
principle in political science holds that a power division exists among the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary factions; therefore, each plays a great role in constraining the 
others through the checks and balances system.  
      Who are the main actors in this accountability relationship? For most countries, the 
legislature is the one popular and crucially empowered agent in terms of carrying out 
horizontal accountability. In addition, a series of other agencies is evident in modern 
political systems, ranging from the judiciary to oversight agencies like the ombudsmen 
in some countries, the auditing department in others, various professional corruption 
control agencies in many, and even special police forces of scrutiny committees in 
many of them.  
Horizontal accountability through the legislature will be dominated by holding 
bureaucrats accountable to elected representatives, rather than by holding bureaucrats 
directly accountable to the public. As Harry points out, local bureaucrats are arguably 
also accountable to the citizenry, but the more practical view is that the lines go from 
 
50 O’Donnell G, “Delegative Democracy?” East-South System Transformations Working Paper, No.21 ( Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1991).  
51 O’Donnell G, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, In The Self-Restraining State, eds Schedler A, 
Diamond I and Platterner M( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 38. 
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bureaucrats through elected representatives and then to citizenry. This is because the 
elected officials are the ones who will sanction the bureaucrats in the end (through 
their supervisory role), whereas the voters must ultimately exert control over their 
representatives during elections. To be sure, bureaucrats should be responsive to 
citizens, but they should be directly accountable to elected representatives. 52
This horizontal accountability mechanism has its discernible strengths. The main 
actors can use legal and empowered powers to subject incumbents to the law or to give 
determinate priority to public interests instead of private ones. They can also use legal 
powers to carry out the eventual sanctions if incumbents conduct wrongdoings or fail 
to perform their duties. For legislatures, the law oversight, budget control, personnel 
nomination and demotion, and decision-making influences are the usual instruments 
for guaranteeing accountability. However, some obvious challenges are apparent for 
achieving accountability by this mechanism, both in structural aspects and in 
contextual parts. According to Arkerman, structural difficulties involve the 
impossibility of monitoring the almost infinite number of government actions (and 
inactions) and the political isolation that results from these agencies’ statutory or 
constitutional independence. Contextual difficulties include the lack of adequate 
funding, limited enforcement capacity, the absence of second order accountability (i.e., 
holding institutions of accountability accountable), and the overall weakness of the rule 
of law needed to enforce agency sanctions. 53  In addition, the motivations of 
authorized organizations are usually weak in pursuing horizontal accountability unless 
external actors (the public, mass media, or society, etc.) put pressure on them.  
 
Societal Accountability      
Traditional understanding of accountability mechanisms has largely ignored societal 
actors. However, accountability practices initiated by societal actors can provide some 
 
52 Harry B, “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries,” 
World Development. Vol.28, No.1 (2000):21-39. 
53 Arkerman J, “Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice,” World Development, Vol.32, No.3 
(2004):447-463. 
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hope for the countries with feeble elections and ineffective horizontal accountability. 
Smulovitz and Peruzzotti’s pioneering study on Latin American societies support this 
point.54 On the one hand, governmental accountability both in the vertical dimension 
via elections and in the horizontal dimensions through power separation is sadly 
lacking there. On the other hand, emerging actors, such as civil society, mass media, 
interest groups, and so on, tend to adopt effective measurements to improve 
government accountability, even though their role is largely neglected in theory. 
Therefore, they develop this mechanism with the intention of adding a new one to the 
classic repertoire of electoral and constitutional institutions for controlling government. 
In their opinion, societal accountability refers to: 
 
A non electoral, yet vertical, mechanism of control that rests on the actions of a multiple array of 
citizens’ associations and movements and on the medias, actions that aim at exposing 
governmental wrongdoing, bringing new issues into the public agenda, or activating the 
operation of horizontal agencies. 55  
 
Following this concept, identifying the chain of accountability, from the civil 
society with less power to the state with more power, is simplified. Specifically, 
societal actors, including the mass media, civil associations, and movements, hold 
bureaucrats and politicians accountable on behalf of public interests. Ombudsmen at a 
horizontal level also play the role in giving voice on behalf of the specific citizens’ 
complaints and activating the operation of horizontal agencies. Thus, we can regard it 
as the actor at both horizontal and vertical levels. Compared with the previous 
mechanisms that emphasized votes and power checks, exposure and voice are powerful 
instruments for this mechanism of promoting bureaucratic and political accountability.  
In Jonathan’s opinion, this mechanism has the strength to encourage oversight 
institutions to act, as well as to target and weaken entrenched opponents of 
accountability. The instruments range from exposing abuses of power, raising 
 
54 Smulovitz G and Peruzzotti E, “Societal accountability in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No.４
(2000): 147–158. 
55 Smulovitz G and Peruzzotti E, “Societal accountability in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No.４
(2000):147–158. 
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standards and public expectations of state performance to bringing political pressure to 
bear. It may also drive the creation of certain institutional checks and balances in the 
first place.56 However, societal exposure and pressure are not sufficient for ultimately 
sanctioning the abuse of power without the support from supervisory authorities. Just 
as O’Donnell observed, the impact of this mechanism largely depends on the extent the 
properly authorized state agencies may undertake in order to investigate and eventually 
sanction the wrongdoings.57 Even so, we still should admit that civil organizations and 
the media have become indispensible actors that contribute to accountability, 
especially in contemporary society.   
 
Co-governance Accountability 
The complex governance practices also call for increasingly more actors to become 
involved in accountability processes. Therefore, some sort of “combined process 
mechanism” to optimize accountability becomes quite necessary, which can be 
described as follows: 
   It is usually in the form of diverse public fora participated by multiple stakeholders, for 
example, the public, mass media, interest groups, professional oversight organs, international 
organizations, legal oversight agents. During the combined process, the “account giving,” 
“questioning,” “justifications,” “judgments” will happen through the co-efforts of multiple 
actors and the influential debates among stakeholders on detailed public issues or public 
policies, which can produce pressure to promote accountability or carry out sanctions for failed 
performance. 58
 
56 Jonathan.F, “Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion”( paper presented at the 
“Institutions, Accountability and Democratic Governance in Latin America” Symposium, University of Notre 
Dame,May8-9,2000).  
57 O’Donnell G, “ Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, In The Self-Restraining State, eds Schedler A, 
Diamond L and Platterner M( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999): 30. 
58 This definition mainly derives from the following literature: Goetz AM and Jenkins R, “Hybrid Forms of 
Accountability:Citizen Engagement in Institutions of Public-sector oversight in India,” Public Management 
Review,Vol.3,No.3(2001):363-383; Robert NC, “Keeping Public Officials Accountable through Dialogue: 
Revolving the Accountability Paradox”, Public Administration Review, Vol.62, No.6(2002):658-669; Arkerman J, 
“Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice,”World Development,Vol.32, No.3 (2004):447-463; 
Wampler B,“Expanding Accountability through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting in 
Three Brazilian Municipalities,” Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.46, No.2 (2004):73-99; Erkkila Tero, 
“Governance And Accountability- A Shift in Conceptualization,” Public Administration Quarterly (2007):1-39. 
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Drawing on Ackerman’s appeal for “Co-governance for accountability” 
(emphasizing social actors’ participation in the core activities of the state),59 we 
probably can call this “combined process mechanism” as “co-governance 
accountability,,” which is characterized as the involvement of multiple stakeholders 
both in vertical dimension and in horizontal dimension. While detailed public issues 
can be initiated or advocated by one kind of actor, its own capabilities are usually 
inadequate to hold bureaucrats and politicians accountable, especially under current 
complicated governance environments. Thus, co-accountability by integrating 
comparative advantages of stakeholders can be used to make up for the above 
shortcoming. 
Public fora probably include the creation of policy-networks, the building of 
dialogue platforms, the promotion of institutional participation and the arrangement of 
public hearing meetings, etc. They are the main instruments for ensuring 
accountability. For instance, institutional dialogues can opened the black box of power 
via the process of “account giving,” “questioning,” and “justifications,” which may 
also provide much information to allow stakeholders to form clear “judgments” and 
possible “sanctions” on the incumbents’ acts, decisions, and performance.  
An apparent strength of this mechanism is the ability to place joint pressures on the 
governor. Another dominant factor is its potential to produce compatible incentives 
among multiple stakeholders. Take participatory institutions, for example; Wampler’s 
comments can further prove its advantages: 
The focus of the accountability debates has been on how one agent (the voters, the courts) can 
control another agent (elected officials, the executive branch). One weakness of such a focus 
is that the conceptual variants—horizontal, vertical, and societal—tend to run on parallel 
tracks, unable to show how citizens, the bureaucrats, politicians, and institutions may place 
interlocking checks on the ambitions of other actors. Participatory institutions, by contrast, 
tap into all three dimensions of the debates. They have the potential to act as a check on the 
prerogatives and actions of administrative officials (horizontal), to allow citizens to vote for 
 
59 Arkerman J, “Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice”, World Development, Vol.32, No.3 
(2004):447-463. 
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representatives and specific polities (vertical), and to rely on the mobilization of citizens into 
political process as a means to legitimate the new policymaking process (societal).60
 
It should be noted that this mechanism also has obvious weakness to carry out 
effective and complete accountability without the support of empowered agencies. The 
latter are still crucial for enforcing final sanctions during these combined and collective 
accountability processes.  
Current practices in seeking budgetary accountability have showed the potential of 
this new mechanism. In Brazilian municipalities, for instance, participatory budgeting 
is regarded as a new institutional arrangement for expanding accountability by 
incorporating stakeholders into budget-decision making process. 61This is not an 
isolated case. In one LPC, China, an invention termed the Participatory budget 
examination through deliberative discussions has been introduced. The unfledged 
Local People’s Congress has successfully pressed governments to change improper 
budgeting proposals by adopting the mechanism of co-governance accountability. 
During the deliberative discussion process, budget departments and government 
leaders first showed their budget account, and then they gave justifications after 
receiving inquiries from the public, representatives, leaders from standing committee 
in Local People’s Congress, experts, and social organizations. In the end, the 
stakeholders’ voice in deliberative discussions and media coverage was used as the 
main basis to refuse improper budget applications or to punish budget programs that 
showed poor performance. 62  
 
60 Wampler.Brian, “Expanding Accountability Through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting 
in Three Brazilian Municipalities,” Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.46, No.2(2004): 73-99 
61  Some literature began to focus on the connection between participatory budgeting inventions and the 
accountability extension in Brazil, which can be seen from representative works: Wampler .Brian, “Expanding 
Accountability Through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting in Three Brazilian 
Municipalities,” Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.46, No.2(2004):73-99;SR.Osmani, “Expanding voice and 
accountability through the budgetary process,” Journal of Human Development and Capabilities,Vol.3,  
No.2( 2002):231-250; Arkerman.J, “Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond Exit and Voice,” World 
Development, Vol.32, No.3 (2004):447-463. 
62 This description comes from the author’s participatory observation on one LPC’s reform experiment in China in 
November, 2009. Some Chinese scholars also began to notice the accountability practices characteristic of multiple 
actors’ participation in the Chinese society, the representative research may see Jun.M, “The Dilemma of 
Developing Financial Accountability without Election—A Study of China’s Recent Budget Reforms,” Australian   
Journal of Public Administration, Vol.68, NoS1(2009):S62-S72; Hsu.S.Philip, “ In search of Public   
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2.3. Explaining Accountability 
   Neither political accountability nor the multiple mechanisms mentioned above can 
operate in a vacuum; they also cannot automatically achieve expected ends due to their 
embeddedness in multiple relationships. Whether they can be effectively exercised and 
whether they are adequate to force bureaucrats and politicians to be accountable to the 
public will inevitably be affected by some crucial factors within complex accountability 
circumstances. One question stands out: what are the key factors that constrain or 
promote the achievement of political accountability?   
To understand the complexities of the analysis on multiple accountability 
relationships, some scholars have opted to split up the effects by analyzing different 
variables. For instance, Vibake constructs three “external” variables (constitutional 
powers, external actors, and social legitimacy) and some principal “internal” variables 
(the committee system, party groups, and the chamber). 63  Others focus on 
accountability in general instead of as separate parts. According to Moncrieffe, the 
conditions for political accountability are constrained by prevailing power relations, 
institutional design, and political culture.64 Hyden criticizes the limitations of solely 
focusing on formal rules and structures, and further highlights the importance of actors 
and embedded settings for accountability institutions.65 In addition, Bovens indicates 
that political accountability can also be regarded as highly associated with the publicity 
of the decision-making process. 66
In spite of the fragmented lists of variables effecting stronger or weaker 
accountability in the above literature, they provide a useful guideline for further 
identification of key causal factors. The variables—institutional factors, power 
 
Accountability: The ‘Wenling Model’ in China,” The Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.68,  
No.S1(2009): S40-S50. 
63 Wang.Vibeke, “The Accountability Function of Parliament in New Democracies: Tanzanian Perspectives,” 
Working paper, in CMI Development Studies and Human Rights, 2005(2). 
64 Moncrieffe MJ, “Reconceptualizing Political Accountability,” International Political Science Review, Vol.19, 
No.4 (1998):387-406. 
65 See Hyden G, “Political accountability in Africa: is the glass half-full or half-empty?” Working paper, 
January,2010, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/APPP/appp-working-paper-6.pdf. 
66 Bovens M, “Public Accountability”, In The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Ferlie E, Lynne L, Pollitt 
C, Eds (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005). 
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structure, perception and political culture held by actors—become more prominent in a 
situation where they both overlap and reinforce each other. This view is also consistent 
with the conviction of “historical institutionalism,” one dynamic typology of the new 
form of institutionalism.  
 
Institutions 
Historical institutionalism defines the institutions as the formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity 
or the political economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order, or the 
standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy, to the conventions governing 
behaviors.67 When it comes to accountability, institutions define the formal norms and 
rules through which accountability relationships are constructed and processed. These 
may involve the Constitutional stipulations, legal regulations, power limitations, 
electoral and recruitment rules, etc., which can empower the main actors with the 
institutional resources and capabilities to constrain the agents’ actions.  
In general, accountability models vary with constitutional and political systems. For 
instance, in parliamentary systems, governments are held accountable to the legislature 
through parliamentary debate, questioning by opposition parties, the voters’ 
retrospective judgments, and ultimately by the threat of a vote of no confidence or 
withdrawal of support in the next election. The governing party or parties and their 
leaders are the ones who should be held accountable. In contrast, in the US presidential 
system, accountability is more diffused because power and responsibility are diffused 
into several institutions. The voters and interest groups often have difficulty in 
determining whom to hold accountable for specific decisions, and the “buck-passing” 
is more serious than with parliamentary systems.68      
 
67 Hall.P.A&Taylor.C.R,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political 
Studies(1996,XLIV):936-957 
68 See Weaver, K.R and Rockman, B.A. (Eds), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United 
States and Abroad (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1992):15-16. 
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The influence of different power stipulations on accountability performance is 
obvious. In this respect, the power to amend the budget can serve as a good example. 
The American Congress plays a strong role in the budget decision-making process, 
mainly due to the American Constitutional provision on larger budget powers 
possessed by the Congress. The Congress has more power to increase or decrease the 
government’s annual budget, which inevitably increases the opportunity to change 
improper budget programs. However, for some countries without budget amendment 
power, the legislatures are usually too feeble to make minor changes on annual budget 
drafts submitted by the government. Under this situation, legislatures are not “strong” 
accountability actors, not to mention being accountable to the public (taxpayers).   
 
Structural factors 
Political accountability cannot be conceived as being determined solely by institutions. 
In practice, it is closely associated with many relationships, ranging from 
intergovernmental relationship to state-society relationship. As Chabal put it, “political 
accountability lies not just in the constitutional and institutional devices which 
formally hold rulers to account for their deeds. It is also part of the wider fabric of 
society in relations between patrons and clients, ethnic leaders and their kin, party 
bosses and party members, bureaucrats and citizens, employers and employees, 
mullahs and believers, as well as military and civilians. Above all else, it is embodied 
and symbolized in the relation between the state and civil society.”69  
The structure of accountability plays an important role in promoting or hindering the 
achievement of “embedded” accountability. Structural factors mainly relate to the 
following variables: the actual power relationship among party, the executive and the 
legislature; the level of party discipline in legislature; the corresponding degree of 
power and accountability inside the legislature; the existence of veto points among 
 
69 Chabal, P(ed), Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). 
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multiple accountability relationships; the institutional access available for the public, 
mass media, interest groups and societal organizations to affect policies. 
 
Actor-based variables   
The countries with more institutional powers and structural opportunities are prone to 
gain better accountability performance. However, these factors at a macro and meso 
level are inadequate to explain the difference in accountability within the same unit, 
not mention the distinction among similar sectors. Consequently, it becomes necessary 
to pay more attention to actor-based variables at the micro level.  
According to historical institutionalism, political life is history- or path-dependent. 
As a consequence, the behaviors of the main actors will also be shaped by factors 
taking place within pre-established patterns of moral and causal beliefs, behavioral 
routines, the incentive structure, and institutional resources.70  For any countries, 
previous ethos or traditional culture will shape the perceptions of actors regarding 
accountability processes and the final achievement of accountability. This is also true 
when it comes to the areas or departments with different ethos, ideas, and culture. 
Therefore, explaining accountability performance individually or organizationally 
should consider these variables, emphasizing the influence of actors’ perceptions, 
cultural preferences, and path dependencies, as well as incentives in new governance 
environments. 
 
Conclusion: A theoretical framework for exploring accountability 
The theoretical framework we have constructed based on current theoretical reviews is 
as follows: 
First, compared with the previous understanding of the accountability concept, 
which was solely linked to power checks, power control, and sanctions for 
 
70 Olsen.Johan P and Peter.B. Guy, Lessons from experience: experiential learning in administrative reforms in 
eight democracies (Oslo : Scandinavian University Press,1996),12. 
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inappropriate abuse of power, the recent evolution of the concept shows how a focus 
on transparency and answerability is crucial to give a full definition of its meaning 
today. That is to say, conceptually, holding government accountable should not only 
include a passive restraint on improper power use, but it must also involve the 
institutional settings of “positive” power operations with a transparent process and with 
rapid public response. Controllability, transparency, and answerability are therefore 
the three critical ingredients in the political accountability concept.  
Second, election accountability is regarded as the traditional and popular mechanism 
for defining the qualities of democracies. Theoretical review reveals that it is neither 
the only mechanism nor a sufficient criterion to ensure “full” accountability. Relying 
on the criteria of different power spaces and prominent actors, new theoretical thinking 
identifies four optional mechanisms for achieving political accountability in terms of 
accountability relationship, accountability instruments, strength, and weakness. These 
are electoral, societal, horizontal, and co-governance accountabilities. Accountability 
can be enhanced by mutual influence among multiple mechanisms as well as by 
diverse actors. Just as O’Donnell said: “the effectiveness of horizontal accountability is 
to a significant extent contingent on the kinds of vertical accountability (including, but 
by no means exclusively, elections) that only polyarchy provides.” Hence, he added, 
“achieving a significant degree of accountability requires the coordination of several 
agencies, each of them subject to divide et impera strategies.”71   
Third, some factors within complex accountability circumstances are particularly 
crucial to the ultimate achievement of “maximum” accountability. Since accountability 
institutions do not function independent of context and politics, ideas rising from “new 
institutionalism” put much stress on institutions, structural factors, and historical 
legacies when trying to explain the potentialities and challenges of political 
accountability in specific countries. 
 
71 O’Donnell G, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, In The Self-Restraining State, eds Schedler A, 
Diamond L and Plattner M( Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 1999), 45. 
  
36 
 
                                             
Fourth, given the above theoretical reviews, both democracies and non-democracies 
could contribute to the whole development of accountability theory and practices in 
their own wisdom. Non-democracies have developed other forms beyond the 
traditional election accountability rooted in democracies. For instance, China has 
chosen a non-election form—co-governance accountability—to hold incumbents 
accountable, especially when it related to budgetary decision processes. 72Another 
example would include the practices in Latin America, which have exhibited the 
potential for societal accountability mechanisms in constructing their own 
accountability system. Citizen actions and demands by an organized civil society play 
a much more prominent role in decision-making venues.73  
Lastly, but not least important, the different countries should be sensitive to local 
contexts instead of blindly transforming theoretical criteria drawn from liberal 
democracy models to their own country. For example, institutions and structures have 
significance when we talk about the factors or variables of affecting accountability. 
However, their impact on developed democracies and developing countries is not 
always uniform due to distinguishing local contexts. Specifically, a check-and-balance 
structure is helpful in calling for accountability in democracies. Yet, in China, with its 
one authoritarian society and one party, it is more challenging to achieve accountability 
if accountability actors try to form check-and-check relationships with the same level 
of Communist Party committee and government. Conversely, actors probably can 
promote the achievement of accountability by adopting cooperative and embedded 
strategies within power structure. Distinguishing local contexts perhaps can open up 
avenues for further research on the issues of accountability. 
 
72 This is mainly concluded from the author’s interviews and participatory observation on the accountability 
practices in several Chinese Local governments. See also Jun Ma, “The Dilemma of Developing Financial 
Accountability without Election—A Study of China’s Recent Budget Reforms”, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol.68, NoS1(2009):S62-S72; Hsu .S.Philip, “ In search of Public Accountability: The ‘Wenling 
Model’ in China,” Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.68, No.S1(2009): S40-S50. 
73 Some Latin American scholars began to induce new accountability mechanisms based on their own practices 
rather than just abide by the traditional election mechanism embedded in western democracies. Related literature 
can be seen from: Wampler.B,“Expanding Accountability through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and 
Budgeting in Three Brazilian Municipalities,” Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.46, No.2(2004):73-99; 
Smulovitz G and Peruzzotti E, “Societal accountability in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy,Vol. 11, No.4 
(2000): 147–158. 
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In short, political accountability is certainly a challenging and complex issue, not 
only for liberal democracies but also for the newly emerging democracies, as well as 
for authoritarian countries. If we want to improve our understanding of this concept, 
both theoretical criteria derived from multiple countries and local contexts embedded 
by accountability should be taken into serious account. Otherwise, accountability 
issues will not be properly addressed and solved.  
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3．Methodological design        
Since 1978, China has been taking on a new face in economic reform and opening up. 
However, a strong path dependence on traditional Confucian ideas of harmony and 
hierarchy is still evident in the political arena. Most government officials and 
politicians remain cautious about interviews and surveys that touch on politics. Three 
reasons probably lead to the popular unwillingness for openness in these areas: (1) 
Traditional political culture, such as “Less to say equals fewer mistakes and fewer 
unnecessary troubles,,” is a deeply rooted mindset due to limited tolerance of political 
criticisms in traditional Chinese society; (2) Both government officials and politicians 
are afraid that the openness on their truthful political opinions will bring unexpected 
political risks, since they face huge political pressure once their opinions are 
distortedly reported by media or widely criticized by netizens; and (3) When it touches 
on political issues, identifying the true purpose of interviews and surveys becomes 
difficult, especially for those having relevance with western democracies in terms of 
backgrounds and funds. In fact, this has been realized by several Western scholars 
doing fieldwork in China—as a foreign scholar, one has to observe certain limitations 
both in the selection of fieldwork and in the openness and the willingness of public 
officials and CCP members interviewed.74  
As a Chinese person familiar with Chinese culture and informal politics, I have 
some advantages and strategies for coping with these challenges and difficulties, 
especially those mentioned by Western scholars endeavoring to carry out fieldwork in 
China. Of course, it is worth noting that obstacles are unavoidable under any 
authoritarian political background dominated by a single communist party. Given the 
 
74 See Oscar Almén’s discussion of interview limitations in his 65 interviews with Chinese where he was very aware 
of the challenges to contact and talk with Chinese officials. At the same time he mentioned he had to be very careful 
to address sensitive issues relating to the role of local people’s congresses as a foreigner: “Authoritarianism 
Constrained. The role of Local people’s Congresses in China” (PhD.diss, University of Gøteborg, 2005): 11-14.  
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relevance between methodology adopted and research results, in this chapter, issues 
related to methodological strategies, the sources of data, validity and reliability, and 
limitations experienced by myself during the entire fieldwork process are presented. In 
all likelihood, this can also provide the necessary impressions for those who will 
engage in similar research in China.  
With regard to the arrangement of this chapter, firstly, I discuss the choice of case 
study strategy to explore political accountability issues in a Chinese context. At the 
same time, the choices and sketches of four cases used in the whole thesis will be 
described. Secondly, strategies to cope with the challenges of fieldwork are discussed. 
Thirdly, the main sources of data are presented. Finally, the chapter ends with the 
emphasis on the limitations of my fieldwork and data collection.  
 
3.1. Case study  
The choice of case study method  
Case study is a suitable method for digging out the essence of political accountability 
issues under present-day Chinese conditions, for three main reasons:  
First, a long distance exists between formal documents and actual operation in the 
Chinese context, not to mention real perceptions and opinions held by the main actors. 
Therefore, although documents published and propagandized by local authorities 
provide possibilities to get a sense of formal rules, touching on actual contexts is more 
difficult without in-depth investigations. 
Second, given the heritage for sensitivity and low openness in Chinese politics, 
conducting quantitative research on political issues in China is inevitably constrained 
by occult data, opaque politics, uncontrolled variables, political unwillingness, and so 
on. The in-depth information that this study needed—for instance, the information on 
main actors’ perceptions, election experience, accountability stories, and political 
context—cannot be met solely by relying on this method. 
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Third, case study as one qualitative method has the potential to give in-depth 
responses to key questions in this work in terms of how the accountability function of 
Chinese LPCs is on the move and why.75 In the words of Creswell, a case study can 
provide an exploration of a bounded system or a case (or multiple cases) over time 
through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information 
that are rich in context.76 It is plausible to probe into fieldwork cases after adopting 
some strategies in a Chinese setting. 
In addition, it is worth noting that embedded cases in particular situations within 
each case are useful in responding to key questions and to show the differences across 
LPCs. 
 
Unit of analysis 
Except for National People’s Congress at the central level, bodies at local levels have 
multiple names, but they are all usually designated as: Provincial level people’s 
congresses, Municipality people’s congresses, people’s congress in district-level cities, 
County-level people’s congresses, and Township People’s Congresses, depending on 
the different administration levels.  
The unit of analysis in this study is the Chinese local people’s congresses (LPCs), 
both at county-level (counties, cities and district) and district-level administrative units. 
Focusing on LPCs at these levels is mainly based on the following considerations: 
On the one hand, the last few years have seen substantial change in the local 
legislatures due to a series of institutional reforms and certain degree of autonomy. 
Within the framework of the Constitution and related specific laws, much room is 
wielded for individual interpretations and autonomy to adapt to local needs. Thus, the 
 
75 According to the study of Yin, case studies concentrate on answering “how” and “why” questions. For the further 
discussion on the choice of case study and the type of research questions, see Yin. Robert K, Case study research: 
design and methods (3rd) (Sage Publications. Inc, 2002),14-25. 
76 Creswell J W. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 1998),61. 
  
41 
 
                                             
local legislatures are relatively vigorous in practice when compared to the National 
legislature.  
On the other hand, the local people’s congress at the county and district levels, as the 
middle layers in China’s four local administrative units (province, district-level cities, 
county and township), are the vital nexuses of institutional reforms and gathering 
nodes of social contradictions upwards and downwards. Their development can first 
and foremost indicate the changes in Chinese governance processes due to closer 
connection with the public and other multiple actors, vertically and horizontally. Local 
people’s congresses at these levels, in contrast to provincial-level legislatures that are 
well equipped with power authority and township legislatures that are less well 
equipped with bureaucratic agencies and personnel to carry out legal roles, are 
relatively appropriate for this study.  
 
The sketch of four LPC cases in my work 
While united political systems that are regulated by the Constitution and laws exist 
without regional borders in China, the factor of geographic diversity is considered in 
the selection of local people’s congress cases for district-level and county-level cities. 
This is partly due to the argument that performance differences exist between LPCs in 
economically prosperous areas compared to less developed areas.77 To challenge the 
conventional wisdom that coastal LPCs with more wealth are more active than those in 
poorer inland areas,78 I chose cases in developed areas with relatively poor economic 
development and cases in less developed areas with better economic development 
levels. At the same time, other factors such as establishment time of LPCs, the level of 
economic development, and democratic atmosphere were also involved in the selection 
process. Based on these considerations, four different cases having a great spread and 
 
77 Related discussions can refer to the literature: Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China:      
Development and Transition (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 14-15; Oscar Almen, “Autoritarianis 
Constrained: The Role of Local People’s Congresses in China” (PhD diss., Goteborg University, 2005), 8-9. 
78 Cho has a deeper discussion on this point. Please see Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: 
Development and Transition (Cambridge University Press,2009),14-15. 
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diversity of empirical experiences were selected (see the map in figure 3.1). To avoid 
violating the anonymity principle, as promised to the interview units, LPCs in my 
fieldwork are designated as different capital letters. I will abbreviate the overview of 
LPC cases as follows:  
    
 
a) W people’s congress, one county-level city People’s Congress in Zhejiang province. 
It has a population around 1.5 million and its average per capita GDP was about 
$6000 in 2010.  
b) M people’s congress, one county-level district People’s Congress in Shanghai. It 
has a population of about 2 million populations and around a $8000 per capita GDP 
in 2010. 
c) B people’s congress, one county-level district People’s Congress in Anhui province. 
It has a population of about 1 million populations and about a $6000 per capita GDP 
in 2010.  
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d) J people’s congress, one district-level city People’s Congress in Henan province. It 
has a population about 3 million and its average per capita GDP was below $5000 in 
2010. 
Among these cases, the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress are 
regionally located in coastal areas in the relatively prosperous areas of China. The B 
people’s congress and the J people’s congress belong to middle regions where 
economic conditions are usually poor but not at the very lowest economic strata in 
China. Economic development in W city and M district ranks just at the middle level 
compared to cities at the same level within prosperous Zhejiang province and Shanghai. 
The selection criteria for case B were precisely the opposite: it belongs to a rich district 
within Anhui province—one of the relatively poor provinces in China. This can be seen 
from the per capita GDP statistics for 2010; B area in the relatively poor region seems 
somewhat wealthier than W city in the prosperous areas.  
  When it comes to the history of these LPCs, the W people’s congress and the J 
people’s congress have a long history since their establishment. In contrast, the M 
people’s congress began to rise at the beginning of 1990, while the B people’s congress 
was established in 2002 with a new administrative division and is the youngest among 
the four. However with regard to LPC reforms, the W people’s congress in Zhejiang 
province and the M people’s congress in Shanghai have attracted wider attention from 
mass media and scholars. 
 
3.2 Fieldwork  
Given the high relevance between the settlement of these problems and the 
effectiveness of subsequent data collection, I examined several major issues 
encountered by myself during the process of fieldwork in this part.  
Access to fieldwork  
The main part of my fieldwork research was conducted in four LPCs located in four 
different provinces in China from March 2009 to January 2010. The distance between 
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any two of these is at least six hours by high-speed train. I had been shuttled among 
them for the whole period while seeking chances to collect data. The process was not a 
smooth one.  
Firstly, key contacts within the research field are necessary through private 
relationships before planned investigations. My access to the M people’s congress and 
the B people’s congress relied on this strategy: my PhD supervisor in China introduced 
me to one leader of the CCP committee in the M district to help me after I failed to 
contact authorities by introducing myself; this provided further access for me to the M 
people’s congress. The access to the B people’s congress was carried out under the 
help of one of my Chinese PhD classmates, who had worked for a CCP committee 
department for many years in Anhui province and had more work contacts with lower 
level administrative units (the B district belongs to one of their lower level units). Even 
so, unexpected difficulties to approach the planned interviewees still existed. For 
example, my experience in M district in Shanghai, the leader recommended by my 
Chinese supervisor agreed to make appointments with persons on my interview list and 
told me to await his response in March, 2009. I got the first chance to interview one 
commission director to the standing committee in M people’s congress after waiting 
for three weeks, but I failed to carry out my planned structural interviews due to the 
interviewee’s political sensitivity to some questions. At the same time, I was told that it 
was very difficult to make further appointments with leaders and members of standing 
committee in the M people’s congress due to their unwillingness to be interviewed by 
an outsider.  
  Secondly, the strategy of “transforming outsider into insider” seems useful to 
approach the targets. My initial challenge encountered in the M district confirmed that 
Chinese officials affected by traditionally closed culture continue to keep certain 
degree of vigilance when confronted by strangers, in order to avoid unnecessary 
trouble. This kind of culture becomes especially noticeable when it comes to certain 
sensitive topics or issues from their perspectives. To cope with this challenge, I was 
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recommended to enter the M people’s congress as an intern with a formal letter of 
introduction from my Chinese supervisor and the CCP leader in the M district. This 
allowed me the chance to continue my fieldwork there.   
  Thirdly, “making use of formal work contacts to gain trust and chances” is also 
workable. Before I entered into the W people’s congress in Zhejiang province, I was 
concerned about my lack of private relationships and key contacts there. Fortunately, I 
was granted permission to go with one commission to the standing committee in the M 
people’s congress when they went to the W people’s congress to exchange reform 
experiences on budget accountability during my internship. I made use of my 
professional advantage to give some statements on budget accountability in developed 
countries during the meeting, which gained me the chance to establish preliminary 
contact with the W people’s congress. Later, I asked one of my master’s teachers to 
formally introduce me after I learned at an academic meeting of his status as a reform 
consultant in W city. These two chances provided me with the possibilities to contact 
some members of the standing committee in the W people’s congress. The snowball 
method was then used to find more informants to answer my research questions. Some 
of these persons introduced me to the deputies at my request while others refused my 
request.  
Fourthly, other informal contacts are also useful. The access to the J people’s 
congress in Henan province was easier than access to the other three: on the one hand, 
my previous internship and fieldwork experience in the J city Finance department in 
2006 had laid a solid foundation of relationship. Due to the close connection between 
the Finance department and the People’s congress in terms of public budget issues, I 
was already familiar with some of the leaders and members of the standing committee 
in the M people’s congress at that time. On the other hand, J city is near to my 
hometown and my familiarity with local dialects and customs provided possibilities to 
alleviate the sensitivity of members of the J people’s congress.  
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Gaining trust 
The access to fieldwork is just the first step in carrying out fieldwork. Trust from 
fieldwork units and informants within them have a close bearing on the further 
collection of valid and reliable data. My main approaches to cope with mistrust in 
political scenes can be listed as follows: 
First, “one must learn to give sincerely in advance if you want to take something 
from others..” This challenge was encountered in the first interview with one official in 
the M people’s congress and it impressed me, especially his emotionally words—“no 
benefit and even harm or trouble will befall me if I tell you my true feelings, which are 
favorable to your research..” Inspired by his words, I did not dare to start any formal 
interviews before establishing a trusting relationship with them. Instead, I first tried to 
communicate with them sincerely. For instance, I set my main task as reading some 
archival material, chatting with different people, and providing necessary help for 
those in need in the prior several weeks during my internship in the M people’s 
congress. I always opened my office door to welcome anyone who wanted to talk with 
me. Some leaders dropped by my office for a number of reasons, such as curiosity 
about my experiences, interest in how to apply successfully to universities abroad, and 
experience sharing about legislature reforms abroad. Several staff who were pursuing 
graduate degrees used to visit me to ask questions about writing their master’s theses. 
Having lunch with the leaders and staff in the office of the standing committee every 
day, participating in recreational activities with them after work, helping some of them 
revise their master’s theses, holding some courses for their children, and accompanying 
them to speak English were main activities in the preliminary phase of my internship. 
Soon, some leaders and members of the standing committee began to talk to me about 
my research on their own initiative because I was different from other greedy young 
people, from their perspective. I was also regarded by them as a friend rather than my 
original nickname—“spy.” 
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Second, showing an appropriate status description to informants to alleviate mistrust 
was critical at the self-introduction phase. I found one contrasting attitude held by 
Chinese officials and politicians towards foreign or persons who have an abroad 
background during my fieldwork: on the one hand, some persons expressed their 
appreciation or curiosity towards foreigners or persons who have an abroad 
background. On the other hand, a strong sense of suspicion was prominently held by 
others. Against this context, adapting to different informants who held distinctive 
opinions was necessary. I had been suspected and questioned many times due to my 
status as a PhD student abroad. Except for the nickname of “spy” in the M people’s 
congress, my PhD classmate, who was in charge of contacting with the B people’s 
congress for me, kindly reminded me that it was not worthwhile doing fieldwork on 
Chinese LPCs under financial support of foreign institutions, because it would be at the 
cost of sacrificing my future in China. One vice chairman of a standing committee and 
one congress deputy in the B people’s congress asked me if I obtained foreign 
donations to conduct this research when I introduced myself as a Ph.D. student from 
Bergen University. Given a similar political recognition within one region, I learned to 
introduce myself as a lecturer focusing on the issue of China’s LPCs in a university in 
Shanghai in the B district (I had a formal job offer from a university in Shanghai at that 
time), which was useful in alleviating their suspicions due to the higher social value 
extended to university teachers.  
Additionally, gaining trust is possible by being courteous. One of my techniques was 
to send small but unique gifts to informants. These types of gifts are usually esteemed 
as a form of emotional expression to show respect and, in the Chinese context, they 
characterize a long tradition of courteous civilization, which sometimes would make 
people who were unwilling to answer questions change their attitudes. Some people 
were also glad to introduce other colleagues to me due to the respect they felt during 
the contact process. Another technique was to be a good listener. Interruption with 
direct intention usually injured the feelings of informants and the process of smooth 
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investigation. Of course, conducting guides were strategically applied when the 
informants were off topic.  
 
3.3 Data collection 
Data come from numerous sources, and with each of these sources come assets as well 
as certain weaknesses or liabilities. To enhance the general validity and reliability of 
this research study, the data were a combination of interviews with main actors, 
questionnaires to congress deputies and constituents, observation, a fieldwork diary, 
archival records, documents, internet information, media reports, and scholarly 
sources.  
Interviews 
The interview is a very important data source in the writing of my thesis. During 
2009 and 2010, I conducted 83 interviews with leaders and members of standing 
committees, ordinary congress deputies, people’s congress staff, government officials 
and staff, and researchers. Except for a few researchers and government staff, most of 
the interviewees came from four LPCs regionally across Shanghai, Zhejiang province, 
Anhui province, and Henan province. To avoid unnecessary interruptions, more than 
90% interviews were carried out with only the interviewee and myself in interviewee’s 
office. However, for interviewees who shared an office with others, group interviews 
were conducted. I was requested by most interviewees to keep their names and regions 
anonymous, so the list of interviews in the appendix of this thesis presents only general 
information.  
The design of the interview questions is guided by a theoretical framework of 
vertical and horizontal accountability, to explore and assess the accountability role of 
the local people’s congress under the current Chinese governance process. The 
overriding aim is to observe to what extent LPCs have made improvements in 
performing their accountability function, how, and why. The focus was placed mainly 
in two areas: First, how the electoral institution transforms candidates into congress 
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deputies and how elected deputies show their accountability vertically to constituents; 
and secondly, how congress deputies as an institution and individual deputies hold the 
authorities accountable in terms of horizontal supervision and budget decision-making 
The accountability performance of LPCs was generally assessed in terms of 
controllability, transparency, and answerability. The differences in accountability 
performance would be expected to be explained by institutional, power structure 
variables, and actor-based variables mentioned earlier in the theoretical chapter 
(Chapter 2).  
The semi-structured questions focused on the perceptions of interviewees toward the 
main questions. Deputies were encouraged to elaborate about their elected experience, 
stories connecting with constituents after elected, successful or failed influence on the 
authorities during the process of holding them accountable, and roles played in 
budgeting accountability, as well as main variables that affected accountability 
performance. Compared to ordinary deputies, the leaders and members of the standing 
committee were good at demonstrating their experience with power games among 
CCP, government, and LPC behind institutional innovations and reforms as well as in 
personnel appointments. Thus, specific focus was given to these topics during the 
interviews. For government officials and staff, and the researchers interviewed, the 
focus was placed on their perceptions of LPCs accountability performance and driving 
forces.    
Most interviews took about one and a half hours. Several interviews extended to 
three hours or concluded in about forty minutes. Although Oscar argues that, in his 
case, the informants were sometimes even reluctant to allow him to take notes, a 
tape-recorder would certainly have been out of the question, 79 for me, a tape-recorder 
was allowed in where strong trust had been established, but not at all LPCs. However, 
note taking was typically acceptable throughout the whole interview process across all 
 
79 Oscar Almen, Autoritarianism Constrained: The Role of Local People’s Congresses in China（PhD dissertation, 
Goteborg University, 2005）,13. 
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my fieldtrips. All interviews were immediately transcribed by me at their conclusion. 
The language used was Mandarin Chinese and local dialects to keep it authentic. 
Finally, the interviews were categorized according to distinctive aspects of 
accountability.    
The effectiveness of interviews is evident when noting that the interview results 
were able to cover the most essential questions in my design, while some sensitive but 
critical issues had to be discarded as they were avoided by the interviewees.  
 
Questionnaires 
To reduce subjective judgments in the analysis of interview materials, one 
questionnaire was conducted on congress deputies in the M people’s congress in July 
2009. I designed it to grasp deputies’ perception on the performance of accountability 
in terms of contacting with constituents, pressing the authorities to respond to 
constituents’ voices, budget accountability, personal appointment and removal, 
influential strategies, incentives, and obstacles faced by LPCs as an institution. 
However, it was sent in the name of a financial economics working commission to the 
standing committee rather than through me, in order to avoid deputies’ sensitivity 
about a stranger. Excluding those interviewed, 220 questionnaires were sent as letters 
to the resting deputies and 106 responses were received. The response rate was 48%. 
The females in the final result accounted for 38.7%. Due to the characteristics of an 
amateur for most congress deputies in China, the sketch of 106 deputies’ professions 
could be seen from the following table. Related analysis results for these data were 
used in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
Table 3.1 Deputies’ professional structure in the 2009 questionnaire conducted in the M people’s 
congress 
Profession Civil service 
Staff in 
public 
institution 
Cadres in 
village or 
resident 
committee
Enterprise 
staff 
Business 
managers
Retired 
staff Others Total 
Frequency 27 23 38 2 35 13 1 139 
Percentage(%) 19.42 16.55 27.34 1.44 25.18 9.35 0.72 100 
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Source: the questionnaire conducted by the author in 2009 in M people’s congress.  
 
With regard to the accountability relationship between congress deputies and 
constituents, another survey was co-conducted in June 2010 with one commission to 
the standing committee in M people’s congress. That commission intended to measure 
the performance of “deputy-constituent contact institution” since its initial 
implementation in 2008. By taking advantage of this chance, I added my questions in 
terms of deputy-constituent accountability relationships to the questionnaire. They 
ultimately shared their response data with me. Specifically, 139 congress deputies and 
256 constituents participated in the survey. Their professional information is presented 
in Table 3.2 below. The discussion on the link in accountability between congress 
deputies and constituents in the M people’s congress in Chapter 6 relies strongly on 
these data.  
Table 3.2 Congress deputies’ professional structure in the 2010 questionnaire conducted in the M 
people’s congress 
Profession Civil service 
Staff in 
public 
institution 
Cadres in 
village or 
resident 
committee
Enterprise
staff 
Business 
managers
Retired 
staff 
Others Total 
Frequency 27 23 38 2 35 13 1 139 
Percentage
（%） 19.42 16.55 27.34 1.44 25.18 9.35 0.72 100.00 
  Source: the questionnaire jointly conducted by one commission to the standing committee in M 
people’s congress and the author in 2010 
 
Table3.3 Constituents’ professional structure in the 2010 questionnaire conducted in the M people’s 
congress 
 
Profe
ssion 
 
 
Stude
nt 
Wor
kman 
Individ
ual 
busines
ses 
Private 
entre-
preneu
rs 
State
-own
erma
nage
rs 
Colle
ctive-
owne
rman
agers
Civil 
servants 
and Staff 
in public 
institutio
ns 
Peasa
nt 
Freelan
ce and 
jobless 
 
Retired
People  
Total 
Frequ
ency 2 44 2 2 11 7 25 12 6 
144 255  1
Perce
ntage
（%） 
0.8 17.2 0.8 0.8 4.3 2.7 9.8 4.7 2.4 
 
56.25 
99.6  
0.4 
Valid-
Missin
g 
Source: the questionnaire jointly conducted by one commission to the standing committee in M 
people’s congress and the author in 2010 
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Participant-observation data 
I was fortunate to obtain an internship inside the M people’s congress for several 
months and could thus collect participant-observation data on key events that happened 
for different accountability aspects. I spent one month on average at the other three 
LPCs to seek interview chances, which also provided possibilities to observe 
institutional innovations in LPCs, the behaviors, perceptions, and performance of 
congress deputies toward accountability issues. I was also able to collect important 
data on the political influence of congress deputies, on individual motivation, on how 
reforms and interaction among LPCs, governments, and CCP that occurred while 
attending meetings and during multiple investigations. For instance, participation at 
public budget hearing meetings, participatory budget considerations, standing 
committee meetings every two months and special investigations toward governmental 
branches as well as courts provided clear snapshots on the issues of accountability. 
These data were used to complement and verify the data obtained from individual 
interviews.  
 
Fieldwork diary 
Interviews were not carried out every day, as these heavily depending on the 
arrangement of work and meetings with the interviewees. I also talked with people 
informally or randomly took part in their supervising activities when no interview 
appointments were scheduled. I wrote my observations down in fieldwork diaries 
every day, and these diaries were used heavily to pin down scattered information and 
genuine impressions during the fieldwork period. They also served to control many of 
my observations. 
 
Other sources 
Archival data on the background of individual congress deputies were collected 
systematically from three main sources for the four LPCs: internet information on 
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congress name lists, working reports related to congress deputies’ activities, and secret 
data on deputies’ social background, education level, job experience, party status, and 
contact with the office regarding the personnel appointments, removals, and 
representative commissions to standing committees. This information was useful for 
analysis of the relevance among individual’s perception, performance, and concrete 
background.  
In addition, unique file data were collected from 2008 to 2010 regarding institutional 
contact between 255 elected deputies and constituents from the M people’s congress. 
The file provided tracking information about the elected deputies’ focus on 
constituents’ affairs and their influence on the authorities in solving constituents’ 
issues. Their performance during this period was assessed and these file data were 
mainly used in chapter 5 to assess congress deputies’ accountability to constituents in 
the M people’s congress. Another unique data set on chairmen’s internal meetings 
within the M people’s congress was allowed to be copied due to the familiar trust 
relationship I had established, and these data provided critical information on LPC 
decisions and internal power structure.     
I had also access to the official websites of LPCs, research websites relating to LPCs 
institutions, media reports, documents, annual working reports, and literature. These 
multiple sources of data made it possible to emphasize the actual development of 
LPCs’ accountability function at both the individual and the organizational levels.   
 
3.4 Limitations 
Although unique data were collected from LPCs via private contacts and use of 
plausible strategies, two limitations should be pointed out that affected my data 
collection: 
 On the one hand, the collected data collected were uneven across four fieldtrips, 
which probably led to the difficulty to generalize the fieldwork observations. For 
instance, similar survey research was refused in three LPCs even though sending of 
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questionnaires to deputies and constituents in the M people’s congress was acceptable, 
since I had stayed for more than four months as an intern. Similarly, while I was 
allowed to handle the information on petition letters, budget accountability, and 
electoral materials for both in the M people’s congress and the W people’s congress, it 
was difficult to get corresponding data for the other two people’s congresses. 
Therefore, I had to make use of multiple data to make up for this deficiency.  
 On the other hand, the anonymity principle and official reviews of the planned 
questionnaire inevitably affected the control of validity and variables. My case is not a 
singular case. Some foreign scholars, for instance Oscar and Manion, also encountered 
similar problems. In the words of Manion, interviews, however skillfully and cleverly 
designed, must practically always be conducted with Chinese in localities that are not 
selected according to any principle of random selection but chosen partly for 
convenience and always subject to the approval of the Communist authorities.80  
However, it is worth noting that cooperation with official organizations also seems 
necessary to carry out a certain scale of surveys or to obtain useful data under the 
current Chinese context, especially when it comes to political issues relating to power 
relationships among the CCP, the government, and the people’s congress at the same 
level.  
 
 
80 See Oscar Almén, Authoritarianism Constrained. The role of Local people’s Congresses in China (PhD,diss., 
Gøteborg University,2005), 9-14; Manion Melanie, “Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: 
Learning from Local Samples,” The China Quarterly, No.139(1994):741-765, P 741. 
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4．Institutional structure and political context for LPCs   
With the intention to understand the accountability functions of Chinese local people’s 
congress within a one party regime, this chapter endeavors to provide some 
background information about Chinese politics before entering into the subsequent 
empirical chapters. Therefore, the institutional evolution that contributes to the current 
profile and operational rules of LPCs will be introduced, followed by the institutional 
structure and political context of LPCs.  
 
4.1 Institutional evolution of LPCs in China 
The institutional evolution of the Chinese local people’s congress underwent three 
distinctive development stages: initial establishment in 1954, a stagnation period 
(1966-1978), and a gradually institutionalized stage since 1979. 
 
4.1.1 Initial establishment in 1954 
Most legislatures in liberal democracies arise from intense conflicts of interest and 
strong public demands, but this was not the case in China. Instead, enhancing political 
legitimacy and expanding political mobilization were the main dynamics that promoted 
the initial formation of Chinese people’s congresses in 1954. Specifically, this event in 
1954 can be considered to represent a combined product of soviet experimentation and 
the political situation at that time.  
On the one hand, representative organs adopted by China germinated in the Soviet 
model. Since the first day of establishment of the Chinese communist party, it was 
prepared to follow the road of the Soviet as one country under the leadership of 
communists, based on Leninist discipline that highlighted strict adherence to the 
dictates and norms of the Party organization. When it comes to the arrangement of 
political system, the Chinese Communists also regarded Soviets as their example. For 
instance, as early as 1931, they borrowed a system of administration headed by the 
Congress of Soviets from the 1924 Soviet constitution, with regional and local soviets 
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below it, indirect election of higher congresses, exclusion of the bourgeoisie from 
elections, and representation ratios weighted against peasants. Although the congress 
was empowered to discuss and decide on laws and future development plans, in 
practice, it usually failed to exercise supreme power and formally subordinated 
administrative bodies made policy. 81  
On the other hand, Mao Zedong formed new ideas regarding China’s congress 
institution after winning the leadership position of the CCP in 1935; his intention was 
to broaden the revolution’s popular base and build support for Communist rule. That 
is, a system of popularly elected people’s congresses, from township to nation, could 
lay a foundation for a New Democracy and universal suffrage would ensure proper 
representation for each revolutionary class according to its status in the state.82 In this 
sense, the Chinese people’s congresses became an important arena for mobilizing all 
classes and for collaboration with non-Communist forces in the revolutionary period, 
including progressive non-Communists, political parties, social groups, petty 
bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, and so on. 
Until the founding of new China in 1949, Mao’s ideas mentioned above still had an 
obvious impact on the design of the people’s congress system. The precursor of 
people’s congresses—Representative conferences of the people of all circles—is a 
good example. According to the stipulates of “The Common Program of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference(CPPCC)” passed on 29 September 1949, 
the Representative Conference of the people of all circles was charged with the 
authority of people’s congresses as a transitional form, before establishing a universal 
suffrage-based political institution. The Representative Conference of the people of all 
circles was convened by the government. On the basis of a recommended election, this 
representative conference was largely organized by the principle of professional 
 
81 O’Brien KJ, Reform Without Liberation: China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics of Institutional 
Change (Cambridge University Press,1990), 20-21. 
82 Mao Zedong, On New Democray, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol.2 ( Peking:Foreign Languages Press: 
1975): 352, Cited from O’Brien KJ, Reform Without Liberation: China’s National People’s Congress and the 
Politics of Institutional Change (Cambridge University Press ,1990), 22. 
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sectors, mainly involving workers, farmers, soldiers, students, business, education, 
women, patriotic personages, and culture sectors. It should be noted that the generation 
of conference representatives was very cautiously carried out at that time under the 
sponsorship of the CCP and government: the representatives could be generated 
through democratic election meetings where local mass organizations existed and the 
government had the capability to control the situation; for those places that having no 
mass organizations and capable government, the representatives were usually selected 
by ways of nomination, quotas, recommendation, and invitation. 83
Further legalization of Communist rule was obtained by the representatives of CCP, 
who had asked for Soviet Union’s guidance in establishing a system of popular 
assemblies in 1952. Stalin’s response revealed the urgency for setting up a Chinese 
people’s congress under this kind of international circumstance: “If you do not enact 
the Constitution, do not introduce election, the enemy can fight against you by 
publicizing to the workers and peasants in two ways: first, your government is not 
elected by the people; second, there is no Constitution in your country. They can say 
your government is based on the bayonet and is self-proclaimed because of the 
unelected characteristic of Chinese People’s Political Consultation Council (CPPCC). 
In addition, the common program is proposed just by one party rather than being 
passed by an elected people’s congress. It may also say that there is no law in your 
country.” 84
Against this background, Chinese people’s congresses both at national level and at 
local levels were initially established with the passage of the Election Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the National People’s Congress and Local People’s 
Congresses in 1953 and the Constitution in 1954. An initial outline of Chinese people's 
congresses can be identified as follows: 
 
83 The W County-level City People’s Congress Annals( Beijing: Zhong Hua Book Company,2000),76. 
84 Liu Shaoqi, “The telegram on the talks with Stalin to Mao and the Central ,” Liu Shaoqi’s Presentation Since the 
Founding of Chinese State（1952.1-1952.12）(Beijing: Zhongyang Literature Publisher, 2005),533-535. 
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1) Due to close relationships with the People, People’s congresses have the highest 
authority among state organs. As Article 2 in 1954 Constitution stipulates, “All 
power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through 
which the people exercise state power are the National People’s Congress and local 
people’s congresses at different levels.”  
2) The system of combination of legislative and executive powers was adopted at 
local levels: The standing committee was the permanent body of the National 
people’s congress plenary meeting during the intersession. However, the local level 
did not copy the system of the National people’s congress. It was the People’s 
committee of government that held the authority and acted as the executive body of 
local people’s congresses at the same level during the intersession.85 According to 
the speech of Liu Shaoqi—the vice president of central government at that time—if 
it set up a permanent body within the local people’s congresses under that 
condition, it would inevitably cause an overlapping of local organizations and 
related inconvenience.86  
3) The People’s congress was held at least once annually. Congress deputies in the 
town peoples’ congress were elected directly by the voters for two year terms; 
congress deputies in each people’s congress at or above the county were indirectly 
elected by the people’s congress of the level below, for two-four years (the 
county-level term was two years). Most congress deputies were part-time 
amateurs, who left their regular jobs for a few days when congress plenary 
meetings were held. 
4) The most salient operation principle was dual democratic centralism: for one thing, 
the National People’s Congress, local people’s congresses at different levels and 
other state organs applied the principle of democratic centralism, demanding the 
 
85 People’s committee was the name of Chinese local government at all levels during 1954-1966, which was the 
executive body of local people’s congresses at that time.  
86 Literature Compilation of People’s Congresses in the People’s Republic of China(1949-1990) (Beijing: China 
Democracy & Rule of Law Publishing House ,1991),85. 
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subordination of lower congresses to the higher congresses; for another, people’s 
congresses as state power organs had to obey the CCP’s leadership, which 
implemented the principle of democratic centralism.   
 
4.1.2 Stagnation period during 1957-1978 
In practice, the defects in the local people’s congress institution designed in 1954 were 
quickly exposed. Specifically, these were: 1) The 1954 Chinese Constitution and the 
Rules of local governance were written in a language that could indicate a broad 
framework of accountability and “democratic centralism,” but the basic ideological 
principles ruled the control of the system in a different way. For instance, a more 
centralized and less democratic emphasis reduced the autonomy of the LPCs in the 
system operation, subjecting them to the CCP and higher people’s congresses most of 
the time; 2）The institutional design where the government held the executive authority 
for the LPCs during the intersession impeded the implementation of the LPCs’ 
oversight of government. Although, legally, the local people’s congress should be 
convened by government for regular meetings, the actual operation was not that case. 
Most of the time, the government was willing to decide the issues by itself rather than 
solve problems through convening people’s congresses; sometimes the government 
was too busy to convene congress meetings. Under the circumstances, neither statutory 
powers nor functions of people’s congresses could be effectively exercised or fully 
displayed,87 not to mention holding accountability to the voters.  
These defects exposed in practice triggered discussions about further improving the 
LPC system. A major focus of the reformists had been to establish standing 
committees inside the LPCs, to strengthen the supervision of government and to 
enhance the link between congress deputies and the voters. Specifically, two important 
propositions should be mentioned.  
 
87 Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renmin daibiao dahui zhidu (The Institution of the Chinese People’s Congress) (the 
fourth edition) (Law Press,2003), 232. 
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One happened on 1957. Following the proposal of “expanding people’s democracy 
and improving socialist under the rule of law” in the eighth CCP national congress, a 
party group of the National People’s Congress standing committee submitted to the 
CCP central committee a report for improving the system of LPCs, in which they 
proposed “the establishment of the standing committee at or above the county level,” 
“the transferring of legislative powers from the hands of people’s committee in 
government to standing committee in LPCs,” “the allocation of a range of legislative 
authority to people’s congresses and their standing committee at the province level,” 
and so on. However, the occurrence of an Anti-Rightist Movement across China at that 
time put this report aside. 88
The other occurred in 1965. The CCP central committee and the NPC standing 
committee reconsidered the issue of establishing a standing committee at or above the 
county level. The driving forces came from two aspects: 1）with the intention of 
meeting the needs of socialist revolution and construction, older veterans in 
government were to be arranged to work in the standing committee in people’s 
congresses while installing a group of younger figures in the government; 2) Setting up 
a permanent body within LPCs was favorable for timely decision-making on major 
issues during the adjournment, particularly in the conduct of regular supervision of 
government.89  
However, the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 caused this proposal to be 
ignored. More seriously, people’s congresses were almost defunct during this period. 
Although, in 1975, the congress ratified a new version of the constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China, empowering the revolutionary committees as permanent 
fixtures of LPCs, they were not given any role in the supervision of government or in 
 
88 See Liu Zeng and Cheng Xiangqing, Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu de lilun yu shijian (The Theory and Practice of 
the System of People’s Congress)(Beijing: China Democracy & Rule of Law Publishing House,2003),125-127. 
In addition, the Anti-Rightist Movement, instigated by Chairman Mao Zedong in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
officially referred to those intellectuals who appeared to favor capitalism and class divisions and against 
collectivization.  
89 Pu Xingzhu, “Renda yiyuan shuangceng jiegou de youxiao tuozhan ( The effective expansion of unicameral and 
two tiers of Chinese people’s congresses) ,” Tansuo yu zhengming (Exploration and Contending ), 
Vol.12(2009):10-14. 
  
61 
 
                                             
the formulation of policy. Because revolutionary committees—the organs that were 
originally tasked with the representation of the Cultural Revolution's mass 
organizations—were just the products of a dramatic combination of powers under the 
circumstances.   
 
4.1.3 Institutionalized reforms since 1979 
While the proposal for improving people’s congresses repeatedly encountered 
setbacks, it laid a solid foundation for subsequent institutional developments. As a 
consequence of drawing lessons from the Cultural Revolution in the 3rd Session of the 
11th CPC Meeting, democracy and rule of law became the main guiding principles in 
the reform era. Conforming to these principles, the reforms and development of 
Chinese people’s congresses became prominent in serving the CCP’s agenda of 
building a socialist democratic and legal system. In May 1979, Pengzhen, the director 
of the NPC law committee at that time, proposed three options to the CCP central 
committee for carrying out reforms in terms of people’s congresses: first, fixing the 
Revolutionary Committee as permanent body of the LPCs through legislative 
procedures; second, restoring the People’s Committee and abolishing the 
Revolutionary Committee; third, setting up a standing committee in the LPCs at or 
above the county level, and reinstating the People’s Committee as the executive organ. 
Lastly, Deng Xiaoping proposed to adopt the third option after the CCP central 
leadership’s review of Peng’s report.90
Hence, one significant system reform involved the stipulation of establishing a LPC 
standing committee in the 2nd session of the 5th NPC meeting in 1979, along with the 
amendment of the Local Organization Law and Election Law. Until the end of 1981, 
29 provincial and 3000 sub-provincial people’s congresses across the country had held 
congress plenary meetings on the basis of direct elections by the voters and had then 
 
90 Pu Xingzhu, “Renda yiyuan shuangceng jiegou de youxiao tuozhan (The effective expansion of unicameral and 
two tiers of Chinese people’s congresses) ,” Tansuo yu zhengming(Exploration and Contending), 
Vol.12(2009):10-14. 
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elected their permanent organ—the standing committee. 91  To ensure effective 
supervision, the Constitution and related laws stipulated that members of standing 
committees at any levels would not hold offices in state administrative, judicial, and 
prosecutorial bodies. Admittedly, at first a tension remained between the operation of 
standing committees at the local level and depreciations from some government cadres, 
which mainly consisted of retired party cadres who had passed the age limit for party 
and government officials. Yet, compared with the previous system of 
executive-dominating characteristic in LPC daily affairs, this new arrangement of 
political-executive relative independence, in terms of organizational settings, provided 
the requirements for implementation of the LPCs’ legal functions. These functions 
included the links between deputies and the voters, supervision of the government, the 
deliberation of the law, decision-making on important issues, appointment and removal 
of leading officials of government organs, and so on.  
Another sign of LPC institutional reform was the sharp increase in laws or amended 
rules governing the normal functioning of the LPCs, which was one kind of 
rectification for the destruction of legalization during the Cultural Revolution. Since 
1979, a series of laws relating to LPC functions was promulgated or amended. Most 
remarkable were the Local Organic Law in 1979, the new Election Law enacted in 
1979 and revised in 1982, 1986, 1995, 2004, the Representation Act issued in 1992, 
the Budget Law promulgated in 1994, the Legislation Law of 2000, and the 
Supervision Law enacted in 2007. All of these laws brought about many changes to 
LPCs in their institutional operation but also provided a critical basis for LPCs to assert 
power.  
In addition, with the intention of securing the effectiveness in dealing with 
increasing public affairs, standing committees of LPCs gradually developed their 
 
91 Yin Zhongqing, “Difang renda changweihui de jiannan yunyu (The difficult birth of standing committee in LPCs), 
Zhongguo renda xinwen wang (the Website of NPC News) , Accessed February 2, 2000, 
http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/news/200003/02/102.html. 
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supporting organizations by setting up diverse special committees and Working 
Commissions beginning in the 1980s.  
 
4.2 The structures of LPCs in contemporary times 
The basic structures of LPCs took shape after undergoing institutionalization in the 
past decades. They are as follows (see fig 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1 Organizational Chart of the LPCs at or above County Level in China 
Sources: this figure was made by the author. The sources are the combination of interviews and the 
information from LPC websites in China.  
Notes: The arrangement of Working Commissions in LPCs at or above county levels is similar, 
with minor differences. Here, several common Working Commissions will be listed.  
○ “ESCHWC” refers to Education, Science, Culture and Health Working Commission 
“IALWC” represents the Internal Affairs and Legal Working Commission※  
 “UCEPWC” means Ur◎ ban Construction and Environmental Protection Working Commission 
＃ “PREWC” stands for Personnel and Representative Election Working Commission 
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＋ “MOCWC” is the abbreviation of Minority and Oversees Chinese Working Commission 
· Dashed portion (    ) in the figure indicates that it does not exist in the period of LPCs’ 
adjournment. 
·Solid lines (    ) in the figure indicate the standing bodies.  
·Special committees marking with “   ” in the figure mostly exist in LPCs at the provincial level, 
sub-provincial city and larger municipalities with legislative power. Four cases in my study are 
LPCs at lower levels; these do not have standing bodies except for the standing committee. They 
are marked with “  ” .Bodies supporting the standing committee and accepting its leadership are 
called working commissions.   
 
First, China has shaped unicameral local congresses characterized by two tiers, named 
the plenary meeting and standing committees (SC) of the LPCs at or above county 
level (1 and 2 in above figure). 92 A deputy attending the plenary meeting on average 
represented 2285 people at the county level and 1,0965 people at the municipal or large 
district level.93 The plenary meeting meets once annually for up to about 8 days since 
most congress deputies have other full-time jobs to do, and the latter meets 6-7 times 
per year (members are elected by full deputies at the plenary meeting and about 50% of 
the members are full-time professionals). While the plenary meeting participants are all 
elected congress deputies in session (varying from 120 to 450 according to population 
size at county or district level), the standing committee—the permanent power organ 
during the adjournment—has relatively small numbers of congress deputies (about 
15-35 at the level county, autonomous county, city not divided into districts or 
municipal district). The huge population of China is the main driving force for 
adopting this dual institutional arrangement. That is, a large number of deputies is 
favorable to reflect democracy although it inevitably brings about many difficulties in 
performing functions. The establishment of a SC with a lower number of deputies 
during the adjournment can improve the efficiency of exercising powers, and also can 
make up for other disadvantages caused by large numbers of part-time deputies. Even 
more important, a strong accountability relationship needs to exist between these dual 
structures. The standing committee emerging as a consequence of the election by all 
                                              
92 There has not established standing committee at township level LPCs in China. 
93 Manion Melanie, “ Chinese Congressional Representation As An Institution” (paper presented at the 2009 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 2-5, 2009). 
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congress deputies at the plenary meeting should make reports and hold accountability 
for the plenary meeting.  
  Second, the Presidium at the plenary meeting at session and the Chairmen’s 
Council are leading organs at the intersession. The members of the presidium at the 
plenary meeting is equal to about 15% of the congress deputies in total numbers, and is 
composed of the CCP leadership, the SC chairman, the SC vice chairmen, directors of 
multiple-democratic parties and associations of industry and commerce, chairmen of 
working commissions and the SC office, directors of people’s organizations and 
people’s armed forces departments, representatives of entrepreneurs and villages, and 
heads of delegations. The latter assists by the working commissions over which the SC 
vice-chairmen preside. They are mainly composed of SC chairman, SC vice-chairmen, 
working commission chairs, and vice-chairmen. Members of the Chairmen’s Council 
are main components of the SC. The chairmen’s council is widely believed to be the 
power center dominating important decision-making processes in the LPCs. Xia Ming 
shows one good explanation about this when he talks about the National People’s 
Congress:  
The NPC has been developed into a hierarchy with concentric circles (the chairmen group, 
standing committee, delegation meetings, and plenary session). To some extent, their power 
relationship can be explained thus: the plenary is like a huge ship; the delegation meetings are 
numerous separate compartments; the standing committee is its crew; the chairmen group is the 
captain. As for decision making, it usually happens within the small circle of the chairmen 
group, particularly among the chairmen who are Communist Party members, who form the 
ruling elite with the leaders in the CPC and the government in the Chinese political system.94
 
Third, working commissions and special committees (3 and 4 in Figure 4.1) are 
permanent organs in LPCs. However, it should be noted that an authority limitation 
exists for various levels of people’s congresses to set up special committees. Usually, 
LPCs above county level have the right to set up special committees, just as stipulated 
in article 30 of the Organic Law: The people’s congresses of provinces, autonomous 
                                              
94 Xia Ming, “China’s National People’s Congress: Institutional transformation in the process of regime 
transition( 1978-98) ,” The Journal of Legislative Studies , Vol.4, No.4(1998):103-130. 
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regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, autonomous prefectures 
and cities divided into districts may, where necessary, establish special committees 
such as legislative (political and law) committees, finance and economic committees, 
and education, science, culture and public health committees. The chairmen of special 
committees are elected by full congress deputies at the plenary meeting and work 
under the direction of the respective people’s congresses; they work under the direction 
of the standing committees of the people’s congresses when the people’s congresses 
are not in session. When it comes to county-level people’s congress, working bodies 
are popular organizations for assisting standing committees, which are established 
revolving around distinguishing supervision functions of LPCs. The chairmen of these 
working bodies are elected by full deputies at the plenary meeting. The membership of 
each working commission is composed of congress deputies with related professional 
or occupational backgrounds. Each working commission includes about 8-15 part-time 
members who have full-time jobs.   
Lastly, but most important, based on the idea of popular sovereignty, the chain of 
arrows in figure 4.1 is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in 
the reverse direction. The whole structure of LPCs at various levels is designed to 
serve the interests of the public, both directly and indirectly. 
 
4.3 Political context for local people’s congresses 
Despite the fact that significant institutional development is evident for Chinese LPCs, 
the exploration of their statutory functions still cannot be separated from the political 
context to which they belong. Compared with the western “checks and balances” 
relationship among main political institutions, “division and cooperation” can be seen 
as one significant governing principle in the Chinese integrated political system. In 
detail, four major contexts will be examined by grouping them into two categories (see 
figure 4.2): endogenous contexts (CCP and LPC relationships, LPC and government 
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relationships, the relationship between LPCs at higher and lower levels) and exogenous 
variables (actors such as the public, media etc).  
 
Note: this figure is made by the author, based on participatory observations in fieldwork 
4.3.1 Power relationship between the CCP and people’s congress: leadership with a 
clear division of authority? 
The CCP’s leadership has become one critical tenet to ensure stability and 
development in Chinese society, especially after the era of the turmoil of the 10-year 
Cultural Revolution. As early as 1981, Deng Xiaoping warned: Without Party 
leadership there definitely will be nationwide disorder and China will fall apart. 95 
China further established formal rules to clarify how to balance the CCP’s leadership 
and the authority of other political organs. Nevertheless, in real politics, it should be 
noted that the CCP used to expand its power and control over other organs, even 
beyond the due boundary. 
The relationship between the CCP and the people’s congresses can be summarized 
as follows: according to China’s one-party political system, people’s congresses must 
adhere to the leadership of the CCP; but legally, people’s congresses have the highest 
authority. The CCP should operate within the framework of the Constitution and laws 
enacted by people’s congresses and subject to the supervision of the people’s 
                                              
95 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 369. 
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congresses as representatives of the people. More detailed discussion on this 
relationship can be seen from the speech of Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 
celebration on the 60th anniversary of the NPC96: 
“People’s congresses and their standing committees should obey the Party 
voluntarily…Leadership by the Party mainly refers to its political, ideological, and 
organizational leadership… Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall 
situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the relations between Party committees 
on the one hand and people’s congresses on the other hand should be standardized. The Party 
will support people’s congresses in performing their functions as organs of state power 
according to law…Important matters which fall into the jurisdiction of People’s congresses 
and should be observed by people nationwide, the Party should make suggestions to National 
People’s Congress where it turns the Party’s will into national will, through legal procedures. 
Leading officials of state organs should be elected and appointed by people’s congresses 
through legal procedures and subjected to the supervision of people’s congresses and their 
standing committees.” 
However, the relationship between these two units is more complex in actual 
Chinese politics. The development of LPCs is accompanied by the CCP’s support and 
control. On the one hand, the development of people’s congresses benefits 
substantially from the CCP’s support during the process of establishing a socialist 
society ruling by law and carrying out market economy in the era of reform. To restrict 
the arbitrary exercise of state power by party cadres, the CCP tends to show its respect 
to legal institutions and seek for laws to be weapons against those who misuse power. 
However, it should be noted that the main purpose of the CCP was to not to make the 
legislature become a truly powerful and autonomous institution. Tanner’s arguments 
shed light on this point: people’s congresses were poised instrumentally as a vehicle to 
promote institutional impetus for sustaining and accelerating economic reform, rather 
than intrinsically as a proper way to make policy. For the main CCP leaders, granting 
people’s congresses more power just aimed at criticizing state bureaucrats who resisted 
reform or committed malfeasance. 97   
 
96 Sun Ying, “ Constraining or Entrenching the Party-state? The Role of Local People’s Congresses in PRC China”, 
Hong Kong Law Journal (2010): 838, accessed Novermber 6, 2009, http:// big5. China.com.cn/ 
policy/txt/2009-09/21/content_ 18562275. 
97 Tanner, Murray Scot, “ The erosion of Communist Party control over law-making in China, ” China Quarterly, 
No.138 (June 1994):381-403, P385. 
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On the other hand, the rising of people’s congresses was still accompanied by the 
tightening control from the CCP. Although legally there has been a clear definition of 
the CCP’s leadership and the jurisdiction of people’s congresses, in practice, the CCP 
usually tries to take into its own hands all the substantial powers by becoming involved 
in increasingly more affairs of the people’s congresses, even at the cost of exceeding 
the domain of its jurisdiction. One prominent example is the tension between the 
CCP’s power to manage cadres and people’s congresses’ power to appoint leading 
officials of state organs. According to political and ideological evaluation, the CCP at 
the corresponding level used to determine who should be elected as government 
leaders before the list of candidates goes to the LPCs or their Standing Committees for 
discussion and vote. When people’s congresses disagree with the CCP’s determination 
concerning the legal aspects of the cadres’ performance, the CCP tends to seize 
possible ways to make the latter subject to its expectations, although the CCP is not 
always successful under contemporary conditions in China (ints.13, 31, 48, 62).  
In practice, three salient ways exist through which the CCP can strengthen its 
leadership or exercise control over people’s congresses at the corresponding level. 
First, setting a party group in people’s congresses at various levels is a traditional 
way for the CCP to guarantee its leadership. The Communist Party charter states that 
members of party groups are appointed by the CCP committee rather than elected by a 
party plenary meeting, and should be subject to the CCP’s leadership. At the same 
time, the party group is in charge of carrying out the CCP’s will by giving proposals to 
chairmen’s committees or standing committee in people’s congress. Due to highly 
overlapping members between party group and chairmen committee—the leader core 
of the standing committee in people’s congress—this way is very convenient for the 
CCP to be involved in people’s congress’s activities or to transfer its will into the 
people’s will through legal procedures.  
Second, controlling elected officials is another way for the CCP to dominate 
people’s congresses. This can be observed from two aspects. On the one hand, most 
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key officials in people’s congresses were selected by the CCP based on nomenclature 
authority or the principle of party managers’ cadres before they were put into the 
election procedure. In other words, their appointment and promotion have a close 
bearing on their administrative rank and status in party's own hierarchy, rather than on 
their performance to be accountable to the voters. On the other hand, the vast majority 
of elected deputies are composed of CCP members. In this regard, most members in 
the people’s congresses have double principles: they are both Party members 
nominally subjecting to Party discipline and congress deputies legally representing the 
interests of voters. Hence, they probably face dilemmas to show loyalty to the state or 
be accountable to the voters once the conflicts arise.  
Third, the reform that allows the Party chief to hold concurrently the position of 
congress standing committee chairman at local level is a new trend for the CCP to 
enhance its influence. The 15th Party congress in 1997 showed an obvious increase in 
the numbers of Party chiefs concurrently holding positions as congress standing 
committee chairmen in China’s LPCs. For example, in 31 provincial level people’s 
congresses, there were 3 cases at the end of 1997 and 7 cases at the end of 1998; 
however, by 2006, 24 out of 31 committees were chaired by Party chiefs at the 
corresponding level. At the beginning of 2011, 23 provinces still were adopting this 
leadership model; the exceptions were Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing, Tianjing, 
Xinjiang, Guangdong, Chongqing, and Jiangsu (the new Party chief just took office 
and the position of congress chairman is temporarily vacant), where Party chiefs are 
mostly members of central politburo. 98 Most municipal and county people’s 
congresses also followed this model.   
 
98 The data from 1997-2006 comes from Yi Tian, Wen Duan “Renda de xin xingshi: sheng dangwei shuji jianren 
renda changweihui zhuren ( New situation of People’s Congresses: Provincial Party Chief co-chairs Congress 
Standing committee)”, 21st Century Business Herald, 6 Mar 2003; He Junzhi, “Zhongguo renmin daibiao dahui 
zhidu de sange yanjin jieduan (Three evolution stages of Chinese people’s congress institution)”, the Journal of 
Exploration and Contention [Tansuo Yu Zhengming], 2010(12); and the latest data on 2011(up to 12 January 2011) 
is calculated by the author from the websites of 31 Chinese provincial-level people’s congresses. 
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Although official statements said this leadership arrangement stemmed from a 
consideration to promote the governing process of rule by law through enhancing the 
CCP’s support toward LPCs, some insiders deemed it as a reaction by the CCP to 
reduce increasing disagreements between Party and people’s congress at the 
corresponding levels. In the author’s interviews, respondents generally felt that this 
leadership arrangement strengthened the constraints rather than enhanced support for 
the LPCs to perform legal functions on many occasions. Moreover, some localities 
below the province level gradually gave up due to the fact that the disadvantages 
outweighed the advantages. According to personal experience, one informant 
interviewed during the author’s fieldwork explained his disapproval as follows: 
  “According to the model of our province, we adopted this arrangement in 2002, quite early than 
other regions. After so many years’ practice, we found this arrangement is completely 
unnecessary. Why? First, the CCP is in charge of the overall work in our country, and LPCs 
must work under the unified leadership of the CCP. So the CCP can completely depend on the 
Party group in the LPCs to ensure that its views are embodied. Concurrently holding the 
chairman’s position of a people’s congress standing committee by a Party chief is a 
performance of no confidence. Second, the work of the LPCs was affected under this leadership 
arrangement. In accordance with our culture of obedience to superiors, the standing vice 
chairman has to report or request to the Party chief as chairman with regard to important 
issues or daily activities within the LPCs. Without his consent, it is difficult to carry out any 
work, not mention to implement new reforms. If the Party chief and chairman of the people’s 
congress is not the same person, the latter just needs to have regular reports with the intention 
to seek the Party’s understanding and support. Of course, the prerequisite is to arrange LPC 
activities that surrounding the Party’s strategy focus. In contrast, this new arrangement 
inevitably increases the working procedures and decreases the efficiency of the LPCs. Third, a 
lot of political jokes are spread about this phenomenon. For instance, the four major 
leaderships—Party chief, government chief, chairman of people’s congress standing committee 
and Political Consultative Conference—usually attend together and deliver a live broadcast 
when it comes to important occasions. For those areas adopting the policy of a Party chief 
concurrently holding the chairman’s position of people’s congress standing committee, only 
three leaders appear (no seat is prepared for the standing vice-chairman of people’s congress 
according to bureaucratic ranking in China). You know, the public used to observe power 
distribution through seating arrangements of its main leaders. These kinds of seating 
arrangements inevitably transferred the wrong impression to the public: the importance of the 
people’s congress is minimal. All of this also reduced the status of people’s congress as an 
organization.  
  
72 
 
                                             
Therefore, I personally think the CCP should trust the members of people’s congress, and 
believe that our cadres, party members in LPC, will act in accordance with the principles of our 
Party; I even feel a little bit sad about this so-called new reform that formalizes the relationship 
between the CCP and LPC. The LPC chairman’s position had never been occupied by the Party 
chief in the past. Along with the acceleration of the democratic process, it unexpectedly does so 
now. In general, this is kind of sad, it indicates a kind of distrust towards our comrades, and a 
performance that lacks self-confidence. I consider that it will certainly be changed (int.37).” 
 
4.3.2 Power relationship between people’s congress and government: blending 
supervision into support, or the reverse? 
Chinese LPCs have legal authority to exert supervision upon the government, courts, 
and the procuratorate, with the intention of holding them accountable to the public. 
Compared with the “separation of power and check” relationship widely advocated in 
western democracy, the relationship between the people’s congress and government 
should be deemed as a kind of “division of labor” under the unified leadership of the 
Party, in the Chinese context. In this regard, the relationship between people’s congress 
and government is closely dependent on the Party’s attitudes or will. Furthermore, the 
Party acts as the final arbiter when these two units conflict with each other.  
Hence, it is popularly recognized that the government is the Party’s government and 
the congress is the Party’s congress, and all members work together for the Party’s 
career and people’s interest. However, this recognition also can be used as an excuse 
for government to play games with the people’s congresses. Against this background, 
the word “supervision” was politically sensitive during the 1980s and the word 
“support” (zhichi) had to be used in combination with supervision every time it was 
used because of fears that the administrative structure would not accept supervision.99 
While most governmental officials still want more support and less supervision and 
claim that people’s congresses should integrate supervision into support toward the 
government, the LPC officials think that blending support into supervision is more 
 
99 Almen Oscar, “Authoritarianism Constrained: The Role of People’s Congresses in China” (PhD dissertation, 
Goteborg University,2005), 54. 
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appropriate under current circumstances. The typical perception of one informant 
provides proof for this point: 
“The priority for LPCs is to supervise government and hold it accountable. We should not avoid 
talking about this word now. After all, supervision does not mean fault-finding or find fault with 
others. The concept perhaps has a bearing on our traditional culture, regarding supervision as 
confrontation. Therefore, it is normal to mention blending support into supervision over 
government. After all, both supervision and accountability are consistent with legal functions of 
people’s congresses (int.14).”  
Along with this relationship framework, two institutional constraints should be 
mentioned that refer to specific supervision practices. 
One is the unbalanced political status of political leaders in the government and 
people’s congress. The government carries out a Chief Executive Responsibility 
system. According to Party’s ranking system, the chief of the government has a higher 
position than does the chief of the local people’s congress: the former usually co-chairs 
the position of Party committee vice-secretary and is in charge of leadership work of 
the people’s congress as well as its standing committee, whereas the chairman of the 
people’s congress rarely acts as a member of the local Party committee, except under 
the condition when it is concurrently held by Party chief. Letting those “to be led” to 
oversee “the leader” inevitably brings about a supervision dilemma.  
Another constraint can be seen from the improper arrangement of purse strings 
power. Contrary to Western countries, in China, the government rather than people’s 
congress itself has a decisive role in the budget proposal of people’s congress. When 
working expenses in standing committees and other expenses in people’s congresses 
cannot be resolved by the budget, the people’s congress has to argue with the 
government to apply for more money to carry out its accountability functions. Under 
this condition, budget leverage is sometimes used by government as a weapon to 
reduce supervision activities. According to one informant, one chief of government had 
talked with the leader of LPCSC when considering that the people’s congress carried 
out too much supervision on governmental affairs: why not spend much time on travel 
  
74 
 
outsider rather than focusing on governmental activities? We are willing to allocate a 
larger budget to these items next year if you agree with this (int.59).   
A similar arrangement—governmental control over the budget of court as well as 
the procuratorate — indirectly dampens the supervision by the people’s congress at the 
corresponding level. According to China’s constitution and laws, the judiciary also 
should be supervised and be accountable to people’s congress on behalf of public 
interest. However, in reality, the people’s congress usually finds problems of 
inadequate implementation by the judiciary, especially with regard to administrative 
cases like the public suing government. For the judiciary, one main dilemma 
encountered is between accountability to the public or being subject to the government 
is in charge of their budget arrangements.   
 
4.3.3 Power relationship between higher-ranking and lower-ranking people’s 
congresses: supervision and guidance? 
People’s congresses were established as the highest power organ at various 
administrative levels in China. According to the administrative hierarchy from the top 
down, they can be briefly listed as the National People’s congress (NPC) and local 
people’s congresses (LPCs). The latter covers people’s congresses at the provincial, 
municipal county and township levels. Compared with the tight control from the Party 
committee at the horizontal level, the institutional linkage between LPCs at higher and 
lower levels takes distinctive shapes as a consequence of decentralization reforms, 
defining institutional spaces for the accountability performance of local people’s 
congresses in China. 
From the perspective of political decentralization, unlike the Party and government 
affairs system, adjacent people’s congresses are formally autonomous in China. They 
receive no direct leadership nor do they show absolute obedience to superior orders in 
the people’s congress system. While numerous LPCs still expect that the NPC 
exercises leadership over them since the 1982 Constitution was promulgated, the NPC 
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has properly rejected the expectation due to the consideration of accommodating local 
accountability and conditions. Chairman Peng Zhen of the 6th NPC Standing 
Committee, the most persuasive leader to oppose this expectation of leadership, 
pointed out that people’s congresses differ from political party organizations or 
executive agencies. As elected representative assemblies, people’s congresses are 
accountable to no persons other than constituencies. Subordination of lower people’s 
congresses to higher ones violates the principle of representative democracy. 100
However, this does not mean that there is an absolutely loose relationship between 
them. The formalized ties between LPCs at higher and lower levels can be understood 
in three aspects: there are oversight relationships in regard to legislation, contact 
relationships in regard to business and guidance relationships in regard to work. In 
accordance with these relationships, higher-ranking congresses can carry out extensive 
supervision over lower people’s congresses, by issuing approvals of regulations or 
annulling inappropriate resolutions passed by congresses at the next lower level, 
setting the broadest guidelines concerning election rules and other professional 
questions, and exchanging experience or information, rather than interfering in their 
everyday conduct.101  
In addition, the decentralization reform of the fiscal system also influences the 
autonomy of local people’s congresses although this is indirect. As one important 
strategy to eliminate the obstacle of excessive centralism and to promote local 
initiative, China has carried out a series of fiscal reforms since 1980 through which 
local authorities have obtained more power to decide on taxes, policy, and public 
affairs, etc. These provide autonomy for political actors at the local level to test new 
reforms for coping with emerging local affairs. Local people’s congresses are one of 
the critical actors for assessing or voting on local budgets, plans, and public affairs 
decisions. 
 
100 Jiang Jinsong, Jack R. Van Der Slik, The National People’s Congress (Foreign Languages Press,2003),495. 
101 See O’ Brien KJ & Luehrmann LM, “ Institutionalizing Chinese Legislatures: Trade-Offs between Autonomy 
and Capacity, ” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.23, No.1(Feb,1998):91-108, p94. 
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Lastly, it should be recognized that power relationships between higher-ranking and 
lower-ranking people’s congresses have a dual nature under China’s unitary and 
hierarchical political system. On the one hand, both political and fiscal decentralization 
enhances the autonomy of local people’s congresses, which also provides a good 
context for local innovations, even if without the consensus from the higher people’s 
congress. This autonomy does not exclude seeking close ties between adjacent 
people’s congresses. O’Brien, for example, argues that tight coupling between these 
has some appeal with some LPC leaders and staff because it offers opportunities to 
mobilize entwined support, expand jurisdiction, boost organizational capacity, and 
improve the oversight of the government, court, and procurator. In contrast, 
representatives of higher congresses often want to avoid increasing conflict with Party 
committees. He continues to give a specific case, where an LPC may occasionally need 
informal assistance from higher levels when a territorial Party committee fails to 
allocate sufficient funds, or when a local Party organization department attempts to 
ram its candidate through in a rigged election.102   
 
4.3.4 Exogenous actors and people’s congress: critics or partners? 
Public orientations toward the legislature—for instance, Public perceptions, media 
reports, or the opinions from social organizations—consist of cultural roots of people’s 
congresses. In the past, 
the public and media were both used to criticize Chinese people’s congresses by 
calling them “rubber stamps,” mostly owing to their weak strength in affecting 
governmental policies and in absorbing public demands. In other words, the main 
function of people’s congresses was to provide legitimacy to the Party-state instead of 
undertaking their own constitutional accountability.  
At present, the prestige of Chinese people’s congresses, especially LPCs, seems to 
 
102 O’ Brien KJ & Luehrmann LM, “ Institutionalizing Chinese Legislatures: Trade-Offs between Autonomy and 
Capacity ,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.23, No.1(Feb,1998):91-108. 
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be on the rise, although it is still limited. Firstly, one study of public attitudes toward 
LPCs in Zhejiang province, according to surveys done in 2000 and 2010 by a standing 
committee of Zhejiang provincial people’s congress, shows that 67.5% and 68.84% of 
respondents, respectively, said that the status of the people’s congress had been 
enhanced. Moreover, 52.96% of the respondents in 2010 said they would seek the help 
of congress deputies when they encountered problems in their daily lives; however, 
this percentage had been barely 27.5% in the survey done ten years previously. 103 This 
is a signal illustrating the growing influence of people’s congresses in expressing the 
demands of the public. Similar results also can be seen from the survey done by the 
standing committee of Wuxi city people’s congress in 2004, where more than 90% of 
respondents agreed that the role of LPCs had been greatly increased.104  
Increasing attention on LPCs by the media and social organizations is another signal 
of their rising prestige, which also is good for further promoting the attention of the 
public on people’s congress institutions. Due to the lack of related quantitative data, a 
specific case can provide some intuitive information for this argument. Taking a 
budget hearing held by the standing committee in M district people’s congress, 
Shanghai, on 9 December 2009 as an example, more than 20 news organizations took 
part and provided tracking reports. After 5 days, People Daily Online, one of the more 
influential networked media in China, carried out a survey on public perception of the 
budget hearing innovations initiated by the M district people’s congress, involving 
4,1503 netizens. At the same time, one prestigious think tank—the World and China 
Institute—also had continuous coverage via its website. 105In practice, LPCs have 
realized the importance of partnership with the public, media, and public organizations, 
 
103 lin Long, “ Baixing xinmu zhong de renda zhidu: diaocha yu sikao” (public perception of Chinese local people’s 
congresses in Zhejiang province: survey and consideration), The Journal of Zhejiang’s Legislature in China (2010), 
Vol.5. 
104 Lu Jiebiao, “ Wuxi shi renda zhidu wenjuan diaocha fenxi” (The Questionnaire on Wuxi City People’s Congress 
Institution), the Journal of China’s Legislature (2004), Vol.12:39 
105 The source of this case is a combination of the author’s participatory observation in M district people’s congress, 
media coverage, the web of the World, and China Institute (http://www.world-china.org/). 
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with the intention of expanding the publicity as well as enhancing the effectiveness of 
performed functions.  
In general, the transitional reputation of LPCs benefits from two factors: on the one 
hand, institutional evolution of LPCs in past decades improves their assertative 
capability in institutional interaction with CCP committee and government at the 
corresponding level, which laid a solid foundation for the performance of their 
functions in practice. On another hand, the development of a market economy and the 
rise in public self-interest consciousness inevitably produced more public demands. 
The LPCs happen to provide an institutional window to solve the conflicting demands 
as well as to absorb public opinions. More importantly, perception from these 
exogenous actors is favorable to the performance of LPCs’ accountability functions 
under current circumstances.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
Four important points are underscored in this chapter.  
First, from a normative perspective, the institutional evolution of Chinese people’s 
congresses has been matched by a corresponding development in the institutional 
power, organizational strength, and staff after several decades of evolution. According 
to personal experience, one respondent reveals this as follows: 
 
“We have held one congress plenary session every 3-5 years since 1954. The session is 
usually chaired by the government at the same level. In 1978, the establishment of standing 
committees in LPCs at or above county level changed that situation. Shanghai County, the 
predecessor of our present district, was still a pilot unit at that time. We had seven or eight 
members when the standing committee was set up. Most of these were older persons who moved 
back from government leadership positions. They played very limited roles during the actual 
working process of the LPC, although it should not be denied that they had some prestige. We 
have six Working Commissions and dozens of members, most of these are younger now, after 
three decades of development(int.2).” 
 
Second, the institutional development of Chinese people’s congresses has dual 
characters: on the one hand, it benefits from CCP’s support by emphasizing the rule of 
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law; while at the same time, its development also faces constraints imposed by the 
CCP. Against this backdrop, this institution was not originally designed to create an 
accountable legislature; rather, it is more symbolic in real politics. Just like the CCP 
has since 1949 ruled in “the name of the people,” but offered no, or very limited, 
opportunity to “ask” the people what they wanted at that time.  
Third, when it comes to contemporary institutional arrangements of Chinese 
people’s congresses, they have several core and unique characteristics that distinguish 
them from the corresponding institutions in liberal democracies: 1) Unlike the 
co-existence of multiple parties in most liberal democracies, LPCs are subject to the 
leadership of the CCP committee and abide by democratic centralism that requires 
strict adherence to the dictates and norms of the Party organization; 2) a “division and 
cooperation” relationship exists between Chinese LPCs and other state organs instead 
of the “power separation and checks” popularly adopted by western legislatures; 3) 
Elected LPCs are the organizations combining of legislative and administrative powers 
rather than organizations advocating their separation, and the exercise of any powers 
should be in the name of the people; 4) Unlike professional congressmen with fixed 
terms in western countries, elected LPCs in China are mainly composed of part-time 
congress deputies on the basis of career and class. The people enjoy the power to recall 
congress deputies when they misuse their power.106
In practice, most local officials have clear recognition on this distinction of political 
principles between western democracies and China practically. As one LPC official 
illustrates: 
 
“When we discuss new reform plans with external expert groups, they strongly 
recommend us to enhance the accountability capability of our LPC by copying western 
models. Not surprisingly, western models are appreciated by most experts due to their 
advantages, especially for those who had studied abroad. For us, we know that western 
models stemming from their contexts will confront challenges if we apply them to Chinese 
 
106 He Junzhi, Zhongguo renda zhidu yanjiu de lilun shenshi (Theoretical Review on China’s legislature study), 
Working Paper (2010), Fudan University in Shanghai, China; Dingjian Cai, Zhongguo renmin daibiao dahui zhidu 
(The Institution of the Chinese People’s Congress ) (Law Press,2003),134-137. 
  
80 
 
practices. This is a problem that we are trying to avoid in our current reforms. After all, 
the political situations in the West and China are quite different. Our political system 
strongly emphasizes the leadership of the CCP rather than separation and checks on 
power, which shapes our distinguishing focuses and strategies: first, how to improve the 
institutional performance of LPCs under the existing political framework? Second, as long 
as not contrary to the leadership of the CCP and related policies, we can first give some 
voice on local affairs or carry out some reforms, then give more voice or implement more 
innovations, and gradually grow into one of equally important players—just like the CCP 
and government—in local governing process. This is a possible development strategy for 
us by adapting to China’s current circumstances(int.４).”   
 
Lastly, but most importantly, the accountability performance of LPCs in practice 
depends on whether they can strategically take advantage of the political context that 
they belong to. Specifically: 1) The CCP’s leadership cannot only be presented in the 
form of a monopoly, but it must also provide fundamental support to LPCs, although 
the kind of rigid compliance with ideological and policy dictates that were inherited 
from the revolutionary period have came into question in contemporary governance; 2) 
the relationship between the LPC and government at the corresponding level inevitably 
encounters institutional dilemmas, and also has a strong dependence on the CCP’s will 
or attitude due to its role as the dominant player or arbiter between them; 3) the 
relationship between the LPC at higher-ranking and lower levels is more intertwined 
even if formal regulations empower more autonomy to them; hence, it is possible for 
them to cooperate to gain more strength; 4) the favorable motivation and support for 
the development of LPCs may come from the maturation of the exogenous actors 
under current circumstances. Due to the principle of people’s sovereignty in China, 
both the Party and LPC need to seek legitimacy in terms of public interest. Under this 
condition, it is possible to obtain the CCP’s acquiescence for LPCs through 
cooperation with these exogenous actors.  
In short, the established institutional framework and political context are meaningful 
for understanding institutional opportunities as well as possible routes faced by LPCs 
in a non-democracy context. Based on this premise, more detailed analysis of the 
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actual actors and strategies that contribute to the strength of the LPC accountability 
function will be explored in the subsequent chapters. 
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5. Exploring New Developments in Electoral Accountability 
in LPC Elections 
In line with the principle-agent chain, elections of congress deputies that assume some 
degree of accountability by the legislators to those who elect them can serve as a 
starting point for observing and assessing the accountability function of the LPCs. It is 
also generally thought that the electoral systems that limit the power of central party 
leaders in choosing candidates produce more responsive legislators.107 In this chapter, I 
will primarily be concerned with the actual practices of elections to LPCs and their 
impact on changes of accountability in contemporary Chinese local politics in recent 
years. 
For a long time, the election of deputies to Chinese LPCs emphasized consultation 
and deliberation rather than western-style competition. Excessive control by the CCP 
in this arena leaves fewer options for voters I their choice of deputy candidates. Both 
scholars and practitioners have realized the influence of this CCP-centered electoral 
system. For instance, Young Nam Cho pays little attention to election and the 
deputy-constituents connection in his monograph on Chinese LPCs. He considers that 
LPCs are marginal in terms of the electoral arena due to the monopoly of the CCP.108 
According to the “zero-based-model” defined in the introductory chapter, we can 
portray this conventional situation by claiming that election to LPCs is taken care of by 
the CCP, without disturbing involvement from below. Specifically, the CCP’s 
nomination of both ordinary and leadership positions to congresses is consequential for 
electoral success.  
 
107 See Donald L, Horowitz, “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, 
No.4(2003): 115-127, P117; Strom Kaare, “Rules, Reasons, and Routines: Legislative Roles in Parliamentary 
Democracies.” In Members of Parliament in Western Europe: Roles and Behavior, ed. Thomas Saalfeld and 
Wolfgand C. Muller. London(1997); Mark P. Jones eds, “Amateur Legislators—Professional Politicians: The 
Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System,” American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol.46, No.3(2002):656-669. 
108 Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (Cambridge University 
Press,2009),4. 
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 However, things are changing. The modification of the election law in 1979, the 
study on the rising of independent candidates (informal or self-nominated candidates) 
in the current electoral setting, the increasing loss rates of candidates nominated by the 
CCP in the elections of congress deputies and government leaders, and so on, are part 
of these changes.109  
The studies mentioned above provide inspiration for the deliberation on new 
phenomenon in the election to LPC bodies. My considerations will therefore be to 
demonstrate deviations from the zero-base monopoly model featured with no or 
reduced accountability. Therefore, the main question of this chapter becomes: To what 
extent and how does the new electoral phenomenon restrain the excessive power of 
CCP and governments, as well as contribute to the accountability strength of LPCs?    
 Following this main question, this chapter is arranged as follows. First, I describe 
the institutional setting of the election for deputies to local people’s congresses in 
China, and introduce the changed electoral rules and procedures under contemporary 
circumstances. Second, I present detailed case descriptions of the emergence and 
features of independent candidates in direct elections in several historical periods, 
including their identities, why they run for congress deputy positions, and how they 
succeed or fail to interact with authority. Third, the visibility of “opposition” (i.e., 
voices) under tight control in indirect elections will be analyzed. Fourth, I will address 
their influence on institutional rules and power structure using related data. Finally, I 
conclude by assessing the contribution and limitations of these new phenomena to the 
accountability function of Chinese LPCs.  
 
 
 
109 Related literature can be seen from: Brantly Womack, “The 1980 county-level elections in China: Phenomenon 
in Democratic Modernization,” Asian Survey, Vol.22, No.3 (1982):261-277; He Junzhi, “Independent Candidates in 
China’s Local People’s Congresses: a Typology,” Journal of Contemporary China (2010), Vol.19, No.64:311-333; 
Melanie Manion, “When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Functionof Local 
People’s Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China,” The China Quarterly, (2008):607-629; Melanie Manion, 
“The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside,” American Political Science Review, Vol.90, 
No.4(1996):736-748. 
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5.1  Institutional changes of deputies’ election to Local People’s Congresses 
Both nomination and voting in LPC deputy elections were highly symbolic before 
China’s reform era. Voters had fewer chances to deviate from organizational 
arrangements and to vote for their true preferences, due to the no-contest election rule 
(the numbers of candidates equal the numbers of seats) stipulated by the 1953 electoral 
law; thus, voting results were usually consistent with the CCP’s pre-arrangements 
while they underwent the motions of legal election procedures. Only at the township 
level—the lowest one within five administrative levels in China—did voters have the 
right to vote directly for their deputies. Usually, voters had no idea about who their 
congress deputies were, due to the closed election and limited rights. The selection of 
congress deputies relied heavily on the criteria of being a party member so that the 
elected official did not always have the required quality to be a congress deputy in 
practice.  
  New rules governing the election of LPCs in China began to take shape after 1978, 
which was triggered mainly by the CCP leaders’ demands to re-establish legitimacy: 
on the one hand, the CCP found that elections—even if still ritualistic to a high 
degree—were a different route from Mao’s political radicalism, as well as a useful tool 
to bring Chinese citizens into the political process to reduce political dissatisfaction; on 
the other hand, strengthening the people’s congresses was a key strategy for the CCP to 
foster a countervailing force against antireform party cadres. 110 At the same time, the 
CCP gained more legitimacy after transferring its political willingness into laws via the 
procedures of the LPCs.   
Specifically, changes began to happen along with China’s amendment to the election 
law in 1979, which laid new rules for subsequent elections to people’s congresses. 
Three important changes in terms of institutional stipulations were as follows: (1) it 
expanded the scope of direct election from the town level to the county level. The 
 
110 Referring to this background, Chen An had made detailed description in his book. See Chen An, “Destructing 
Political Power in China: Alliances and Opposition, 1978-1998” (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc ,1999),63-64.   
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distinction between two basic elections can be seen in article 97 and article 102 of the 
Constitution. That is, deputies to the people’s congresses of counties, cities not divided 
into districts, municipal districts, townships, nationality townships, and towns were 
elected directly by the constituencies, and they were subject to supervision from 
constituencies; deputies to the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities directly 
under the Central Government and cities divided into districts were elected by the 
people’s congresses at the next lower level, and they were subject to supervision by the 
units which elected them(see figure 5.1)111; (2) it introduced a semi-competitive 
framework into the people’s congresses by emphasizing that there were to be more 
candidates than the posts to be elected (chae xuanju差额选举). Compared with 
previous system of one candidate per place, the number of candidates for deputies to 
the national and local people’s congresses would be greater than the number of 
deputies to be elected under the new rules. According to the stipulations in election 
law, one and a half to two times the voters in direct election were required than the 
number of deputies to be elected. As is the case for the election of deputies to the next 
highest people’s congress in an indirect election, 20-50 percent more candidates were 
to be presented than the number to be elected. The semi-contested rule was also 
applicable to the election of chairmen to standing committees in LPCs, the leader 
positions in executives, courts and procuratorates, while it was optional when choosing 
no-contest elections or semi-contested elections for the chief leader. (3) This 
empowered groups of ordinary voters to nominate candidates via re-writing those they 
preferred and established the rule of the secret ballot.  
 
111 The figure is revised based on Jacobs’ work and the author’s acknowledgements. The purpose is to show the 
distinctive levels of People’s congresses in terms of direct election and indirect election in Chinese context. Original 
chart can be seen from Jacobs. J Bruce, “Elections in China,” The Austrian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.25 
(1991):171-199.  
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Undoubtedly, rules of contested election and re-filling other candidates provide 
access for LPCs to attract more political participation. However, this does not mean 
that the CCP removes itself from its previous involvement and empowers sufficient 
autonomy to the LPCs in terms of deputy elections. This can be observed by 
examining key organizations during the election process—leadership groups and 
election committees with strong CCP characteristics.  
At the city (with district) or county level, the Party secretary usually acts as the 
group leader, and the chairman of standing committee in the LPC at the corresponding 
level is appointed as vice group leader. An electoral committee is then led by this 
election leadership group. As a provisional committee during the election phase, all of 
the positions are held by the current government officials. Typically, they consist of 
persons coming from the party organization department, the party secretary in LPCs, 
the publicity department, the public security bureau, the united front work department, 
and the Working Commission of personnel and deputies inside the LPCs. The main 
duties of the election committee are to divide the election district, distribute the deputy 
quotas in terms of different social categories (workers, peasants, cadres, sex, 
  
87 
 
occupation, etc.), and oversee the electoral affairs. It should be noted that the quota of 
social categories to be elected as congress deputies revolves around the instruction and 
recommendation from higher-level party committees. The final elected deputies should 
be consistent with the preliminary quota by ensuring the appropriate proportion of 
female deputies, worker and peasant deputies, intellectual deputies, and ethnic minority 
deputies as well as re-elected deputies (ints. 6,11,14,15, 23, 30, 35, 51,59,76).  
When it comes to the town level, the party secretary, the deputy director of the party 
organization department, and the chairman of the town people’s congress join together 
to implement the instruction from higher level and keep the electoral affairs going 
smoothly (ints.5, 44). Along with CCP discipline within horizontal and vertical 
relationship, the election can be controlled and steered towards a preferable direction 
by the authorities. 
 
5.2 The emergence and campaign activities of independent candidates in direct 
elections  
5.2.1 The emergence of independent candidates 
The emergence of independent candidates, also known as “the candidates bouncing 
from ballot boxes” or “informal candidates,” goes hand-in-hand with the nomination 
and election process of China’s LPCs. Starting with the registration of voters, the 
election process involves three important stages:(1) a stage of being an initial 
candidate; (2) a stage of being a formal candidate; (3) the official phase of the Election 
Day. Unlike the registration system, China adopts a kind of recommendation system in 
terms of the transformation from voters into initial candidates during the electoral 
process for LPCs. Normally, the initial candidates for deputies in a Chinese LPC 
deputy election come mainly from two nomination channels: (1) nominated by 
organizations: political parties and people’s organizations may either jointly or 
separately recommend candidates for deputies, and political parties including the CCP 
and other eight democratic parties have a minor influence.（2）nominated collectively 
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by voters: a joint group of at least ten voters or deputies may also recommend 
candidates. However, in election practice, both nominations will inevitably bring 
problems: not all of the candidates nominated by the CCP are willing to be deputies; 
sometimes that is only a need from their current position. Not all of the candidates 
nominated collectively by voters are those that they want to support; sometimes this is 
the result of mobilization by local authorities.  
In view of this dislocation between nomination and personal willingness, those who 
have a strong desire to be elected as deputies of a LPC can find chances to mobilize 
voters to nominate them as initial candidates, ensure that they become formal 
candidates, and vote for them on the Election Day. If they fail at the stage of being a 
formal candidate or miss this stage, they still have a chance to mobilize voters to vote 
for them by adding their names onto the ballot on the Election Day. These chances in 
terms of voting for a candidate and filling in another candidate stem from the 
stipulation of article 39 in the election law, which empowers voters with more options 
when voting—voting for a candidate, voting against a candidate for deputy, voting 
instead for any other voter, and abstaining from voting. Thus, compared with 
candidates nominated by an organization and nominated collectively by voters, those 
candidates who have not gained prior approval of an organization or were not 
voluntarily nominated by voters after self recommendation at initial election stage, and 
those who were written in on the ballot by voters on the Election Day can be 
categorized as independent candidates. 112  
 
5.2.2 Campaign activities and features of independent candidates: case studies 
Despite competition-oriented reforms in the LPC deputy elections, this does not mean 
that independent candidates can be deputies without any obstacles, nor does it mean 
 
112 Similar arguments can be seen from He Junzhi, “Independent Candidates in China’s Local People’s Congresses: 
a typology,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.19, No.64 (2010): 311-333, P322. The difference between his 
arguments on independent candidates and my opinion should be noted: he states the nomination style of 
independent candidates is nominated by voters or not as nominees. In my opinion, this classification is a little bit 
rough to distinguish from the candidates through the other two kinds of nomination channels. Therefore, l provide 
detailed categories here. 
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that they are unimportant. On the contrary, their campaign activities have yielded 
unintended consequences towards power and accountability through multiple 
interactions among voters, independent candidates, and the authority. Given the lack of 
statistical data on this sensitive issue, it is hard to make a comprehensive analysis. In 
this section, I will focus on the successful and failed campaigns of independent 
candidates at critical historical junctures, with the intention of revealing the new trends 
in this arena. Successful cases presented below refer to those cases where informal 
candidates won the position to LPCs at the final stage of election, and failure cases 
means those informal candidates who ultimately failed to be elected via the electoral 
game with the authorities.   
 
Initially emerged independent candidates in 1980 
With the initiation of political reforms in 1979-1980, the Chinese authority relaxed the 
LPC election rules and allowed a certain degree of competition in running for election. 
The intention was to enhance public politics participation and governing legitimacy. 
Thus, in the ensuing 1980 elections, a number of constituents emerged to participate in 
the election competition for deputies through self-recommended ways when direct 
election was first held for district and county people’s congresses. They came from 
multiple electoral units, such as Peking University, Hunan normal university (the 
predecessor of Hunan normal university), Shanghai electrical factory, southwest 
normal university, southwest college of agriculture, and so on. Due to the loose 
connection between voters and the authority at that time, the latter had not expressed 
opposition towards the emerging election. For example, the electoral unit of southwest 
normal university  had seven students distribute campaign leaflets, and walk around 
to speak for the election. In the end, four among them were elected the deputies of the 
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9th Beipei district people’s congress in Chongqing. They became the pioneers of 
independent candidates. 113
 
Sporadic presence of independent candidates in 1990s 
Compared with first independent candidates in 1980, the 1990s showed a sporadic 
trend instead of a sustained growth in terms of the approximate numbers of 
independent candidates. This negative trend was partly caused by tightened election 
rules and the authority’s attitude in this respect after the 1980 elections. Some party 
leaders at both central and local levels regarded electoral reform as a threat to their 
control. Their attitudes towards the emergence of a large number of independent 
candidates were also quite prudential at that time. This can be observed from the 
amendment to electoral law passed by the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress on December 10, 1982: (1) this version of the electoral law changed the way 
to introduce the candidates for deputies to voters or deputies stipulated in 1979 
electoral law, stating that a political party, people’s organization, voter, or 
representative may introduce the information of the candidate recommended at the 
group meetings of voters or deputies (2) it cancelled the article that any voters or 
deputies may nominate candidates if they have more than three signatories.  
Both the authorities’ attitudes and revised rules restricted the campaign activities 
that highly hinged on self-publication to voters and support from voters. Despite this, 
in practice, a few successful independent candidates were still elected after their hard 
insistence in 1990s. The descriptions of these representative cases will follow. 
 
Failure  
 In 1987, Yao Lifa, a 29-year ordinary staff in the Qianjiang city education bureau, Hubei 
province, was jointly nominated by his young colleagues when Qiangjiang city held its first-session 
                                              
113 See Yi Donghua, “ Independent Candidates: the Stumbling Political Forces Forward,” June 01, 2007, 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=109746; Luo Liwei, “ Who Is the First Independent 
Candidate?” China Elections and Governance, accesses June 16, 2003. 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=31158.  
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deputy election. This was due to his attentions to public issues in ordinary life. However, his 
colleagues’ behavior encountered strong opposition from leaders of his units. In 1990, Yao ran for 
deputy in the People’s congress on his own initiative as an independent candidate (informal 
candidate). To let voters know him, he distributed 2000 resumes and introduced himself. Qianjiang 
government talked with him and let him stop campaigning after acknowledging his behaviors. 
Ultimately, his name did not appear on the list of official candidates. When Qianjiang city held the 
third session deputy election in 1993, Yao not only focused on introducing himself to voters but 
also emphasized the publicity of the electoral law as well as pointing out the legal behaviors in the 
Qianjiang deputy elections during the campaigning. One of the main leaders in Qiajiang city 
thought Yao’s behavior was dangerous, and it was not wise to allow him to continue. Although Yao 
had not been identified as a formal candidate and failed to be elected on the official Election Day, 
he achieved the highest number of votes in the column for choosing other people whose names were 
not on the ballots, which was a major breakthrough in his previous campaign experiences. One 
retired official who had been in charge of the election affairs in Yao’s election precinct in 1990 and 
in 1993 said: “Yao’s running for deputy was consistent with the law, it also was normal. However, 
it was regarded as abnormal under those circumstances. At that time, I had pressure from above 
because the CCP usually gave their determined views on who could be the candidates to deputies 
in advance.”114These experiences also laid a solid foundation for his subsequent success as a 
congress deputy in the same way in 1998. 
 
Success  
Zeng Jianyu, an enterprise worker, was elected to be the congress deputy via informal candidate 
status in Luzhou city, Sichuan province in December1992. His successful experience was as 
follows:(1) Inspired by Yao Lifa’s story, Zeng tried to turn his enthusiasm in politics into reality by 
participating in deputy election; (2) Although Zeng was not the formal candidate supported and 
nominated by the organization (Party), he still tried his best to gain the voters’ support. On the one 
hand, he sent out 4200 leaflets to voters around his election region during the process of election, 
with the aim of advertizing publicity himself and persuading voters to vote for him. On the other 
hand, he also delivered campaign speeches to voters on many occasions. Zeng’s campaign 
behaviors won the goodwill of voters because they had never seen so dedicated a candidate before. 
Ultimately, many voters wrote in Zeng’s name on the ballot on the Election Day；(3) Although 
Zeng received the highest number of votes among candidates, some officials disagreed with his 
election by calling in question his campaign and informal candidate status. However, no detailed 
regulations appeared in the Deputies Law regarding campaign or no campaign. The Luzhou city 
congress standing committee reported the dispute to a higher organ—the Sichuan province 
people’s congress. In the end, the National People’s Congress instructed that who can become 
elected deputies was determined by votes rather than other means. After receiving the instruction 
                                              
114 Huang Guangming, “ Yao Lifa: Yige Buyi Daibiao De Xianshi (Yao Lifa: Practical Experience of one Common 
Deputy),” Guoji Zaixian Zhongguo Baodao( China Report-International online), accessed January 13, 2004, 
http://gb.cri.cn/41/2004/01/13/116@43785_2.htm. 
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from the top people’s congress, the CCP chief in Luzhou city promptly demanded related 
departments to announce the election result to the public. Consequently, Zeng won the election.115   
 
2.2.3 Rapid rise of independent candidates in 2003  
China’s economic and political context changed substantially in 2003. On the one 
hand, the implementation of market economy enhanced people’s awareness of personal 
interests and political aspirations; on the other hand, the demands and voices were 
gradually valued by the CCP and government at higher levels to boost their legitimacy, 
although leaders’ ways of governing varied a lot in different local governments. 
Therefore, the “bridge” between the CCP and the public—the LPCs—became one 
ideal place for accommodating public participation demands and promoting political 
development.  
Against this background, while the control from the CCP and authority still exists, 
the public has more chances to run for deputy position in district or county people’s 
congress than in the past in China. The rapid rise of independent candidates can be 
observed through the cases of some local governments in China. For instance, 41 
independent candidates ran during the fifth people’s congress election in Hubei’s 
Qianjiang (Yao Lifa’s hometown), including 11 serving and retired teachers, 5 village 
heads, 4 lawyers, 9 workers, and 12 farmers.116 In Shenzhen, more than ten people ran 
for deputy election through self-recommendation and 3 people succeeded in the first 
half of 2003. Most of these were members of community owner committees, the bosses 
in private enterprises, the principals in colleges, etc. After that, dozens of university 
students, property rights owners, academics, lawyers and other professionals sought 
voters’ nominations to participate in campaigns in the Beijing district people’s 
congress election. Lastly, one protector of private property with a master’s degree and 
one public intellectual with a PhD degree were elected by an overwhelming majority.  
 
115 Source mainly comes from Minjie, “ Congress deputy generated via campaign,” China Youth Daily, 14 January 
2002.  
116 Zhou Shubin, “ Dalu 2003nian Minxuan Bolan (The 2003 Election Wave in China Mainland), ”Fenghuang 
Zhoukan(Phoenix Weekly), No.34, 2003. 
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Except for the rising numbers of independent candidates, we can see that their 
professional background, motivation, and interaction patterns with voters and the 
authorities have changed substantially. In addition to multiple occupational 
backgrounds, interests demands from individuals or organizations seem to be a major 
driving force for their campaigning. Successful independent candidates benefit 
significantly from the positive communication with voters and moderate campaign 
strategies. For the failed candidates, they gradually learned to oppose the opaque and 
unfair elections through rational means; for instance, by seeking the support of 
higher-level authorities, appealing to the courts, exposing issues to the media, and so 
on. Notable candidates’ stories follow: 
Successes  
In December of 2003, Lu Banglie, a young peasant with a high school education background 
from Baiyueshi village, Bailizhou town, won a seat as an independent candidate in the Zhijiang city 
People’s Congress of Hubei province. His successful experience is as follows: (1) one of his 
successful petitions for peasants in Bailizhou town brought a lot of public support and laid an 
important foundation for his competition in the election of congress deputies. Since 2001, he had 
begun to petition to Beijing, reflecting the burden of farmers. In the beginning, he was regarded as 
an eccentric person by many peasants, who questioned his running around instead of playing his 
peasant part. However, one thing changed their opinion of him: 248 peasant families who had 
moved to avoid a flood got state compensation of 13,000 yuan. Comparing the amount of 
compensation allocated by town government with the numbers of funds from state, Lu accidently 
discovered some clues that the town government had reduced the compensation. Then he got joint 
signatures from peasants and personally reflected this issue to the “China reform” journal in 
Beijing (a more influential central-level journal on China’s economy and political development). 
After he came back from Beijing, he found that the town government had allocated an additional 
2000 yuan per peasant family on the basis of original 13,000 yuan compensation. (2) Influenced by 
Yao Lifa, an elected deputy as an independent candidate in Qianjiang city People’s Congress of 
Hubei province, Lu Banglie turned his attention to the grass-roots democracy and carried out a 
number of political activities, for example, mobilizing villagers to successfully remove the village 
head due to his illegal imposition of fees on villagers. (3)Taking Yao Lifa as example, he decided 
to compete for congress deputy in Zhijiang city of Hubei province in the end of 2003. He printed 
2,500 leaflets at his own expense, entitled “please respect the vote in your hand.” On leaflets, the 
relevant provisions of "congress deputies' law" were explained, and raised questions like “If 
people’s congress deputies voted by you cannot really represent your interests, try to think please, 
how will they use the delegated power after they become deputies?”. He distributed these leaflets to 
the villagers within his constituency. Officially, more than 4500 voters crossed out the names of the 
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four formal candidates and filled in Lu Banglie’s name in the column of “choosing others,” making 
him become the first deputy to campaign by this way in this city.117
 
Wang Liang, a president of Shenzhen Senior Technical School, won election as an independent 
candidate in the 2003 Futian district people’s congress election in Shenzhen municipality. He 
defeated one official candidate by gaining 1308 votes in the 29th constituency in this district. The 
process was as follows: (1) For a long time, the teachers and students in Shenzhen Senior 
Technical School wanted to elect their own representative to reflect the conditions and voices in 
craft education. (2)Wang Liang, 44 years old in 2003, had MPA study experience in an American 
California University and was an on-job PhD candidate in Nankai University, China. He had been 
interested in being a congress deputy representing the interests and opinions of technical education 
fields. (3) In the 2003 congress deputy election in Futian district, Shenzhen, the district allocated 
Wang Liang’s school into the electoral constituency of the community committee; however, the 
community committee thought this school should be included in the district of election of Education, 
Science, Culture, and Health professions. Their different opinions led to Shenzhen Senior Technical 
School missing the days for recommending an official candidate. After complaints, this school 
made a supplementary registration of voters. Wang Liang also decided to run for congress deputy 
backed by support of more than 1000 teachers and students who had the right to vote. (4) Hence, 
Shenzhen Senior Technical School set up a special “election team” with well-planned work, 
spending a lot of energy on publicizing Wang Liang, touching on his education background, his 
stories, and his dedicated service to public deeds, and so on. (5) There were about 3000 
constituents within this 29th constituency, including the Senior Technical School (one larger 
election unit with more voters), community members, and several other units. The official congress 
candidates were principally persons from one corporation and one bureau. On the election day of 
2003, the number of votes for the two official candidates did not meet the legal criteria, but the 
number of votes for Wang Liang topped the list. (5) The district electoral affairs leadership group 
decided to leave the two candidates receiving the most votes(one official candidate and one 
independent candidate), and put them into a second round of elections. The second round election 
again showed that Wang Liang received 1308 votes and had 331 votes more than the official 
candidate.118  
 
Nie Hailiang was the owner of the Huilongguan community in Beijing in 2003. His initial 
motivation came from the idea to protect owners’ rights through institutional appeal channels: in 
2003, real estate developer violated a contract to construct residential buildings on the land 
planned for green landscape. Property owners spontaneously formed a group and launched the 
rights-protecting activities against estate developer. After failing to petition the Beijing 
                                              
117 See Cai Huiqun, “Lu Guanglie: Cunguan Jiannan Zhizheng Lu” [ Lu Banglie: a village official’s difficult road 
to perform his duty], Nanfang Zhoumo[ Southern Weekend], Accessed Oct 07, 2004, http://www.southcn.com/ 
weekend/commend /200410070002.htm. 
118 Zhou Jiahua,“Shenzhen Futian Qu Renda Daibiao Juxing Huanjie Xuanju, Duli Houxuanren Wang Liang Zhijie 
Canxuan Gaopiao Shengchu” [ Wang Liang won the election to congress deputy as an independent candidate in 
Futian district People’s Congress , Shenzhen China], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao[ China Youth Daily],accessed on 
May 21, 2003, http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2003-05/21/content_666412.htm. 
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municipality and looking for the deputy to speaking for them, a few owners decided to run for 
congress deputy to protect their own interests in the 2003 district congress deputy election. There 
were 3 property owners nominated by voters the first time. They were Yang Fengchen, Du Maowen 
and Nie Hailiang. Due to the numbers of candidates exceeding one deputy quota in Huilongguan 
constituency, the former two exited to support Nie Hailiang during the process of considering 
formal candidate by organization. Because Nie Hailiang was younger and well-educated, and his 
campaign speeches focused on property owners’ interests within his electoral ward, he gained that 
election based on voters’ votes. 119        
 
Xu Zhiyong, an independent candidate for the Haidian District People's Congress in Beijing, 
officially won the election with the highest number of votes in his electoral ward. Unlike other 
candidates who were nominated by political parties, organizations, or groups, Xu, together with 22 
other Beijing residents, actively promoted themselves to the voters in the 2003 district-level 
congress elections. As a lawyer and a law lecturer at the university, with a PhD degree, he was 
well known for his active function in guaranteeing the rights of migrant workers and private 
entrepreneurs. His campaign process included: (1) In October, 2003, he published a notice on the 
Internet declaring his decision to participate in the district-level people's congress elections in 
Beijing (2) On November 12, he published another article on the Internet to explain why he was 
running for congress deputy of the Haidian District People's Congress, “As a Chinese citizen, I 
hope my participation will help enhance democratic awareness among intellectuals and help make 
elections more competitive" (3) On November 20, eight volunteers at Xu's university organized an 
election group to run his campaign. (4)Among all of the 285 possible candidates for first-round 
election who were nominated by 10 or more voters, Xu got the second highest number of votes; the 
list of 285 possible candidates was then given to every elector in the ward for a second-round vote, 
with the top six candidates running on November 30.The official negotiation convention of voters 
decided the four formal candidates, including Xu and the heads of the university's three biggest 
schools, in early December.(5) Formal voting at Xu's university was conducted on December 10. 
Xu topped the poll with 10,106 votes from the total of 12,609 ballots cast, 120
 
 
Failures  
 
Jiang Shan, an information technology professional who moved to Shenzhen, the city 
neighboring Hong Kong, in 1997. After purchasing an apartment in 2003, Jiang began to pay 
attention to property rights issues. He realized how often the rights of residents were undermined 
by real estate and development companies in the rapidly changing city that had been a largely 
rural area in 1979 when central authorities designated it as one of China’s initial four Special 
Economic Zones and launched its meteoric growth. (1) Motivation to run for deputy: beginning 
                                              
119 Zhang Jianfeng, Duli Houxuanren Shinian Chenfu (Ups and Downs of Independent Candidates in Local People’s 
Congress Election over the Past Decade), Nanfeng Chuang(Sound Wind Magazine), 2009-08-05. 
120 Li Liu, Independent candidate elected, Zhongguo Ribao( Chinadaily),2003-12-17, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/17/content_291055.htm 
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around 2003, residents in Jiang’s part of Shenzhen tried several approaches to assert and restore 
their property rights, including organizing themselves into a residents’ group, filing complaints 
with the government, hiring a lawyer to bring an administrative litigation suit, and appealing to the 
media. None of these efforts, some of which Jiang helped lead, succeeded. Against this background 
of frustration, Jiang decided to run as an independent candidate in the Shenzhen Municipal 
People’s Congress elections. As Jiang saw it, the People’s Congress had the power, at least in 
principle, to address the residents’ problems and had the authority to supervise the government and 
the courts—the state organs that had failed to provide residents with the redress they had sought 
(2) Campaign process: Jiang began his campaign by trying to mobilize area residents through 
writing letters, sending text messages, distributing cards, and hanging banners. His efforts were 
met with formidable resistance from local authorities. His banners were taken down within a half 
hour. The district constituency lines were drawn to pit Jiang against the head of the Shenzhen 
Municipal Transportation Company, a state-linked enterprise with 4000 workers who were 
registered in the district and pressured to vote for their boss. Jiang was even rebuffed initially in 
his effort to register to vote. The purported lack of voting qualifications and other grounds were 
variously proffered to deny Jiang’s quest for candidacy. Only after Jiang appealed to the local 
court did the election committee acknowledge that Jiang was qualified to run (3) On Election Day, 
his name did not appear on the ballot. Jiang thus depended on a write-in campaign for the votes. 
The number of votes were well short of what he needed to prevail, so he ultimately failed to become 
deputy.121
 
More Prominence of independent candidates in 2006-2007  
The rapid increase in independent candidate numbers in the 2003 LPC elections had 
demonstrated impacts on subsequent election practices. Compared with 2003, 
independent candidates became more prominent in the China 2006-2007 LPC 
elections: Hubei’s Qianjiang had 47 independent candidates, which was more than in 
2003; in Shenzhen, the number was about the same as in 2003; in Beijing, it is 
impossible to calculate the number, because they are all calculated as candidates 
nominated by ten or more people; in Wuhan there were 20, up from zero in 2003. A 
good number of independent candidates also ran in Shandong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang. 
In Wenling, Wenzhou, Shenzhen, and Wuhan, some independent candidates were 
elected. 122 Representative cases happened in 2006-2007 and stressed the importance 
 
121 Jacques deLisle, “What’s Happened to Democracy in China? Elections, Law and Political Reform”, April 2010, 
see http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201004.delisle.democracyinchina.html. 
122 He Junzhi, “Independent Candidates in China’s Local People’s Congresses: a typology,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol.19, No.64 (2010): 311-333. 
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of voters’ support and local authorities’ acquiescence in winning elections. Although 
the attitudes of local authorities towards independent candidates varies a lot in different 
regions of China, cases show that moderate campaign strategies adopted by 
independent candidates are prone to get acquiescence or gain acceptance from the 
authorities. On the contrary, sharp opposition is easier to encounter resentment and 
coercion from the authorities. 
 
Successes 
Independent candidates in the W city: Seven informal candidates appeared on the ballot 
in 2006 Wenling’s congress deputy election, Zhejiang Province. Their standing for election and 
successes had a bearing on the following factors: (1) background of the elected: 5 were chairmen 
of the village committee, 1 was a deputy secretary of the community party branch, and 1 was a 
deputy secretary of a village party branch. Two of them were non-CCP members. As leaders, they 
had qualified working capabilities and enjoyed high prestige within their villages or community. 
Most of them had strong economic capabilities, running their own private companies. Three of 
them were the deputies in previous Wenling city people’s congresses, having good personal 
relationships and mobilization capabilities. (2) Due to their experience as the leaders in villages or 
communities, they had strong awareness of political participation and decision-making discussions. 
Their dissatisfaction regarding the unfair electoral process, the opaque negotiation and 
deliberation process to confirm official candidates, and the official candidates usually led them to 
participate in elections. (3) Most of them were familiar with election law and regulations, knowing 
that it was still possible for informal candidates to be elected. Therefore, they actively advertized 
themselves through multiple ways, including competing with official candidates, posting posters, 
and communicating with voters or voter groups. Eventually, they were elected by mobilizing voters 
to write them in as candidates (4) A good democratic atmosphere and open-minded local leaders 
provided opportunities for the growing numbers of independent candidates. The developed private 
enterprises in Wenling cultivated stronger democratic and participation awareness  by the public. 
Local leaders also had to adjust their attitudes and governance ways in response to the interest 
from the public or enterprises. Regarding the rise of independent candidates, most leaders in 
Wenling admitted that was some kind of democratic progress while calling on more institutional 
measures to restrain irregular elections(ints.51, 53, 60) 
 
Zhou was a banker and head of a state-owned bank branch in Chongqing, as well as a CCP 
member. He considered that becoming a deputy to the people’s congress would help him enlarge 
the deposits and loans of his bank branch, so he decided to run for congress deputy election in 
2007. To win the election, his efforts or strategies were as follows: (1) after hearing that one 
deputy quota was left in his constituency apart from the organization-nominated candidate, he 
convened a meeting with his core leaders’ group and asked them to help his campaign in order to 
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better serve the bank’s interests. As a first step, he mobilized ten voters to jointly nominate him as 
the initial candidate. Because his bank occupied less than 10% of all voters in the constituency and 
the head of the other bank branch was also seeking election, Zhou and his team separately visited 
the residential committee and other small companies within his constituency. (2) To ensure that his 
name made the list of official candidates, he met with the directors of the residential committee by 
himself. He promised to do some community work for the residential district and would speak for 
the residential committee in the people’s congress. Their efforts ensured Zhou’s status as a official 
candidate(3) To ensure success on Election Day, Zhou appropriated a special fund for education to 
help poor students in the residential district and asked the residential committee to help him 
perform a ceremony for this donation before Election Day. Because his donation was beneficial to 
the residential district, he gained the support from both electoral officials and voters. Ultimately, 
he was elected to the congress deputy position with the acquiescence of local authorities.123  
 
Failures 
Yao Lifa: After losing in the 2003 re-election, former People’s Congress deputy Yao Lifa 
continued to run as an “independent candidate” in the city-level People’s Congress deputy election 
on November 8, 2006. Unfortunately, Yao lost again. His opinion was that he lost repeatedly due to 
the local government’s defense of the independent candidates’ campaign activities. Specifically, 
(1)Yao Lifa started preparing for his campaign in late September, 2006. In the early phase of his 
campaign, Yao printed a large quantity of campaign materials and distributed them in his district 
and the adjacent districts in order to mobilize other members of the public to participate in the 
election, to resonate with his efforts. However, these two ordinary campaign behaviors drove the 
government into a full alert and they deployed the police and related government units. Stalking, 
summoning him to the police station, and telephone tapping became part of Yao’s daily routine 
throughout the election campaigning. (2) The government found many ways to remove Yao from the 
nomination list. On the one hand, the government controlled the rules and therefore the power to 
nominate. This was how the nomination took place in Yao’s school district—at a meeting of 
mid-ranking school cadres, the school’s election committee made a blunt request, “this nomination 
shall go to a woman.” Apparently, it would then be impossible for Yao to get nominated. On the 
other hand, when Yao managed to get a nomination recommendation form from another district 
with the required number of signatures, the personnel of the relevant department very patiently 
dissuaded Yao’s supporters, and persuaded them not to vote by face-to-face intervention or 
promised advantages or emphasized the negative consequences of supporting Yao. In the end, most 
of Yao’s nominators signed on the pre-filled forms named as “voters voluntarily withdrawing their 
nomination for Yao.”(3)When it moved to the voting stage, the local government controlled voting 
by the polling station setting. In order to scatter Yao’s votes, the local government set up 21 polling 
stations in Yao’s district. In addition, there was police presence at all polling stations to keep out 
                                              
123 See He Junzhi, “Independent Candidates in China’s Local People’s Congresses: a typology,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol.19, No.64 (2010): 311-333. 
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external observers. Even worse, the officer who ran the polling station blatantly told voters again 
and again that “votes for the external candidate” would be rendered invalid.124
 
Lu Banglie: On December 9, 2006, the Election Day at Bailizhou town of Yichang city, Zhijiang 
city of Hubei province, the former Zhejiang city People’s Congress deputy Lu Banglie lost his bid 
for election. To Lu, this time, the government’s control on the election process was unexpected and 
left him powerless. In his own opinion, this was the direct cause that he lost this election as an 
independent candidate.  
Perhaps we should give a brief introduction on his ways of performing his duty in the former 
people’s congress before describing the failed election in 2006. When he became the congress 
deputy in 2003, he performed his function in rigid ways, paying little attention to so-called 
“face-saving culture” (Mianzi Wenhua) in the Chinese context. For example, in the 1st session 
plenary meeting of Zhijiang city People’s Congress, following the announcement of the moderator 
on the presidium list, he criticized that presidium members had been determined before consulting 
the deputies’ opinions, not mentioning to consult his opinion. Moreover, he could not tell if these 
members were qualified due to the lack of information on them. Even the president of Bailizhou 
town People’s congress was anxious to remind him not to speak so directly and pulled at his 
clothes, but Lu paid no attention. At last, Lu cast the only abstaining vote at that meeting.    
In the summer of 2006, Lu returned from Beijing to his Hubei hometown to get prepared for the 
grass roots level People’s Congress deputy election. Before his return, he gathered materials on 
the new rural construction, including central government’s texts on rural construction and 
academic research on rural problems. Lu had worked hard on this during his stay in Beijing. With 
determination and an ambitious plan to compete for the congress deputy, he returned to his 
hometown. However, voters from a regular staff member of the Bailizhou town government to the 
head of the administrative department of the Zhijiang city government, and even the higher level 
Yichang city government personnel, in an unprecedented move, joined in the “war” to prevent his 
re-election. The authorities successfully achieved their intention by adopting a series of 
interference strategies—for instance, assigning persons to follow him, imposing constraints on 
constituency demarcation and candidate nominations, twisting the arms of the people who 
supported Lu by offering tangible motivations such as children’s education, military recruitment 
and work-related favors, tight security against the media and outsiders, watching over voting, 
manipulating vote counting, and so on.125  
 
The evolution and features of independent candidates mentioned above in LPC 
deputies’ election since 1979 are summarized in table 5.1.  
                                              
124 “Yao Lifa on 2006 Qianjiang People’s Congress Deputy Election”, 2007-04-09, Background and Analysis 125, 
available at http://www.world-china.org/newsdetail.asp?newsid=1834 
125 Sources come from “Lu Banglie on His Experience in the People’s Congress Deputy Election”, 2006, 
http://www.world-china.org/newsdetail.asp?newsid=1832; “Lu Guanglie: Cunguan Jiannan Zhizheng Lu” [ Lu 
Banglie: a village official’s difficult road to perform his duty], Nanfang Zhoumo[ Southern Weekend], 2004-10-07, 
http://www.southcn.com/ weekend/commend /200410070002.htm 
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Table 5.1 The evolution and features of independent candidates in LPC deputies’ election after 
1979    
___________________________________________________________________________________________                     
Time                1980                 1990s               2003            2006-2007 
Features        Initial emergence      Sporadic presence        Rapid rise        More prominence 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      A bunch of independent   Two prominent          Nearly         Several thousands 
Numbers         candidates            independent candidates     100 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Institutional   1979 Amendment      Tighten election rules      Relaxed election        Local authorities’        
Spaces         Electoral law            and                 rules and CCP’s       attitudes vary a lot     
            laid solid framework    Prudential attitudes from    attention on              although CCP  
            for semi-competitive    CCP at central level       political participation      at central level  
                       election                                                             did not show 
                                                                                         obvious opposition 
____________________________________________________________________________________________  
             ●Teachers and students   ●Staff in the city      ● Private entrepreneurs  ●Village heads 
Occupational    in University           education bureau     ● Property owners     ●Technical personnel 
and          ●Workers in enterprises  ●A worker in enterprises ● Lawyers           ● State entrepreneurs     
Regional                                                ● Students in University ● Lawyers 
Backgrounds                                            ● Village heads        ●Students  
                                                     ●Peasants,Workers    ●Community defenders 
 
           In Beijing, Hunan           In Hubei          In Hubei, Shenzhen     In Hubei, Shenzhen 
            and Chongqing            and Sichuan         Beijing              Beijing, Shanghai                         
                                                                          Wenling,Wenzhou, 
                                                                          Wuhan and Shandong 
____________________________________________________________________________________________  
Motivation     Democratic sentiments   Voicing for voters Protecting private rights   Voicing for personal 
                                                       Speaking for voters   or organization interests 
                                  Promoting democratic     Affecting policies 
 decisions 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ways to win  ● Distributing campaign ●Distributing campaign● Distributing leaflets  ● Self promoting 
the support of   leaflets                 leaflets              ●Mobilizing voters    ●Mobilizing voters 
voters    ● Campaign speech       ● Campaign speech    ● Internet communication ● Doing practical                      
●Visiting voters       ●Promising to serve for     things for voters 
                                                      Voters’ interests after elected   before the  
                                                      ●Establishing election       Election Day 
                                                       support group        ●Promising to appeal  
                                                                           to voters after elected  
                                                                          ●Internet mobilization                      
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Interaction      Loose interaction    Hostile/ Tolerant interaction   Hostile/rational   Acquiesced/confirmed 
Patterns with                    (Authorities were hostile but    interaction          /secretly coerced      
Authorities                      they would adopt a tolerance   (Independent       patterns 
(authorities’ attitudes,             if they faced strong pressures   candidates learnt to      
especially local authorities,         from the voters)              fight with opaque or 
determined distinctive                                     unfair election through  
interaction patterns)                                       legally complaints, disclosure 
to the media etc. And some  
local authorities corrected 
their wrongdoings after that) 
Source: this table is made by the author based on multiple data from interviews, media reports, archives, and 
literature.  
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5.3 The Visibility of “opposition” (i.e., voice) under tight control in indirect 
elections 
Besides the stories about the direct elections, indirect elections are the other arena that 
gives some signals about accountability in terms of elections. This kind of election 
category stipulates that congress deputies, rather than ordinary voters, elect members to 
the next higher-level people’s congress as well as the leaders in people’s congress, 
government, court, and the procuratorate at the same level.   
Compared with direct elections, indirect elections are usually regarded as more 
opaque and less accountable. Several reasons can be identified from my interviews. 
First, about 95% of the nominations of deputies at the next higher level are dominated 
by the CCP, which leaves less space for joint nomination of those strongly supported 
by deputies. Second, the deliberation processes for winning nominations is seldom 
open to the congress deputiesas voters, not to mention taking into account their 
opinions. Third, due to the loose connection between deputy candidates at higher levels 
and the electorate, voters have difficulty in getting sufficient information on them. 
Some internally confirmed candidates also do not get involved in the whole election 
process. It is a “luxury” to talk about participation and accountability with 
them(ints.9,23,27,68,72,76).  
However, tight control during an indirect election is not always workable in the 
present circumstances. “Opposition” (i.e., voices) is visible both in the election process 
and in election results, which is partly due to the enhanced accountability awareness of 
deputies and institutional arrangement of contested competition. Two examples may 
illustrate this tendency under indirect election. 
The first of these has to do with one deputy’s appeal for transparent contestation in 
the congress deputy election. To protect herself from a questionable contestation of 
municipality deputy candidates, she strategically expressed her opposition to a 
contested result by contacting the leaders inside the municipality people’s congress. 
Finally, her appeal was successful. Her case not only brought some challenges to those 
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who were in charge of election affairs but also inspired other deputies to pay more 
attention to election operations. The specific situation is as follows:   
Case 1: Appealing for transparent contestation in a congress deputy election  
From 1999 to now. I have been a three-term deputy on behalf of workers in J city people’s 
congress, elected by district deputies. To be honest, I did not quite understand the exact meaning of 
being a deputy at the first session. I also did not have strong motivation to be a deputy in the first 
two sessions, although I was successfully elected every time. However, when I really wanted to seek  
re-election in the third session in 2008, the election process did not go as smoothly as expected.  
 
At the start, it was relatively smooth. My name was put on the list of initial candidates by the 
CCP organization department after being jointly nominated by deputies. However, my name was 
crossed off the list during the deliberation stage for confirming the official candidate in my 
constituency. Of course, the competition of deputy quotas was understandable. For example, to 
ensure the success of election, a reduction in the numbers of candidates should be undertaken when 
30 candidates compete for 20 deputy quotas within one constituency, although we did not know the 
contestation criteria adopted by our leaders.  
 
 In order to know the reason why I failed during that stage, I contacted the courts to ask if they 
had received a candidates’ poll from the organization department before the official election. They 
said yes and my name was crossed off the workers deputy quotas. After checking those polls, I 
found that the 8 workers deputy quotas were occupied by 7 business owners and 1 government staff 
member. I, a real worker, was kicked off. I was dissatisfied with their deliberation results, which 
were both unfair and inconsistent with election policy requirements from higher levels.  
 
 Afterwards, I reflected on the opacity of election contestation and my story in a discussion with 
the first leader of the standing committee of J city people’s congress. He asked me how I knew 
about this issue. I said I got the information through my private connections with related 
departments. He did not promise anything to me but decided to investigate my issue. After two days, 
I heard that one deputy chairman who was in charge of election oversight in J municipality went to 
my constituency, and discussed my case with the director of party there. That party director was 
also reminded to notice the bad impact of opaque contestation among deputies. In that case, my 
name was added into the list of official candidates. I also won the deputy position during the 
subsequent election(int.73).  
 
The second and more detailed example is the loss of CCP-designated candidates 
while one accompanied candidate won the election to deputy chairman position of 
standing committee in LPC. Along with intensified competition to be deputies and 
enhanced sense of accountability, some deputies have begun to assert their opinions 
through voting power rather than just passive obedience to the arrangements from the 
party organization. This silent opposition can be observed in the following case:  
 
  
103 
 
Case 2:  From accompanied candidates (Pei Xuan 陪选) to be elected126
 At the beginning of February 2003, the Deputy Secretary of the W city party committee (the 
current mayor) talked with me. At that time, I worked in the commission of inspecting the discipline 
of the W city CCP. She said that the Party secretary decided to let me participate in the deputy 
chairman election of the standing committee for W People’s Congress. Because the chairman and 
deputy chairmen of standing committee in LPC had been internally confirmed by CCP,  this meant 
that the actual intention of the Party organization was to ensure the election of the internally 
designated candidate (Nei Ding Houxuanren 内定) by a ritualized difference election.  
 
 For me, I was not very glad to be an accompanying candidate during that election process. 
According to the customs, the office director of the standing committee in LPC was usually chosen 
as an accompanying candidate. The reason was that he or she was a younger staff member 
engaging in the work of the LPC. This would make deputies have clear ideas: he or she was the 
office director, ha-ha, and would not be the deputy chairman. The obvious difference between an 
accompanying candidate and internally designated candidate will make election easier to 
implement organizational intention. 
 
 In practice, the CCP would hold a series of meetings to let party members know, before the 
election voting in plenary congress meeting, who the party-supported persons were and who should 
not be chosen. Specifically, the LPC party meeting would confirm who should be nominated in 
accordance with the approval from the CCP committee at the higher level. They nominated twice: 
the first nomination was early and approved by the CCP committee at the higher level; the second 
nomination was not approved until several days before the plenary congress meeting, nor was it 
released. At the plenary congress meeting, the delegation would announce the addition of one 
candidate after proposing the participating candidates. This was aimed to indicate that the added 
candidate was the accompanying candidate.  
 
 When I asked our deputy secretary why chose me as an accompanying candidate, she said that 
the choice was based on party secretary’s consideration, who demanded that the candidates who 
were put in the election to a leaders’ position should have similarly high qualities. ‘That is the 
opinion of the party secretary g. I do not have time to tell you this. But please remember: do not tell 
others and do not engage in any non-organizational activities’, she added. I thought I would not be 
willing to tell anyone else because it was bad thing rather than good thing for me. After all, I was 
older and had no hope to be promoted (there is a strict age limitation for cadre promotion in 
China). Therefore, I dared to investigate all kinds of corruption when I worked in the commission 
of inspecting discipline. 
 
Although I had some complaints, I could not refuse to obey orders from the party secretary. 
When the plenary congress meeting was held, all internally designated candidates via the CCP sat 
on the podium and waited for voting. The chairman of delegation had introduced them to the party 
deputies in advance at party meetings. I did not receive any introductions, nor did I sit on the 
podium. It was very obvious that I was an accompanying candidate. However, deputies voted 
against one of the internally designated candidates—the director of one motorcycle group 
enterprise and the former deputy chairman in standing committee in our LPC—when they needed 
to choose 5 of the 6 candidates. Instead, I, one accompanying candidate, was elected. The rejection 
of that candidate was said to be due to his negative performance as a deputy chairman. In this 
regard, we can see the progress of our LPC system (int.54).   
 
                                              
126 “Accompanied candidates” here refer to those serving as foils of candidates pre-determined by CCP committee. 
Usually, candidates pre-determined by CCP will be ensured to be congress deputies unless accompanied candidates 
have enough capabilities to compete with them. The arrangement of accompanied candidates is to meet formal 
requirement of competitive election, which also the embodiment of informal politics in China.  
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More importantly, the case noted above is not unique. Early in 1998, one municipal 
deputy candidate, internally designated by the party organization, was voted against by 
the deputies at the lower level. Although the leaders mobilized party deputies to vote 
for him and ensured his election before the election, most deputies voted against him. 
The main reason was they heard that his abuse of public funds and bad life style, which 
caused their strong dissatisfaction (int.9). Similar stories were also reported about 
government leaders elected by deputies.  
The increasing function of deputies in election also can be seen based on one 
statistic. Considering the numbers of officials actually elected by congress deputies 
after 1995, some evidence has yielded an estimate of 17,535 party candidate losses: 21 
at the provincial level, 234 at the municipal level, 2,260 at the county level, and 15,020 
at the township level. 127 Undoubtedly, the vote punishment exerted by deputies may 
produce some pressures for leaders in the CCP, LPC, and government.  
 
5.4  The impact of semi-competitive election practices on the accountability 
function of LPCs 
The expectation of accountability implies a series of relationships between the LPC 
and some other actors in the institutional environment. Thus, both the changes in the 
institutional environment and actors will inevitably produce some effects on the 
accountability functions of the LPC. Focusing on semi-competitive elections, the 
impact should be assessed in terms of institutional rules and power structures. 
 
5.4.1The impact on institutional rules  
Semi-competitive election institutions provide basic rules for actors and their 
campaigning activities in Chinese LPCs. Similarly, practical developments can show 
 
127 Manion Melanie, “When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Role of Local 
People’s Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China,”The China Quarterly(2008):607-630. 
  
105 
 
its interaction with the institution, exhibiting its new institutional demand or a further 
push for the improvement of institutional rules.   
The development of independent candidates has had a positive impact on China’s 
election rule reforms. Just as described in the second part, in 2003, Shenzhen, Beijing, 
Hubei, and other places had showed many cases where independent candidates won 
election as local congress deputies. Their professional background was extensive, 
including private entrepreneurs, lawyers, students, farmers, and so on. The increasing 
political enthusiasm of the public and enhanced competition for deputy elections posed 
a challenge to the election rules at that time. The disputes caused by rising independent 
candidates and low-participation oriented institution rules directly led to the 
amendment of the Election Law of The National People’s Congress and Local People’s 
Congresses of The People’s Republic of China in 2004. The revised law adds one 
article to the introduction regarding pre-selection and encouragement of competition.  
In addition, many independent candidates and voters had begun to seek 
institutionalized protection for their right to vote, especially when local authorities 
were not in compliance with electoral rules or had used a lot of strategies to destroy the 
campaigns of others. This inevitably touches on the improvement of electoral rules and 
rule execution. Take Wu Haining’s case, for example: after failure in the election, his 
questions, including the lists of voters, the dual status of the official candidate, the 
irregular voting behavior management, and mobile ballot boxes, etc, reflected the 
demands to improve rules and their execution. More importantly, voters requests for 
removal of the deputy who was indifferent to voters’ interests in this case also showed 
specifically how the accountability of deputies was promoted through rule changes.  
 
Wu Haining was a 35 year boss at a private technology enterprise in 2003. He obtained a 
bachelor’s degree and was a non-CCP member. Although he failed in this election, his deeds were 
instructive. (1) Since he lived in the Kali garden in the Maling community, he had been keen on 
public welfare, which made him become well-known within the community. For instance, in 1998, 
he initially established an owners’ commission in Kali garden and was successful in 2001. He also 
helped the owners to solve the problem of house property certificates and protected the interests of 
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the Maling industrial zone. Protecting the rights of the community was his motivation to carry out 
subsequent campaigns (2) during the fourth Nanshan district people’s congress election in 
Shenzhen on April, 2003. Wu Haining and Song Xiaowei were accepted as formal candidates in the 
Maling constituency that had a one deputy quota. For personal reasons, Song withdrew from the 
election before Election Day. The election leading group decided to cancel the election in the 
Maling constituency because they considered that Song’s exit made this constituency fail to meet 
the statutory time for reconfirming a formal candidate. However, many voters refused to be 
deprived of their right to vote just through an administrative decree. At the same time, they wanted 
to elect one deputy to reflect the voices of Maling community. After combining the opinions of 
voters, Wu Haining reported these feelings to the standing committee of Shenzhen municipality, the 
up-level people’s congress of his district, and requested to continue the election.(3) Although the 
authority decided not to cancel the election, they reconfirmed a formal candidate, Chen Huibin, 
who was both director of the Maling community committee and head of the election leading group 
in Maling, which inevitably enhanced the difficulty for Wu Haining to win the election. (4) Faced 
with this formal candidate who was strongly supported by the organization, Wu Haining decided to 
take the initiative. He drew upon lessons from other independent candidates and posted campaign 
posters on bulletin boards within the constituency. In addition, he sent more than 1700 letters to 
voters, promising that if elected, he would hire full-time staff and establish a deputy office with his 
own funds to reflect public opinions.(5) Wu Haining insisted that voters should have comprehensive 
information about their deputy candidates before election. Candidates should let voters know their 
campaign incentives, and promises, and should communicate with their voters. The authority 
considered Wu’s behavior to be non-organizational and beyond the laws, and should be forbidden. 
Officially, on May 9th, Wu gained 229 votes, which was less than the 393 votes received by the 
reconfirmed formal candidate. Wu was not willing to accept this election result and raised 
questions in public, including about the list of voters, the dual status of the reconfirmed official 
candidate, the irregular voting behavior management, and mobile ballot boxes, etc. Faced with the 
challenge regarding the dual status of the elected deputy, Chen Huibin responded by saying that 
this stemmed from an organizational arrangement. (6) Afterwards, Wu Haining complained about 
the questionable election to the standing committee of the Nanshan district and the Shenzhen 
municipality people’s congress but received no response. On May 25th, , 2003, 33 voters from the 
Maling constituency sent a letter to the Nanshan district standing committee requesting removal of 
Chen Huibin’s congress deputy status, claiming Chen’s indifference to the interests of voters. These 
civic actions attracted much attention both from society and from the authority at local and central 
levels. 128
    
5.4.2 The impact on local power structure 
 
128 See Zhong Weizhi, Shenzhen Duli Jingxuan Diaocha (the Survey on Shenzhen’s Independent Election), Jingji 
Guancha Bao ( The Economic Observer Newspaper), May 20, 2003; Zhong Weizhi, “Shenzhen Renda Daibiao 
Bamian Shijian Genzong ( Event tracing on Removal of Congress Deputy in Shenzhen),” Jingji Guancha Bao ( The 
Economic Observer Newspaper), accessed June 23,2003, http://www.mindmeters.com/arshow.asp?id=2640. 
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The election reforms involving CCP, government, LPC, voters, independent 
candidates, and deputies have undoubtedly had an impact on the local power structure 
in China.  
First, the rapid rise of independent candidates not only means a growing enthusiasm 
for participation by ordinary people but it also promotes the LPC to be more open to 
multiple players. On the one hand, the contested competition experienced by multiple 
players is quite useful for enhancing their sense of accountability after being elected. 
On the other hand, the addition of new actors to the LPCs may strengthen its capability 
to fulfill its accountability role.  
Second, the elected independent candidates or accompanied candidates usually play 
positive functions in holding the authorities accountable to the public. Taken the 
former for example, this trend is closely related to their promise to voters. Compared 
with deputies nominated by organizations, these deputies do not have enough resources 
to guarantee their success. Therefore, voters’ support and trust become more important. 
However, their positive function will inevitably constrain or touch the power and 
vested interests of local authorities. For example, Yao Lifa, one elected independent 
candidate after a 12-year run for local congress deputy, earnestly fulfilled the mandate 
duties empowered by the Constitution and the law. He repeatedly criticized the 
government in terms of inadequate regulation and misuse of power, rejected the 
provincial government’s city planning, jointly dismissed the leader of the municipal 
civil affairs bureau, involved himself with the concerns of farmers who had been 
illegally imprisoned, and so on.129 This was why many local officials who saw their 
power positions threatened were prone to carry out strong resistance towards his 
campaign in 2006-2007. In this regard, strong coercion from local officials confirms 
the strength of the influence of independent candidates.  
 
129 Zhu Ling, Wo Fandui—Yige Renda Daibiao De Canzheng Chuanq (I object—the Road to Politics by a People's 
Congress Deputy) ( Hainan Publisher, 2006), 43-58. 
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Third, changes in the ratio of nominations inevitably affect the power relationship 
between the CCP and the LPC in the election arena. The nomination is an important 
index for observing who has the real power and who can hold whom accountable. In 
the past, the CCP almost controlled all nominations of congress deputies both at central 
and at local levels, and the loyalty that most Chinese people’s congress deputies felt 
toward the state completely overwhelmed their sense of accountability to their voters. 
The deputies who lacked a strong sense of accountability weakened the function of the 
LPC. Therefore, the marginalized power structure of the LPC was not surprising.  
Currently, significant changes can be observed from the previous election 
monopolized by the CCP with the introduction of contested elections. Little research 
has yet documented the performance of candidates across China by nomination type, 
but a few data from my fieldwork at the county level and town level provide some 
clues for the analysis of the changing nomination ratio. Table 5.2 presents the ratio of 
initial candidates, official candidates, and elected deputies nominated by different 
bodies in the 2006 election in W city and the towns below it, and in M district and the 
towns below it. Few independent candidates are noted in W city and the towns below, 
and the ratio of independent candidates is 1.8% and 0.4%, respectively. Both the ratio 
of candidates and the ratio of elected deputies jointly nominated by voters reach more 
than 75%, up to 97%, which is higher than the election statistics for 1997-1998 done 
by some Chinese scholars, who stated that the ratio of candidates jointly nominated by 
voters reached 15% at its lowest point and up to 70%. 130 More importantly, the ratio 
between official candidates after consultation and elected deputies demonstrates that 
the rate of unsuccessful nominations of candidates by organizations reached 54.5% in 
W city and 44.4% in towns, while the rate of unsuccessful nominations of candidates 
jointly nominated by voters were 17.1% and 42%, respectively. In M city and towns 
below it, a lower rate of unsuccessful candidates nominated by organizations had a 
 
130 The election statistic in 1997-1998 at Chinese county level can be seen from Shi Weimin and Liu Zhi, Jianjie 
Xuanju( Indirect Elections,Vol.1) ( Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe,2004),432. 
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close relationship with its strict limitations on numbers and prudential considerations 
of candidates nominated by organizations.  
 
Table 5.2 The ratio of candidates nominated by different bodies in 2006 LPCs election 
                            Total      Candidates nominated    Candidates jointly    Independent 
by organizations      nominated by voters     candidates 
(Mainly by CCP) 
  W city    
1 The number of              1964             288(14%)            1680(86%) 
 Initial candidates  
2 Official candidates            534             189(35%)             345(65%) 
  after consultation 
3 Elected deputies              379              86(23.2%)           286(75%)         7(1.8%) 
                                    （Unsuccessful rate:54.5%） （Unsuccessful rate:17.1%） 
 Towns below W city 
1 The number of               3258              537(16%)           2721(84%) 
 Initial candidates  
2 Official candidates            1823             385(21%)           1438(79%) 
  after consultation 
3 Elected deputies             1040              214(20.6%)         822(79%)          4 (0.4%)                        
(Unsuccessful rate: 44.4%)  （Unsuccessful rate:42.8%） 
 
 M district 
1 The number of               3258              43(15%)             2775(85%) 
 Initial candidates  
2 Official candidates             423               43(10%)             380(90%) 
  after consultation 
3 Elected deputies              265               40(15%)             225(85%)           0                         ※
(Unsuccessful rate: 0.07%)  （Unsuccessful rate: 41%） 
 
Towns below M district 
1 The number of               2192              72(3%)               2120(97%) 
 Initial candidates  
2 Official candidates            1102              72（7%）            1030（93%） 
  after consultation 
 
3 Elected deputies              666               70（11%）            596（89%）      0    ※                      
(Unsuccessful rate:0.04 %)  （Unsuccessful rate: 52 %） 
 
B district 
1 The number of initial          482                418                     64 
 Candidates   
2 Official candidates after        384               350 (91.15%)              34(8.85%) 
 Consultation   
3 Elected deputies              215                206                       9 
 
Towns below B district 
1 The number of initial          349                290                       59 
  Candidates   
2 Official candidates after        349                290                       59 
  Consultation   
3 Elected deputies              235                220                       15 
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Source: Calculated from unopened data in the 2006 election statistics report from W city in Zhejiang, M district in 
Shanghai, and B district in Hefei Anhui. The calculation of independent candidates in M district was put together 
with the calculation with candidates jointly nominated by voters, so the numbers of independent candidates were 
zero. 
5.5 Conclusion 
What we learn from China’s new developments in electoral accountability is that it 
should be understood within a general institutional framework and with specific 
political contexts. The reconstruction of an electoral system in China’s LPCs has 
benefited significantly from the CCP leaders’ demands to re-establish legitimacy since 
1979.   
In contrast to conventional knowledge that the CCP controlled the whole election 
process without the interruption from below, current practices show that different 
stories are now appearing. Along with the introduction of semi-contested electoral 
rules, the stipulation on re-writing favorable candidates as well as demands for political 
participation of the public, the CCP’s nomination both of ordinary positions and 
leadership positions to congresses slowly deviating away from the previous 
consequential electoral success.  
Against this background, the introduction of semi-competitive rules has created 
more opportunities for ordinary voters to enter into the LPCs, to vote for those they 
support, or to vote against those they dislike. Besides the election practices mentioned 
in this chapter, more and more voters declare to campaign for congress deputies in 
terms of independent candidates via micro-blogging in 2011 election year. And more 
critical voices appear in the face of the negative attitude from the NPC 
toward ”independent candidates”. 131  The emergence and campaigning of 
independent/informal candidates contribute inevitably to the openness of the electoral 
 
131 It is difficult to calculate the exact numbers of independent candidates for congress deputies in 2011 election 
year due to the ongoing process until now. However, media reports, academic meetings and micro-blogging in 
China provide channels to observe the increasing participation enthusiasm from voters as well as diverse campaign 
strategies adopted by them. See Fan Xiehong, “Duli houxuanren wu falv yiju? Gongmin duli canxuan jiang gaibian 
zhongguo” (No legal basis for independent candidates? The participation for the public in the election for congress 
deputies will bring great change for China), Chinese media network, accessed June 10, 2011, 
http://news.ccvic.com/shehui/gnyw/2011/0610/54441.shtml(accessed 10 June,2011); Yanyi and Wang Junfeng, 
“The symposium on the phenomena for independent candidate,” accessed Aug 27,2011, 
http://www.fepc.org.cn/Article.aspx?ArtID=804.  
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process, the accountability connection with voters, and the interaction with the 
authorities in direct elections. In indirect elections, deputies can appeal for transparent 
elections and reject candidates selected by the Communist Party, although the numbers 
remain limited.  
However, some local authorities still work hard to control elections. This inevitably 
brings challenges for expanding the campaigning and the input of new actors in 
positions of the LPCs. At the same time, we should recognize that some changes have 
happened in terms of spurring political participation demands from the public. The 
subsequent public pressure will be a favorable political context for the improvement of 
accountability within the one-party regime.  
In short, the new developments in electoral accountability in the Chinese LPC are 
promising but complex. Evidence gathered in this study has showed some deviation 
from the zero-based CCP monopoly model although the CCP committee still holds a 
dominant position in the election of people’s congress deputies. In the past, the 
Communist Party controlled uncontested elections and implemented quotas to produce 
congresses that crudely mirrored society in composition. The elections conferred on 
congress delegates a purely ceremonial post, premised on political reliability. 132 
Today, it is now possible for voters and deputies to show some pressure toward public 
power by voting for their favored deputies. However, this kind of electoral constraint is 
still limited due to the constrained input of more new actors; further accountability 
expectations cannot be met without the updating of political ideas from party 
leadership and institutional innovations within the LPCs themselves.  
 
 
 
132 Melanie Manion, “When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Functionof Local 
People’s Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China,” The China Quarterly(2008):607-630. 
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6.The Accountability Linkage between Congress Deputies 
and Constituents 
In liberal democracies, elections with free and competitive features are treated as the 
most important accountability mechanism, through which the electorate can choose 
their delegates to represent their preferences, or vote against those who have poor 
performance or who misuse their power.133 In this view, accountability may be ensured 
partly due to election competitiveness, which has the potential to attract the electorate’s 
interest and increase the deputy’s sense of accountability. It is also closely related to 
deputies’ motivation for re-election; that is, the anticipation of not being re-elected in 
the future leads elected officials not to shirk their obligations to the voters in the 
present. 134
 In accordance with this logic, both the incentives of re-election and the constraints 
of the electoral mechanism on legislators’ performance in countries without completely 
competitive election, just like China, will be doubtful. For instance, McCormick 
pointed out that all deputies that he had interviewed had not wanted to become 
deputies, and most constituents had less idea about who their deputies were and seldom 
sought for their help in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 135 Xia argues that there is 
minimal electoral connection and this has less to do with responsiveness between the 
elected and those who elect them.136 Similarly, Manion argues that representation in 
 
133 Several representative literature in terms of this theme are as follows: Eulau Heinz and Karps. Paul D, “The 
Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.2, 
No.3(1977):233-254; Strøm Kaare, “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies,” European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol.37(2000):261-289; Mitchell Paul, “Voters and their representatives: Electoral 
Institutions and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies,” European Journal of Political Research, 
Vol.37(2000):335-351. 
134 See Fearon,J.D, “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus 
Sanctioning Poor Performance,” in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Edited by A. Przeworsk, 
S.C.Stokes and B.Manin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); David Mayhew, “Congress: The 
Electoral Connection” in American Politics: Core Argument/ Current Controversy, edited by Peter J. Woolley and 
Albert R.Papa( Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2002):213-216.  
135 McCormick, Barrett L, “China’s Leninist Parliament and Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis,” in China 
after Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia? Edited by Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan 
Unger, Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe(1996): 40-45. 
136 Xia Ming, The People’s Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network of Governance (London: 
Routledge, 2007):101. 
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Chinese local scenes is not a research question due to the authoritarian genesis. It is not 
obvious who the principals of congress deputies are—or indeed if deputies view 
themselves as agents of constituents at all, in practice.137 Unlike the scholars’ opinions 
mentioned above, O’Brien finds that not all deputies are inactive and not all close their 
eyes to constituents’ affairs. Some deputies are active, but they behave chiefly as 
regime agents and remonstrators rather than as representatives.138
Against these backdrops, the “zero-base-model” in terms of accountability linkage 
between congress deputies and constituents supposes that most congress deputies are 
indifferent to their constituencies or constituent interests and are poorly motivated. 
Simply put, it is very normal for them to cast more loyalty toward the CCP and state 
and to feel less responsibility toward their constituents under the authoritarian setting 
of the CCP-dominated election and re-election processes.  
However, the symbolic or honorary status of the accountability linkage between 
congress deputies and constituents seems to be starting to change. Indeed, Manion had 
redressed her previous opinion by asserting that local congress deputies are substantive 
representatives, on the basis of new evidence.139 The question then becomes whether 
Chinese legislators are inclined to represent the interests of constituents and be 
accountable to them after they are elected. In the authoritarian context dominated by 
one party, is it possible for Chinese congress deputies to contact their constituents 
positively and be accountable to them at local scenes? If so, how and why?  
According to the three criteria of accountability—controllability, transparency and 
answerability—mentioned in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2), this chapter first 
assesses the recall institution arrangement at the macro level for constituents to hold 
deputies accountable. Limited constraint is noted. Secondly, micro-level institutional 
innovations to hold congress deputies accountable in LPCs will be described and 
 
137 Manion,Melanie, “When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Role of Local 
People’s Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China,” China Quarterly, No.125(2008):607-630, P 629. 
138 O’Brien.Kevin, “Agents and Remonstrators: Role accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies”, China 
Quarterly, No.138 (June, 1994):365-372. 
139 See Manion,Melanie, “Chinese Congressional Representation as an Institution” (paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 2-5, 2009). 
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assessed. Thirdly, relying on empirical evidence, contact activities, performance, and 
incentives are explored mainly from the perspective of elected deputies, staff within 
LPCs, and constituents. The final section of this chapter concludes with main findings 
that contrast with previous research.   
  
6.1 Recall power with limited constraint  
The accountability linkage between congress deputies and constituents rests on the 
delegation premise that whoever is elected as deputies should act by those who 
delegated their power and entitled to speak for. According to the Constitution and 
related laws, both constituents and electoral units have legal right to oversight, even to 
recall their elected congress deputies, especially when the latter violate laws, escape 
from political missions, or have poor performance. The provision in Article 43 of 
Electoral Law states, “All deputies to the national and local people’s congresses shall 
be subject to the supervision of constituents and the electoral units which elect them. 
Both constituents and electoral units shall have the right to recall the deputies they 
elect.” The recall proposal is not valid unless signed by more than 30 constituents’ 
jointly at the county level and 50 constituents’ jointly above the county level.  
According to conventional wisdom, the majority of constituents usually stay away 
from supervising the actions of the deputies they elected, not to mention recalling 
them. The right to vote is also less used unless constituents are actively mobilized. 
Hence, the tendency becomes unavoidable in some places: On the one hand, some 
congress deputies, especially those that identify strongly with the CCP, only account 
for their authority instead of keeping in mind their sacred responsibility to the people 
who elected them. On the other hand, some legal channels for opening up information 
and enhancing communication are paid less attention. The will of the constituents is 
seldom input via congress deputies into the political process.  
However, emerging events on recalling of congress deputies in recent years show 
the gradual transition of constituents’ interest and accountability awareness. For 
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instance, 33 constituents signed up to recall one newly elected deputy in Nanshan 
district, Shenzhen, in the first half of 2003. That deputy was accused of avoiding 
running for the deputy position as the head of election leadership group before being 
elected as well as being indifferent to public issues after he was elected. Although the 
recall was finally rejected by the district standing committee, its effect as a rare 
initiative by constituents has been expanded since then. On 25, May 2003, 61 
constituents in Yingfeng district, Zhuzhou city, Hunan province requested the removal 
of the deputy qualification of their resident committee director Yuan Zhiliang, 
asserting that Yuan abused  his power and failed to act on his constituents’ behalf. 
Ultimately, the district standing committee of people’s congress voted against setting 
up the recall procedure because only 26 constituents continued to insist on removing 
Yuan after four months of investigation. In Tianjing, a joint removal request against 
deputy Dingbing was proposed by 196 constituents in February 2007, condemning 
Ding’s construction company for causing huge economic losses of the people. While 
the district standing committee agreed to initiate a recall procedure, ultimately no result 
occurred due to the constraint of vague procedures and ambiguous attitudes from the 
district leadership. Following these events, on 17th January 2011, 211 constituents 
submitted their proposal to recall their congress deputy Yang Xiancheng, via joint 
signatures, in Luqiao district, Taizhou municipality, Zhejiang province. However, the 
recall failed again. 
While constituents’ accountability awareness is significantly increasing, recall 
activities initiated directly by constituents have had no obvious influence on deputies’ 
final turnover. This is partly due to the fact that the constituents’ proposals for removal 
of incompetent deputies are usually constrained or rely highly on the approval of 
political authorities who have extreme discretionary power. In addition, some detailed 
stipulations, such as under what conditions people's congress deputies are dismissed 
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and how to start the recall process, remain ambiguous in the related laws. One detailed 
event regarding a citizen-initiated removal of congress deputies is as follows: 
 
On August 17, 2010 an application jointly signed by 64 citizens under the lead of citizen Zhang 
Jianzhong was submitted to the Standing Committee of Xiacheng district people’s congress in 
Hangzhou, China, demanding the removal of chairman of Hangzhou Flexed Noble Group Limited, 
the legal representative of the Zhao Zhiyi deputies. The reasons mainly referred to "seizure of 
house property, affecting the course of justice in the name of congress deputy.” Zhang Jianzhong 
and related constituents insisted that it is hopeless for congress deputies who blatantly violate laws 
to act in the interest of constituents and they deserve to be recalled.   
According to the "National People's Congress and local people's congresses at all levels of the 
electoral law,” the original constituents, more than 50 people may jointly, in writing, request the 
removal of the Standing Committee on behalf of the application. As the proponent Zhang Jianzhong 
did not belong to the original constituents, and the vast majority of joint applicants are also not the 
original constituents, the application is rejected due to the failure to meet the requirement by law.  
Although the Letters and Visits office of Xiacheng district people’s congress did not open Zhao 
Zhiyi’s original constituents to Zhang Jianzhong in the name of confidentiality, 75 older employees 
from Zhao’s group and constituency allied with Zhang to submit a second application for removal 
of Zhang Zhiyi. The re- application also increased the removal of "forced to dismiss older workers 
buyouts, forced employees 'volunteer' to take 5 years less seniority compensation and embezzlement 
of state assets "and other reasons. However, this case is still ongoing. While complex procedures 
bring a lot of obstacles to constituents’ successful recall of congress deputies, it is worth 
mentioning that this case has attracted much attention from the media, experts, congress deputies, 
and citizens. 140
Although most LPCs usually hold a cautious attitude toward these events characterized 
by political sensitivity, apparently the recall activities mobilized by standing 
committees of the LPCs or the CCP seem to be effective in deciding the removal of 
congress deputies. Take one event of  officially mobilized removal of congress 
deputies, for example:      
 
Mi Xiaodong was elected to the fifteenth county deputy in Xupu County, Hunan province, in 
November 2007. On his own initiative, he visited constituents to collect their complaints and 
petitions on the eve of the plenary meeting of the people’s congress. Later, he also submitted some 
 
140 For more detailed description, please see Chen Dongsheng and Yu Yanli. “Hangzhou, a joint application for 
dismissal of another 75 people under the District People’s Congress.” Fazhi ribao (Legal Daily), accessed Aug 
26,2010, http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20100826/Articel04003GN.htm; “64 voters want to jointly 
recall congress deputy in Xiacheng district people’s congress, Hangzhou”, Zhejiang Online, 
http://news.sohu.com/20100819/n274315082.shtml. 
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valuable suggestions via joint signature with other congress deputies; for instance, a suggestion to 
improve the benefits of village and street cadres, the improvement of rural public utilities, and so 
on.  
However, Mi Xiaodong not only neglected his duty as one deputy but also was sentenced to three 
years in prison due to his embezzlement of public funds in 2009, which produced an unexpected 
negative impact among constituents. Therefore, with the responsible support from the county 
people’s congress, 51 constituents in his constituency submitted their recall application for Mi to 
the Standing Committee.  
On 15, April 2010, constituents from No 138 constituency began to remove the fifteenth session 
deputy position of Mi Xiaodong by secret ballot in Xupu County, Hunan province. In total, 6444 
constituents took part in the final vote, among 7003 constituents. Ultimately, the recall of congress 
deputy Mi Xiaodong was passed by 5553 votes, 159 votes against, and 732 abstentions. The issue 
was released to the public after the Standing Committee of Xupu people’s congress listened to the 
removal report, declaring the termination of Mi’s deputy position. 141
 
Therefore, besides the improvement in related procedures, the approval and support 
from the authorities is crucial for constituents to use this institutional power effectively 
in the Chinese local context. At the same time, we also found that constituents have at 
least one recognition in common: they all try to sanction deputies who have failed or 
show no capacity to reflect the will and interests of the people in their electoral 
districts, although the reasons for these recalls of congress deputies may differ in many 
ways and ideal results are still difficult to achieve in the present circumstances.  
 
6.2 Micro-level institutional innovations to hold congress deputies accountable 
According to the data obtained from interviews, fieldwork observations, and media 
reports, related institutional innovations that are characteristic of transparency and 
answerability can be seen from the following experiments carried out by LPCs.  
 
Institutional connection mechanisms between deputies and constituents 
 
141 The source mainly comes from Mingxing, “Voters recall congress deputy sentenced to probation in Xupu county 
Hunan province”,Remin wang (People’s Daily), Accessed on May 26,2010, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/11705361.html. 
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Congress deputy performance in reporting to constituents or their constituency, 
institutionalized connection between deputies and constituents, and deputy 
workstations are three prominent mechanisms for LPC innovations. The latter two 
were initiated in M people’s congress and W people’s congress and have attracted 
much attention from both media and scholars. The detailed information is as follows: 
Congress deputy performance in reporting to constituents or the constituency is one 
popular system for demonstrating what has been done or what has not been completed 
on the behalf of the delegators and was first started in 1988. Many LPCs since then 
have begun to enact related regulations to enhance their deputies’ awareness of the 
need to perform their duties. Even now, this is still quite commonly used in B people’s 
congress, J people’s congress and W people’s congress. Deputy performance reporting 
is usually carried out under the auspices of specific personnel, a representative 
Working Commission, or the standing committee once per year. Procedurally, the 
self-evaluation report is given first, which relates to the deputy’s activities in abiding 
by the Constitution and concerned laws, reviewing governmental working reports, 
submitting suggestions and motions, participating in PC meetings, connecting with the 
electorate, and so on. A trust evaluation, which has a performance rank for deputies 
ranging from outstanding, competent, basically competent, to incompetent, is given by 
participating constituents (ints. 23, 43,76). Although respondents admit that this system 
does contribute to reducing the alienation between deputies and constituents, they also 
mention some formalism exists due to low involvement of numerous deputies and the 
lack of any true interaction between deputies and constituents (ints.30, 32, 48, 67).  
In contrast, M people’s congress ceased the use of the deputy performance reporting 
system after a short attempt in 2003. Because the main leaders in the CCP committee 
and governments co-chaired the positions of congress deputies at that time, it was 
difficult for them to visit constituents or to carry out relevant activities except for 
engaging in their own work. In addition, no definite stipulation is defined for this 
system in related laws (ints.9, 15). Against this background, the standing committee of 
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M people’s congress voted on 27 Feb, 2008 for measures for promoting close contact 
between the district deputies and constituents to lay an institutional foundation for its 
implementation across the whole M district. With the intention of effectively reflecting 
and responding to constituents’ opinions, these measures not only involve the contexts 
and forms for deputies to contact their constituents but they also prescribe that every 
deputy should contact their constituents at least twice every year.  
The arguments of the standing committee chairman in M people’s congress provide 
us with some clues about the possible effects of this institutional innovation: 
“enhancing the close contact with constituents is one of my main works after I was 
elected as the chairman of standing committee. On the one hand, it is easy to obtain 
political support both from the CCP committee and government due to the potential to 
reflect public demands and resolve social conflicts, which is consistent with the main 
political pressure faced by the CCP and government at the local level. In practice, in 
order to support this institution, the CCP and government in the M district agree to 
allocate a budget of RMB 1000 million to solve the proposals, suggestions, and 
motions reflected by the deputies. On the other hand, an institutionalized measure can 
bring some constraints for congress deputies, especially those with strong 
organizational and CCP backgrounds, to involve them in the interaction with their 
constituents or constituency. In turn, the potential is there to motivate congress 
deputiesto perform an accountability function and even to provide a further 
enhancement of the influence of LPCs within local governance” (ints.8, 13,14, 15).   
Since 2009, the W people’s congress has established more than 40 congress deputy 
workstations for different constituencies, which are composed of congress deputies 
from all three levels—town, city and municipality—within certain constituencies. They 
are listed in the items of the annual budget and their main tasks are to resolve social 
conflicts, provide services for constituents, urge the government to solve livelihood 
problems, and enhance the communication between government and constituencies at 
fixed times and places. This institutional platform underwent a two-stage evolution in 
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2005: first, it stemmed from the LPC’s petition reception rooms, and then extended 
into the workrooms of congress deputies to fully play the accountability role of 
congress deputies. Secondly, with the increase in social demands and conflicts, 
collective deputy workstations appeared to replace petition reception rooms and 
individual workrooms involved in limited congress deputies and limited services. 
Deputy workstations in the W people’s congress gained recognition from higher 
people’s congresses although the innovation for establishing individual workrooms for 
congress deputies in other areas was demanded to stop by the National people’s 
congress due to their prudent attitude towards individual-centered political reform 
experiments. One important reason is that the workstations are collective-based places 
for congress deputies to hold surgeries within constituency rather than individual-based 
activities (ints.51, 55). 142  Subsequently, many LPCs tend to carry out similar 
innovations. For instance, the J people’s congress has embarked on the establishment 
of “the home to congress deputies” since 2010 while its effect has not been obvious 
until now.  
 
The openness of activities by congress deputies and LPCs 
The activities of deputies both in terms of the individual deputy and standing 
committees were not known to the public in 1980s and 1990s in China. With the 
strengthening of democratic demands, opening up the activities of elected 
representatives to constituents has become one inevitable trend. Related practices 
became more widespread after the promulgation of the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Supervision by the Standing Committees of the People’s Congresses at All 
Levels in 2006. Article 7 stipulates that the standing committees of the people’s 
 
142 The National People’s Congress tried to prevent innovative efforts of local people’s congress to establish work 
room and provide full-time service in terms of individual congress deputy via the revised congress deputy law in 
2010, which are criticized undemocratic. For more detailed information please see the following report: Li 
Xiuzhong and Zhao Hui, “Woguo shouge renda daibiao gongzuoshi bei jiaoting (The first congress deputy 
workroom has been stopped in China),” Oriental website, Accessed Aug 31, 2010, 
http://news.qq.com/a/20100831/000159.htm. 
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congresses at all levels shall make known to the public their exercise of the power of 
supervision. While the J people’s congress is emerging in this aspect, related reforms 
in the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress are prominent. As the main 
actors of standing committees, opening their activities to the public is also one channel 
for standing committees to urge deputies to perform their functions actively, to exert 
pressures on governmental activities, and to enhance public trust toward the people’s 
congress. While standing committees have no legal power to supervise or evaluate the 
congress deputies’ accountability performance along with basic principle-agent 
relationship, they can play a crucial role in motivating them (ints. 15, 54, 55).  
The J people’s congress and the B people’s congress launched websites to provide 
public information on standing committees’ work and deputies’ activities, but some 
key information on supervisory activities, deliberation opinions, personnel 
appointment and removal, suggestions and motions, decisions, and so on are only 
shown briefly. For example, the column of deputies’ activities in their website  shows 
that only some rough information in terms of the list of names of the deputies and good 
deeds from advanced deputies, which are insufficient for constituents to obtain basic 
information on their deputies, not to mention evaluating them on the basis of their 
actions in office. At the same time, the J people’s congress has established an openness 
system with feedback information about deputies’ initiated motions and suggestions, 
following practices by other advanced people’s congresses. The internet platform 
among governments, people’s congresses, and political consultation members has been 
opened since 2010 to resolve public grievances, through which the public can readily 
make inquiries on governmental activities. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
traditional conservative attitude toward information openness can still be found in the 
process of interviews with some officials in the J and B people’s congresses. For 
instance, petition information is regarded as internal secret and its release or discussion 
was avoided when asked for in both of these people’s congresses (ints.26, 37, 68, 72).  
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Along with the dominant idea to inform of the public and monitor the government, 
the W people’s congress has tried to deepen the practice of openness in three different 
ways. First, an institutional framework on the transparency of elector-empowered 
power began to take shape, especially after the issuing of the opinion to carry out open 
principles prescribed in the Supervision Law on 23 July 2007. The contents, scopes, 
forms, and channels for opening are clearly defined within this document.  
Second, it simultaneously pioneered multiple traditional channels to provide 
information about the activities of the standing committee and congress deputies to the 
widest possible audience, including media reports, work communications, press 
conferences, and citizens attending forms. When it comes to contents to the public, the 
standing committee meeting, chairpersons meeting, inspections on law enforcement, 
crucial decisions from the standing committee, personnel appointment and removal 
results, and other congress deputy activities are usually reported to the public. Some 
information that is not suitable for release to society is notified to congress deputies 
through internal publications designated “LPC Work Communications” and “Standing 
Committee Proceedings.” At the same time, the Citizen Participation System provides 
access for citizens to observe the operation of the standing committee and the 
performance of congress deputies after registration. For instance, seven ordinary 
citizens went into the hall of the standing committee at the end of November 2008 to 
attend the fourteenth meeting of the fourteenth session on the basis of inviting the 
attendance of congress deputies and the leaders of lower level people’s congress.  
The third and most successful demonstration of the practice of openness by the W 
people’s congress is innovation using the internet and TV platforms. Specifically, the 
W people’s congress website and “people’s attention” TV column act as main 
platforms to perform this function. Except for the transmission of information on 
policy and laws, the annual job objectives of standing committees, budget supervision, 
personnel appointment and removal, investigation reports, media focus, and so on, 
these modern channels provide more information on deputies’ work for the public. On 
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the one hand, suggestions and motions proposed by deputies were collected into a 
special section on this column at the first half of one year, with the intention of letting 
the public as constituents know what kinds of issues congress deputies were concerned 
about and if deputies were behaving on the behalf of their interests. At the same time, 
the feedback on suggestions and motions from concerned governmental branches also 
appears on the website in the second half of the year, which is useful to tell the public 
how their issues are reflected by the deputies and solved by governments or how they 
are being prepared to be dealt with. On the other hand, the deliberation process of 
congress deputies on governmental department work reports and subsequent feedback 
from governmental departments are open to the public via live online video broadcasts 
and factual films. In addition, some new interaction mechanisms termed online 
democratic deliberation, and forum participation by the public, congress deputies, and 
leaders of standing committees have become more widespread recently in the W 
people’s congress. These are inevitably good for the public for obtaining more 
information on key work engaged in by congress deputies.    
In contrast, the M people’s congress is outstanding in its openness on budget 
supervision and deputy contact with constituents. The institutional openness on budget 
information, the budget deliberation process, and budget hearings implemented in the 
M people’s congress not only encourage democratic involvement of multiple actors 
but also provide innovative access for constituents to observe the performance of the 
government, LPC and individual deputies. To a certain extent, the pressure caused by 
openness can be seen as an invisible inspiration for them to perform their duties 
responsibly.  
The deputies’ contact with constituents has been promoted by a set of institutions 
enacted to make the whole process open to constituents. First, contact activities by 
deputies with constituents are open to constituents and deputies via multiple media, 
which include congress lists, contact with methods, frequencies, information 
collection, and subsequent handling. Who behaves actively and who never becomes 
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known to their constituents becomes very clear. Second, a network processing 
platform on deputies’ written suggestions and motions has been established since 2008 
to place all work under the joint supervision of the public and deputies. On the one 
hand, this platform makes the numbers to contact with constituents and contents of 
suggestions and motions proposed by congress deputies known to everyone, which 
inevitably prompts deputies to perform their duties more seriously and more 
responsibly. On the other hand, every deputy has access to information on which 
governmental branch deals with their suggestions and motions，so that they can check 
the processing progress and results feedback via this internet platform. The internet 
system will also give warning in red lights if concerned governmental branches have 
not dealt with them within a given time. In this regard, this platform plays some role in 
pressing the government to make timely responses to deputies’ voices on the behalf of 
their constituents (ints.3, 20).  
Furthermore, the commission of personnel appointments, removals, and deputy 
elections to the standing committee follows up on the congress deputies’ practical 
activities and governmental feedback, which is regarded as a useful way to push them 
to be accountable. Just as the leader of this commission says, ‘we are the tie between 
congress deputies and government: we can help deputies to perform their duties by 
training them and improving working methods. For instance, they are advised to 
strategically supervise governmental work on the behalf of constituents’ interest rather 
than criticize, regardless of the sensibilities. At the same time, we also…communicate 
with the CCP committee and government to change attitudes when congress deputies 
are mistreated during the process of appealing their constituents’ issues. Practice has 
proved that this is very important for stimulating deputies to perform their duties 
actively (int.15).  
 
6.3 How and why congress deputies keep in touch with their constituents 
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Along with different degrees of institutional innovations in the four fieldwork LPCs, 
marked differences emerged regarding how congress deputies maintained contact with 
their constituents and what motivated them to be accountable. To ascertain how they 
differed and to identify significant incentives for deputies to be accountable to their 
constituents, the author gathered detailed data about the M people’s congress, where 
two questionnaires on the perceptions of deputies and constituents were conducted in 
2010. Survey methods and basic demographics are summarized in the methodology 
chapter (Chapter 3). At the same time, several congress deputies were interviewed 
there. Due to the time limitations for performing the survey, the data on the other three 
people’s congresses mainly come from the authors’ interviews, fieldwork observations, 
and media reports.  
 
Main channels and frequencies for congress deputies to contact with constituents 
As far as channels for congress deputies to contact with constituents as concerned, 
respondents in the B people’s congress viewed that visiting and making performance 
reports to constituents are available channels for contact with constituents apart from 
joining inspection tours organized by the standing committee between plenary sessions 
at times. Symposiums are held with lesser frequency (ints.23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 39). However, some deputies are not responsible and even avoid taking part 
in collective activities due to weak constraints after the elections. This can be observed 
from one chat snapshot between the author and the director of Personnel appointment, 
removal, and representative election commission: 
I went to B people’s congress and wanted to interview congress deputies to 
comprehend their experiences relating to their performance of accountability functions 
on the 29th October 2009. The deputies were concerned about the interviews, especially 
from stranger, so I had to ask for help in advance from an acquaintance, the director of 
Personnel appointment, removal, and representative election commission who has 
more contact with deputies both in his daily work and in his past 11 years’ tenure in B 
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people’s congress. I asked if he had succeeded in arranging appointments with 
congress deputies for me when I met him in his office that day. However, he seemed a 
little bit depressed, saying that most deputies claimed they were too busy to conduct 
interviews although he had tried to call them many times. He continued to say that 
many deputies were also absent and were attending symposiums with constituents and 
had given similar excuses yesterday. I asked him, jokingly, ‘Why do I feel that you 
have to beg congress deputies to perform their function?’ He said with a wry smile: 
‘Just as what I told you repeatedly—most deputies to our people’s congress are not 
active after they are elected and they do not take part in activities and contact with 
constituents, whereas they were extremely active to compete for positions of deputies 
before elected. We have no effective ways to constrain or motivate them (cited from 
the author’s research log done in 2009). 
Some channels are available for deputies to contact their constituents in J people’s 
congress, involving inspection, public hearings, personal visits, symposia, making 
performance reports to constituents, and so on. Undoubtedly these channels provide 
access to collect petitions and suggestions from constituents and voting areas. 
However, it should be pointed out that the frequencies of these types of personally 
initiated contact activities are rare. Some congress deputies are reluctant to view 
contact activities with constituents positively, unless they face strong demands from 
the public, or they are inspired by something else (ints.65, 66, 70, 75, and 76).  
Deputies in the W people’s congress have more contacts with constituents under 
new institutional contexts. Specifically, inspection, deputy workstations, making 
performance reports to constituents, internet interactions, and public hearings are 
available channels for deputies to communicate with their constituents in the W 
people’s congress. The deputy workstation plays a prominent role in involving more 
deputies in public issues among the multiple channels mentioned above. According to 
rough statistics, deputies’ activities organized by deputy workstations have reached 
432 instances by the end of September 2010—one year after their establishment. The 
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attendance of deputies at the workstations only at the W city level was near to 30 
percent of the whole deputy numbers, and 1219 constituents were contacted during the 
process. At the same time, the strict implementation of making performance reports to 
constituents has contributed to increasing the perception of accountability by the 
deputies. For instance, 248 deputies (69 percent of the deputy population) were 
evaluated by 6500 constituents in this session, and the results were 66.66% judged as 
excellent, 32.22% were passed, and 0.92% were regarded as incompetent. 143 Some 
deputies admitted that similar situations brought a lot of pressure to them, especially 
for those who used to raise hands, clap hands, and shake hands in dealing with public 
issues (ints.44, 48, 50, 51).  
Similarly, more frequent and extensive contacts have been established between 
congress deputies and constituents in the M people’s congress via multiple 
communication channels. According to the stipulations in related measures, 
investigations, personal visits, symposia, publicly receptions, key connecting persons, 
and participating in meetings are listed as multiple channels for holding deputies 
accountable to their constituents. In practice, related statistics have confirmed that 
these institutions contribute significantly to both the collection of public opinions and 
the solution of complaints, as well as increasing the accountability consciousness of the 
deputies.  
On the one hand, internal data in the M people’s congress shows that 3159 instances 
of contact activities with constituents had been carried out, and more than 37710 
constituents were contacted and 5573 public opinions as well as suggestions were 
received by all the deputies from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2010. This was 
equivalent to 12.4 times contact activities, 149 constituent contacts, and 22 collected 
public opinions per deputy (for the data per year, please see table 6.1 below). This 
positive result also can be seen from the perspective of the congress deputies. When 
 
143  Mao Donggang and Shi Yancai, “Ba Luzhi Pingtai Dajian Zai Baixing Shenbian（Building platforms for 
performing duties with intention to closely serve for voters）,” Renmin Daibiaowang( the website on congress 
deputies) , April 1, 2011, http://www.rmdbw.gov.cn/2011/0401/51222.html. 
  
128 
 
asked “How often do you contact your constituents as a congress deputy?” in the 2009 
questionnaire conducted by the author, 54.7%  of the congress deputies (106 
informants) admitted that they contacted their constituents at least twice per year, 
38.7% said that they did this 1-2 times per month, and only 0.9% deputies contended 
that they seldom communicated with their constituents. 
Table 6.1 Contacts between deputies and constituents in the M people’s congress from 2008 to 
2010 
      
Performance 
Year 
Attendance 
numbers of 
deputies 
Contact 
frequency 
With constituents
Numbers of 
constituents that 
being contacted 
Collected 
opinions and 
comments from 
constituents 
2008  255 1023 14753 1799 
2009  255 1048 11908 1913 
2010  255 1088 11049 1861 
Source: the author’s calculation, relying on work records of the personnel appointment, removal, 
and representative elections commission to the M people’s congress during 2008-2010. 
On the other hand, deputies made many attempts to handle issues raised by 
constituents to live up to their delegations. Specifically, direct responses by 
themselves, requiring towns as lower governments for solutions, and reflecting issues 
to related government branches at district level were the three main methods used to 
enhance answerability to the constituents. Some information collected from 
constituents was input into the political process via submitting suggestions, appealing 
to deputies at higher levels, and other innovative methods, while usage frequencies 
were lower. The number of direct response by deputies and suggestion submissions 
clearly decreased since 2010 (see figure 6.1). The reason for this was that considerable 
social conflicts and petitions were solved in the process of these frequent interactions 
among deputies, constituents, and concerned governmental branches. Therefore, the 
issues reflected to deputies tended toward a downward trend. Furthermore, both 
constituents and deputies have gradually learned to make allowances for others and 
reflected their issues in kind rather than just focusing on trifles after these years of 
practice (ints.15, 20).  
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Source: the author’s calculation, relying on work records of the personnel appointment, removal, 
and representative elections commission to the M people’s congress during 2008-2010.  
 
In addition, it is worth noting that most deputies with official and cadre identifiers have 
regular involvement in these activities, including the district CCP 
secretary-cum-congress deputy, chairman of the CCP organization 
department-cum-congress deputy, the chairman and vice chairmen to the standing 
committee of the M people’s congress, and the cadre deputies from grass roots. 
According to the statistics from 2008-2009, deputies from government agencies and 
institutions as well as standing committees to the LPCs kept in contact with 
constituents 3 times on average per year. The cadre deputies from resident committees 
communicated with constituents more than 9 times on average per year (see table 6.2). 
When it comes to the further feedback on opinions and demands expressed by 
constituents during contacting activities, official deputies are considered to have strong 
influences in promoting related government branches to deal with them quickly while 
it is difficult to obtain detailed statistical data (ints.1, 3, 5, 15, 20).  
Table 6.2 Contact frequencies between congress deputies with different occupations and 
constituents in 2008-2009 
2008 2009 
Multiple identities of 
congress deputies  Number 
Contact 
frequency with 
the constituents 
per person 
Number  
Contact 
frequency with 
the constituents 
per person 
Deputies from government 
agencies and institutions 77 3.5 82 2.9 
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Enterprise deputies 68 3.8 67 3.2 
Cadres deputies from 
village committee 31 1.9 29 2.1 
Cadres deputies from 
Resident committee 36 9.5 32 14.3 
Resident deputies 5 7 7 6.6 
Peasant deputies 2 2 2 2.5 
Teacher deputies 17 4.2 17 3.5 
Medical staff deputies 5 2.2 5 4.4 
Researcher deputies 5 2.4 5 3.6 
Senior leaders deputies 7 2.1 7 1.4 
Army men deputies 2 1 2 4 
Total 255 4.2 255 4.6 
Among 
them 
The members of 
standing 
committee 
27 3.3 27 3.3 
Source: Work report on the contact activity between congress deputies and constituents in the M 
people’s congress, one from the document collection on the standing committee meetings 
for the M people’s congress, 2010:12-13. 
 
Deputy incentives to be accountable: role-driven, interest-driven, and institutional 
constraints 
Since congress deputies in China have a lot of autonomy to perform their duties 
inactively or actively under different institutional contexts, we could not expect every 
deputy to pay close attention to constituents’ issues and yield responsible influence on 
them. The practices mentioned above in the four fieldwork LPCs confirmed the uneven 
development in terms of deputy behaviors: deputies in the W people’s congress and the 
M people’s congress are more responsible than those in the B people’s congress and 
the J people’s congress. While the incentives for irresponsible deputies is consistent 
with O’Brien’s explanation—weak electoral sanctions and limited leadership cues 
allow a substantial number of deputies to be irresponsible and devoid of 
responsibilities—144more still remains unknown regarding why some deputies still 
                                              
144 See O’Brien.Kevin J, “Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies”, 
China Quarterly, Vol 0, Issue 138(1994):359-380, P365 
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behave actively and responsibly, and why congress deputies are more responsible in 
some LPCs than in other LPCs.  
However, my interviews and survey shows that these congress deputies can be 
classified into three categories in terms of their incentives to behave more responsibly: 
role-driven, interest-driven, and institutional constraints. It is also worth noting that the 
institutional constraints are only observed where new institutions were effectively 
adopted. 
First, some deputies tend to behave responsibly despite that the majority of  
deputies are regarded as irresponsible in the B people’s congress and J people’s 
congress. The driving forces indicated by the interviewees, who esteemed themselves 
as active and responsible, showed one common explanation for the incentive of a 
contested-election institution, which was that constituents’ trust when voting in a 
competitive election is clearly an incentive and pressure. Subsequently the 
consciousness of being congress deputies pushes them to actively respond to 
constituents’ demands and to focus on public affairs (ints.27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 
65, 69, 70, 73, 74). 145At the same time, some expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
lack of punishing mechanisms for those deputies who failed to perform their duties 
under current circumstances (ints.25, 28, 39, 65, 73, 74). I will call these “role-driven 
deputies,” similar to the “role-playing” model classified by Luttbeg in terms of the 
linkage between political representatives and constituents, in which an internalized 
value, or set of values, causes a deputy to seek out and follow their constituents’ 
opinion even without the prospect of constituent sanctions being imposed.146
Second, the pursuit of self-interest or industry interests is found to be another 
incentive for deputies who show more inclination to collect and respond to 
constituents’ demands. In the J people’s congress, some deputies frankly pointed out 
 
145 According to the election material in these LPCs, one congress deputies at county-level and district-level cities 
delegate more than 2000 people. 
146 Luttbeg. Norman R, ed., Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkages, Homewood, III.: 
Dorsey, 1968:2. 
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they could realize their benefits directly or indirectly through being responsible 
deputies. On the one hand, a good reputation for being a responsible deputy can bring 
popularity within the LPCs and build solid interpersonal relations (guanxi) with other 
deputies from diverse trades, which can be useful for solving personal issues. For 
instance, one deputy told the author that she had succeeded in obtaining a good job 
position for her son in court with the help of some deputies who work there. This was 
partly due to her good reputation among the deputies, which also stimulated her to 
work hard (int.73). On the other hand, being a responsible deputy can contribute to the 
leaders’ trust or position promotions within their own work units (ints.66, 69, 74, 76, 
77).  
Similar incentive is obvious in the stories and experiences told by the deputies 
interviewed, while they did not speak directly about the B people’s congress. For 
instance, one famous amateur deputy, who emphasized that constituents’ trust was his 
main incentive to be active in the interviews, shared his experience in solving a conflict 
between his work unit and surrounding residents: “My work unit planned to build a 
gate in front of one main road to expand our business several years ago, where some 
residents used to do small sales, repair bicycles, and so on. So, they were strongly 
against it at the beginning. Consequently, I went to communicate and cooperate with 
residents on behalf of my work unit. Given my good reputation as a congress deputy in 
helping them to solve issues, the residents gave me a lot of trust and agreed to let us 
build the gate after meeting their several demands. Our leader bestowed high praise on 
my ability to deal with this thorny problem. All of this gave me a strong sense of 
achievement (int.32).”  
This is also observed by one intern staff inside the J people’s congress standing 
committee. In his words, “Unlike western congress members’ concern about ballots, 
which is the basic dynamic mechanism for them to listen to voices from constituents, 
the congress deputies in our people’s congress have less linkage with their electoral 
units. For them, successful election to the position of congress deputy means much 
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more of an honorary thing, although people never forget to appreciate those deputies 
who responsibly perform their duties. However, their incentive will be relatively lower 
until the issues have close bearings with their own interests or their units’ interests” 
(int.75).  
Several cases are given as follows: We have one congress deputy who shows more 
attention to the demands of dairy farmers during his tenure. For instance, he calls for 
the government to give subsidies favorable to the interests of dairy farmers. If so, the 
milk price will be reduced when he takes over ex-farm milk as the leader of a dairy 
factory. At that time, the outbreak of the Sanlu milk powder scandal occurred in China, 
which we also helped him appeal. In the end, the government introduced a subsidy 
policy relating to dairy farmers. This is not the only case. One transportation group in J 
city wanted to build a logistics campus. After all, many products produced by 
enterprises need to be exported to other areas. There was not one in J city, although 
many areas nearby had established logistics campuses. With the intention to urge the 
government to deal with this issue, they mobilized their congress deputies to cooperate 
with deputies from other occupations to obtain joint signatures, including those of 
peasant deputies who usually were concerned about some themes relating to 
agricultural subsidies, harvester allocating to the countryside, pensions, and so on. In a 
word, the incentive of active congress deputies has a close bearing on their occupations 
on behalf of distinctive interests (int.75).  
Third, the institutional constraint incentive of deputies appears gradually in the W 
people’s congress and the M people’s congress apart from the role-driven and 
interest-driven incentives. This kind of incentive can be deemed as the force pushing 
congress deputies to act on behalf of constituents’ interest or to prevent their inaction 
by imposing institutional constraints. Most deputies took pride in their institutional 
innovations in contacting with constituents and responding to their demands in the W 
people’s congress when interviewed. They also gave high evaluation of their 
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performance in fulfilling their duties under the new institutional context. In the words 
of some deputies:  
We usually visit or receive constituents and track government annual activities closely 
relating to constituents’ interests via deputy workstations and deputy groups. These institutions 
work very well because we could speak for constituents and expose the improper or illegal acts 
of governments without any worries. After all, our first leader in the standing committee, who 
has courage to take responsibility if we need his support, had communicated with the CCP 
committee and government on these institutions in advance. In turn, we have incentive to carry 
out these institutions in conscientious and responsible manners (ints.44, 48, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 
58, 60).   
From the perspective of the constituents, the more attention congress deputies paid to 
their issues, the stronger trust they would give to congress deputies and the LPC. In the 
W people’s congress, two signs showed the positive influence of deputies’ behaviors 
on constituents’ trust, while quantitative data was hard to obtain. First, constituents 
grew increasingly to rely on the LPC to solve their problems rather than being 
previously ignored. According to a vice director of the finance and economy working 
commission to the standing committee, the role of congress deputies is remarkable at 
present. For example, people’s visits and letters as a percentage of petitions for 
constituents to W people’s congress remain relatively high in number. Our chairman 
has to receive a lot of constituents every day, and some constituents have to wait until 
the next if they did not make appointments in advance. There seems to be a new trend 
appearing; that is, the constituents have begun to share more trust toward us when they 
encounter difficulties. This is partly because we currently produce positive influences 
in solving their difficulties on many cases (int. 50). Second, both constituents and other 
actors, including media, social groups, scholars, and so on, are gradually paying more 
attention to deputy activities and the functions of the W people’s congress via its 
website. Compared to the numbers of 1846 and 8467 in 2006, 4896 and 17158 in 2007, 
8849 and 22236 in 2008, monthly traffic and page views on the W people’s congress 
public website remains relatively high, recently reaching to 12765 and 32134 in 2009 
(int.54). Most deputies, especially professional deputies, told me that they had 
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developed the habit of checking public opinions online and responding to individual 
demands every day (ints.51, 53, 54, 57, 59, 60).   
In the case of the M people’s congress, questionnaires conducted in 2010 showed 
that a blending of incentives was occurring—role-driven, institutional-driven, and 
interest-driven—for congress deputies and their perceptions. Specifically, the 
proportion of choosing “the accountability sense to constituents,” “benefiting for self 
and personal work” and “response to institutional requirements” remained higher than 
other factors when congress deputies were asked “What is your incentives to contact 
constituents and hold yourself accountability to them”(multiple options). They were 
90.6%, 43.9%, and 43.2%, respectively. More importantly, “the accountability sense to 
constituents” was put in the first place by deputies with diverse backgrounds when 
asked “What is your main incentive to contact constituents and be accountable to 
them,” accounting for 56.8%, “Response to institutional requirements” with 7.9% 
came in second place, and “Benefit for self and personal work” ranked the third with 
6.5%. In contrast, only one deputy chose the option of “seeking re-election,” 
accounting for 0.7%. To some extent, this showed the huge difference between western 
MPs and Chinese people’s deputies in terms of incentives to contact constituents.  
  The results mentioned above are consistent with the survey on the incentives for 
being congress deputies under China’ new institutional environment. Congress 
deputies were asked what motivated them to go into LPC in the questionnaire done in 
the M district people’s congress in 2009. The options that “really want to do something 
for the electorate” and “the important channel to express demands for interests and 
impact decision-making” ranked as the first two positions. Meanwhile, “political 
honor” and “organizational arrangement,” were no longer considered as very important 
compared to before (See table 6.3).  
Table 6.3 The incentives to be congress deputies 
Q: What is your incentive to be deputies? 
   (n=106 congress deputies, 105 is valid, and 1 is 
missing) 
     Yes  
(percentage)    
         No 
  (Percentage) 
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Positional demands or organizational arrangement      38.7     60.4 
Political honor      28.3     70.8 
The important channel to express demands for interests 
and impact government decision-making  
     42.5     56.6 
Really want to do something for the voters, good 
deputies will be respected and supported 
     85.8     13.2 
Accumulating interpersonal relationship and political 
resources 
     0.9     98.1 
A good chance to learn and self-improvement       11.3     88.7 
Source: the analysis on questionnaire done by the author in 2009 in the M people’s congress. A 
total of 105 congress deputies responded to this questionnaire within 106 returned questionnaires. 
 
As is to be expected, congress deputies’ activities supported under blending incentives 
made a difference in the perception of the constituents. According to one survey on the 
public perception of the local people’s congress conducted in Zhejiang province in 
early 2000, only 27.5% of the respondents tried to seek for the help of congress 
deputies when they encountered grievances in life. A similar survey done in Huaihua 
city demonstrated that 33.7% of the respondents gave positive evaluations toward the 
role of news media in providing help in cases where their legitimate rights were 
infringed upon, while only 31% of the respondents selected people’s congresses or 
congress deputies when they encountered the same problem. 147 In comparison, the 
perception toward the role of congress deputies as well as the LPC institution was 
measured by asking questions “what kinds of channels have you chosen to reflect 
personal or public issues” and “which channel do you think is most effective in your 
experience” in the 2010 questionnaire sent to 256 constituents. Survey results showed 
that constituents held congress deputies in high regard in the M people’s congress 
under the current institutional context: “congress deputies,” “reflecting issues via 
village cadres or residence cadres” and “reflect issues to government via possible 
ways” ranked top three channels for constituents to reflect issues. At the same time, 
constituents pointed out that “congress deputies” were the most effective channels for 
                                              
147 Tian Biyao, “ Renda Jiandu De Jiazhi Mubiao ( The value and target of LPCs’ supervision)”, Zhongguo Renda 
Xinwen (Chinese News on People’s Congresses), June 20,2002. 
  
137 
 
them to seek help in solving their issues in practice, accounting for 48% (see the 
following tables).  
Table 6.4 Constituents’ perception on channels they have chosen to reflect issues in 2010 
questionnaire in the M people’s congress 
  Channels 
 
 
Frequency 
Reflecting 
issues via 
village 
cadres or 
residence 
cadres 
Reflecting 
issues to 
government 
via possible 
ways 
Letters of 
complaint 
Petitions to 
higher 
authorities 
for help 
Congress 
deputies 
Others 
Percentage 66.8% 15.6% 10.2% 2.3% 68% 0% 
Valid 171 40 26 6 174 0 
Missing 85 216 230 250 82 256 
Total 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Source: the data comes from the questionnaire results sent to constituents in 2010 in the M people’s 
congress. A total of 256 constituents gave feedback, and the missing numbers are given in the table.  
 
Table 6.5 Constituents’ perception on the most effective to solve their issues in 2010 questionnaire 
in the M people’s congress 
  Channels 
 
Frequency 
Reflecting 
issues via 
village 
cadres or 
residence 
cadres 
Reflecting 
issues to 
government 
via possible 
ways 
Letters of 
complaint 
Petitions to 
higher 
authorities 
for help 
 
Congress deputies 
Percentage 9.0% 4.7% 7.4% 2.0% 48% 
Source: the data comes from the questionnaire sent to constituents in 2010 in the M people’s 
congress. A total of 256 constituents provided feedback, and the missing numbers accounted 
for 28.9% for this question.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The empirical evidence above suggests a strengthening of the accountability linkage 
between congress deputies and constituents in the Chinese context. However, the 
incentive models of congress deputies identified in this study are distinct from those 
recognized in Western experiments. To sum up the findings: 
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Firstly, substantial deputies are operating instead of the previous symbolic or ritual 
deputies, both from the perspective of deputies and constituents. Although the behavior 
of the deputies in responding to constituents’ affairs is still uneven, a sense of their 
constituents is popularly held by the deputies. This is partly due to intensified 
competitive election experiences when running for deputy positions. The 
semi-competitive election provides some possibility for the loss of the CCP’s 
nomination during the electoral process  
Secondly, although the semi-competitive election of Chinese congress deputies and 
public accountability recognition behind recall experiments has a visible impact on 
producing the sense of constituents after election, it should be admitted that election 
constraint is still limited in terms of rewarding or punishing deputies via recall and 
re-election institutions given China’s current politics. This partially accounts for why 
some deputies get away with failing to contact constituents after election.  
Thirdly, compared with the prominent incentive of re-election for MPs in western 
democracies, Chinese congress deputies gave less consideration to being re-elected 
when deciding whether to be accountable to their constituents. This was reflected both 
in the interview materials and the questionnaire results. Therefore, we could not obtain 
further explanations on the incentives of Chinese congress deputies by only relying on 
the re-election constraints that are widely accepted in western democracies. 148
Fourthly, the evidence has suggested that role-driven, interest-driven, and 
institutional-driven incentives constitute the main forces driving congress deputies to 
contact their constituents and provide services for their issues in a responsible manner. 
However, these are conditional in different LPCs, with distinctive institutional 
arrangements: role-driven with strong sense of constituents are prominent in the 
 
148 The difference of institution contexts determines the path divergence of exploring similar question. For instance, 
Mitchell Paul can define the key question as “Do voters have any effective means of controlling their 
representatives? And what’s possible effect of different electoral institutions on the links between voters and 
representatives?”, but in Chinese context, it is suitable to consider similar question by adding questions such as 
“why some congress deputies are proactive to respond to constituents under the conditions of limited constraints 
from voters and electoral institutions.” Mitchell Paul, “Voters and their representatives: Electoral Institutions and 
Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol.37(2000):335-351. 
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fieldwork LPCs due to the influence of macro-level contested electoral institutions and 
rising recognition of accountability by the constituents; interest-driven incentive is one 
emerging factor to explain deputies’ behaviors: the stories that most deputies told in 
terms of why they participated in the election and how they influences related 
government branches give away information about this incentive, whereas the deputies 
are usually embarrassed to admit this directly, because a search for personal or unit 
interests bluntly or publicly is conflicted with the value of collectivism and moral 
supremacy in traditional Chinese culture. Compared with the former two incentive 
models, deputies who hold institutional-driven incentive just appear in the W people’s 
congress and the M people’s congress where institutional innovations have been 
carried out recently. More interesting, these institutional innovations that had attracted 
more attention from other LPCs, scholars and media are allied simultaneously with the 
CCP committee and the executive at the corresponding level. They are supported 
mainly due to their potential for resolving the increasing social conflicts between the 
public and government as well as the CCP, although the input of more interest 
demands from constituents will inevitably produce some impact on CCP-dominated 
authoritarian rules.  
  In contrast to previous explorations of incentives in terms of self-interest and 
altruism, 149  the empirical evidence in this study suggests that institutional 
arrangements at the micro-level are one critical but neglected variable for capturing 
why deputies as individual and LPCs as institutions are responsive to their 
constituents’ affairs and voices. At the same time, it is worth noting that institutional 
innovations will be limited to producing constraints and stimuli on deputies unless the 
institutional power structure is prone to the implementation of these institutions under 
a Chinese political setting. 
 
149 Guo Jiguang, “A Study of Deputies in Local People’s Congresses in China” (PhD diss., National University of 
Singapore, 2007: 148-157). 
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In short, distinctive combinations of a series of key variables, such as the rising of 
accountability recognition from constituents under a contested electoral environment, 
the enhancement of interest demands from deputies, the appearance of institutional 
stimuli at the micro-level, as well as the focus of the CCP and government on 
increasing social conflicts, accounts for the improvements in the congress deputies in 
terms of their performance and incentives in the four fieldwork LPCs. At the 
macro-level, a political environment filled with increasing recognition of 
accountability and interest articulation clearly indicates that congress deputies are 
prone to attach more attention to their constituents where LPCs characteristically lean 
towards more institutional innovations and favorable political supports. 
To some extent, this could lay a foundation for a further understanding of the 
performance of deputies as individuals and LPCs as institutions in holding the 
authorities accountable in horizontal accountability arenas, which I will discuss in the 
next chapter. 
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7. Emerging Local People’s Congresses as Institutions of 
Horizontal Accountability 
 
Legislatures under Chinese circumstances were for a long time regarded as marginal to 
all significant proposals or actions because of subordination to other power actors in 
the political system. Along the same vein, the “zero-base-model” in terms of horizontal 
accountability assumes that the LPCs are minimal and difficult to exert influences 
compared with governments and CCP in real power structures.  
However, the Chinese People’s Congress, especially the LPCs, are arguably moved 
beyond their previous roles of “rubber stamps” and are more powerful today than 
before，as reflected in the changing images of the LPCs depicted by scholars. For 
example, Oscar notes the occurrence of increasing constraints of the LPCs over the 
local party committee and local government’s discretionary rule.150 Cho demonstrates 
an active role in the views of the LPCs’ strategic supervision over governments by 
focusing on two areas of supervision—the examination of law enforcement and 
appraisal of government bureaus and officials. 151  
Given limited knowledge of this changed process, the aim of this chapter is, first, to 
assess how and to what extent LPCs can hold authorities accountable. Second, 
understanding is sought regarding what forces contribute to their successes and 
failures, as well as what explains the differences among the LPCs in the different 
fieldwork sites.  
The horizontal accountability exerted by LPCs refers to their ability to prevent the 
illegitimate use of political powers and the ignoring of the executive, people’s court, 
 
150 Oscar Almen, “Authoritarianism Constrained: The Role of Local People’s Congresses in China”( PhD 
dissertation, Goteborg University,2005),145. 
151 Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009),44. 
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and people’s procuratorate of public voices and demands. 152 The assessment of LPCs’ 
accountability performance will be carried out along three dimensions —transparency, 
answerability and controllability. On the one hand, we look at whether the policy 
processes dominated by power-holders are visible or open to the LPCs and the public; 
on the other hand, we study whether the power holders are required to justify their 
actions. More importantly, the possibilities for LPCs to exert influence or impose 
sanctions on political authorities will be examined when cases of ignoring public 
appeals or violating public interests occur.  
Specifically, this chapter starts with a description of the broad institutional 
improvements and constraints that have arisen under Chinese circumstances; Part two 
demonstrates the accountability activities and influence strategies from SCs in practice; 
Part three mainly focuses on how individual-level congress deputies perceive their 
influence in ensuring accountability. Part four explores the driving forces behind the 
increasing role of LPCs as horizontal accountability institutions. In the conclusion, the 
main findings will be summarized.  
 
7.1 Institutional improvements and constraints on LPC accountability  
7.1.1 Institutional improvements 
Powers 
Letting all of the power of the country belong to the people is the cornerstone of the 
establishment of Chinese LPCs. On this basis, Chinese politics feature a chain of 
delegation from the people (the voters) to people’s congresses and then to the 
government, which is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in 
 
152 In accordance with Chinese political system, both the executive and people’s court and people’s procuratorate 
should be accountable to the legislature on behalf of the public at the corresponding level, which is different from 
the Western liberal democracies. Therefore, judicial organs will be regarded as part of the government in the thesis 
unless otherwise stated.  
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the reverse direction153: a) the accountability chain from people’s congresses to the 
people: Just as stipulated in Article 3 in Chinese Constitution, “the National People’s 
Congress and the local people’s congresses at different levels are instituted through 
democratic election. They are responsible to the people and subject to their 
supervision.” b) the accountability chain from the governments to people’s congresses: 
“All administrative, judicial, and procuratorial organs of the state are created by the 
people's congresses, to which they are responsible and under whose supervision they 
operate.” People’s congresses at different levels have a certain degree of autonomy 
although people’s congresses at higher levels retain some influence over the lower 
levels: “the division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs 
is guided by the principle of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the 
local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.” 
In accordance with these accountability chains, people’s congresses at local levels 
are empowered by the supreme powers in Chinese local politics to hold the 
governments accountable to the people. Supervision, the power to appoint and recall, 
decision, and legislation are the four constitutional powers of LPCs. Following 
MacFarquhar’s observation and the author’s fieldwork, LPC supervision covers the 
executive, courts, and procuracy, and includes the right to respond to letters and 
complaints from the people and LPCs at lower levels, to initiate investigations. 
Appointment involves the right to appoint and recall vice-governors, temporary 
governors, and other high-ranking officials in the executive, the courts, and the 
procuracy. Decision power covers the right to decide on important local affairs in their 
respective administrative areas and the right to approve public budgets, which will be 
especially emphasized in next chapter.  
 
 
153 Due to the similarity arrangement between Chinese People’s Congresses and Representative countries, This idea 
benefits a lot from Kaare Strøm’s article, “ Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracy,” European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol.37(2000):261-289. 
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Here, the LPCs at the city and county level concerned in this thesis mainly involve 
the first three powers (supervision, appointment, and decision) because these LPCs 
have no legislative power compared to provincial-level people’s congress at higher 
levels. Nevertheless, they have the right to investigate the enforcement of laws and 
rules (zhi fa jian cha), which can be categorized into supervisory power for the LPCs. 
This makes it possible for LPCs to push the authorities into actions or to sanction them 
in cases of their non-accountable reactions, by using these institutional powers. 
 
Resources 
a) Committees and empowered accountability tools  
Formally supreme powers are only one requirement, but an insufficient variable, to 
produce good performance. In this respect, the person in whose hands these powers 
reside and who exercises them in practice would seem critical. At the beginning, the 
powers of the LPCs were exercised by the executives during the intersession meeting, 
which greatly reduced the influence of LPCs on the governments. Although the 
standing committee (SC) came into being with the Chinese National People’s Congress 
at the birth of the system of people’s congresses, the LPCs were not empowered until 
1979 to create similar standing bodies as the result of strengthening the construction of 
democracy and legality after the reform and opening policy were adopted. 
Subsequently, the establishment of SCs as permanent organs in the intersessional 
period provides the possibility for local people’s congresses to become more powerful 
organizations. On the one hand, the SC’s position in ensuring accountability can be 
observed from Article 110 in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
which stipulates that Local people’s governments at various levels are responsible and 
report on their work to people’s congresses at the corresponding levels. Local people’s 
governments at and above the county level are responsible and report on their work to 
the standing committees of the people’s congresses at the corresponding levels when 
the congresses are not in session. More detailed stipulations are written both on the 
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tools and procedurals for the SCs to carry out their tasks in Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Supervision of Standing Committees of People’s Congresses 
at Various Levels enacted in 2006. On another hand, the commissions have been 
successively established to assist SCs in most LPCs below the province level since 
1980; for instance, the Finance and Economy Affairs Commission, the Personnel and 
Deputies Affairs Commission, the Science, Education, Culture and Health 
Commission, and so on.  
 
b) Congress deputies to LPCs 
Congress deputies are the main actors of the LPCs and their SCs during the 
intersession. Although LPCs and SCs were ironically criticized as being dominated by 
a group of cadres and older persons who retired from the CCP committee and 
governments, which greatly violated the independence and decrease the performance 
of LPCs, we should admit that there have been obvious improvements recently.  
To ensure the characterization of wide representation, elected congress deputies are 
required to cover the proper proportion of workers, peasants, cadres, intellectuals, 
People’s Republic Army (PLA) personnel, ethnic minorities, non-CCP or “democratic 
party” members, and so on. Among them, the cadre deputies and non-CCP deputies are 
usually regarded as an important index to observe to what extent LPCs would be 
subject to the CCP’s control instead of promoting the solution of administrative 
problems on behalf of the public. 154 The figures on general occupational structure 
statistics of the LPC deputies during 1977-1999 in China show that cadres occupied a 
relatively large proportion at the local level (see Table 7.1 below). They also exhibited 
 
154 For more detailed discussion please see: Pan Zhaomin, “ Difang renda daibiao de jiegou bianqian duiqi jiandu 
xiaoyi de yingxiang fenxi (The Structural Change of the Composition of Congress Deputies and Its Influence on 
Supervision Performance of LPCs), ” April 16, 2009, http://www.fepc.org.cn/Article.aspx?ArtID=245; Barrett 
I.McCormick, “China’s Leninist Parliament and Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis,”, in China after 
Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia? Edited by Barrett I. McCormick and Jonathan Unger. 
Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe (1996):29-53.   
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a gradually increasing trend, especially at the county and city levels. The maximum 
ratio reached 53.22% although the minimum ratio was equal to 25.42%.   
 
Table 7.1 Occupational structure of LPCs’ deputies in China 155
 
   The proportion of the total congress deputies in LPCs     Year      Levels of 
LPCs     Worker     Peasant     Cadre     Intellectual 
    Province     27.17%     20.19%     19.32%     16.15%     1977-1981  
  County     9.47%     49.26%     25.42%     8．61% 
   Province     19.88%     13.30%     23.58%     21.28%     1983-1987  
   County     10.44%     39.52%     26.03%     16.48% 
   Province     13.69%     11.97%     55.74%      Na 
  City     16.78%     17.73%     53.22%       Na  
    1988-1990  
   County     9.82%     41.16%     39.51%      Na 
    Province     12.08%     11.89%     49.85%       Na  
   City     15.26%     17.29%     48.48%        Na   
    1993  
  County     10.22%     40.87%     42.10%      Na 
    Province     14.01%     10.47%     42.80%     20.95% 
   City     15.83%     17.76%     36.79%     20.32% 
    1996-1999  
  County     9.83%     37.28%     35.01%     12.68% 
Source: based on Guo(2009:11-15) 
Note: here “cadre” mainly refers to the staff in party organs, executive authorities, and the judiciary 
branches, part of whom occupy leadership positions.  
 
However, some changes in the composition of congress deputies have occurred since 
2003. First, the percentage of the numbers of cadres in the four LPCs studied here is 
not only lower than the corresponding average percentage of nationwide statistics for 
LPCs, but it also shows a decreasing trend year by year, which can be seen from the 
empirical data collected via the author’s fieldwork. For example, in the M people’s 
                                              
155 Guo Qingzhu, “Guanyu renda daibiao goucheng xianzhi de xianfaxue sikao (The Constitutional Consideration 
on the Occupational Composition Constraint of People’s Congress Deputies),” The Study on Chinese Legislature, 
Vol.6 (2009).  
  
147 
 
congress, cadre deputies make up only 14% of the congress deputies, which is much 
lower than the percentage in its previous session (see table 7.2 below) and the 
minimum ratio—25.42%—on the statistics of nationwide LPCs. Most respondents 
point out that this is a great benefit for the authorities’ answering the complaints of 
congress deputies and the public. For instance, congress deputies made suggestions 
that it was inappropriate for too many government cadres to exist in a supervised 
position and act as congress deputies in the fourth plenary meeting of the third session 
to the M people’s congress. The M people’s congress and the CCP attached great 
importance to this suggestion and there are almost no government cadres on the list in 
the subsequent election to congress deputies in the fourth session in 2006(ints.2,15,16). 
The CCP also took the initiative to decrease the nominating quotas for government 
cadres both in the J people’s congress and the B people’s congress as a result of 
congress deputies’ complaints and the quota instruction from higher levels 
(ints.23,39,68,76). More interestingly, intense competition in the election of congress 
deputies brought great pressure to the election of cadre deputies in the W city where a 
well-developed private economy dominates (ints.54,56). 
 Second, the quality of congress deputies has greatly improved. On the one hand, the 
educational background of congress deputies shows that more than 60% of the 
congress deputies have junior college or higher education. Compare to the lower 
education level of congress deputies (some were illiterate due to the political-oriented 
evaluation and election of congress deputies) in past years, this improvement is 
meaningful for improving the performance of LPCs. On the other hand, the experience 
and capabilities rather than the sole political quality are now given more attention in 
re-election. Table 7.2 shows the higher percentage of re-election in the four LPCs. 
Congress deputies are now also younger. We can see that more than 75% of the 
congress deputies in these four places are 36-55 years old in table 7.2.   
 
Table 7.2 Main compositions of congress deputies in the four LPCs 
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LPCs Session 
(Year) 
Num
ber 
of 
deput
ies  
  Main occupy composition of deputies to LPCs 
Worker   Cadre Intellectual   Non-public   PLA  
& Peasant                   Business 
Among them 
Women  CCP  Reelection  Education    Age
( college or above) 36-55 
W 13th 
2003 
378 Na 33.1% Na 9.3% 0.5% 20.1% 74.1
% 
28.6
% 
47.6% 79.6% 
W 14th 
2006 
379 47.34
% 
26.65% 13.62 
% 
9. 76% 0.79% 13.19
% 
78.3
6% 
38.26
% 
63.59% 84.17%
M 3th 
2003 
257 Na More 
than 
14% 
Na Na Na Na 72.7
% 
Na Na Na 
M 4 th  
2006 
263 23% 14% Na 8% 1.1% 28.9% 76.4
% 
39.9
% 
78.8% 89% 
B 1th 
2003 
215 29.51
% 
Na Na Na 0.58% 28.93
% 
88.5
2% 
-- 68.31% 75% 
B 2th 
2006 
218 33.49
% 
32.09% 18.51% 8.51% 1.39% 29.74
% 
78.6
% 
33.02
% 
73.02% 80% 
J  10 th 
2004 
361 37.6% 33.8% 15.5% Na 3.9% 25.5% 68.4
% 
34% 70% 78.5% 
J 11 th 
2009 
367 18.2% 28.3% 19% 9% 3.8% 27.5% 65.7
% 
41.9
% 
78% 80.4% 
Source: the author’s calculation from the fieldwork data in the WPC, MPC, BPC, and JPC in China 
during 2009-2011.  
Note: Most leaders in Chinese LPCs regard data mentioned above as confidential information,  
which makes it very difficult to obtain comprehensive data even if adopting many strategies. So I 
have to mark “Na” in the forms where I could not obtain actual data.   
 
c) Standing committee members 
Following the principle-agent relationship between the people and LPCs, the 
power of SCs during the intersession can be further treated as the delegation 
from the whole congress deputies. Due to the fact that the SCs are legally 
elected from congress deputies by all congress deputies during the plenary 
meeting of LPCs at the corresponding level, the numbers are much lower than 
those of congress deputies. For instance, the members of SCs in LPCs at the 
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county and city level are legally allowed to range from 11 to 45 to balance the 
representation and the scale problem in the Chinese context. This is true for the 
four LPCs listed in table 7.3 below.  
When it comes to the composition of the SC members in LPCs, 
improvements and constraints coexist. On the one hand, both educational 
background and age have absolute advantages compared with the case for 
congress deputies, as can be seen from table 7.2 and table 7.3. It is the same if 
we evaluate the improvement from the perspective of vertical development. For 
example, in the W people’s congress, the SC members experiencing college or 
university education accounts for 0% in 1980, 4% in 1984, 37.9% in 1996, 
71.4% in 2003 and 97.1% in 2006.156 Unlike the part-time congress deputies, 
the more than 40% full-time SC members in these four LPCs at present provide 
chances for them to concentrate on public affairs. On the other hand, it is also 
obvious that the LPCs are limited to one prominent characterization; namely, the 
higher proportion of CCP members both in the SCs and the LPCs, demonstrated 
in table 7.2 and table 7.3.  
Table 7.3 The sketch on the main compositions of standing committee members in the four LPCs 
LPCs Session 
(Year) 
Numbers of 
standing 
committee 
CCP   Women    Education         Age          Full-time    Part-time    Re-election   
(College and above)    36-55            
W 13th 
2003 
28 96.4
% 
21.4
% 
71.4% 92.8% Na Na Na 
W 14th 
2006 
35 91.4
% 
11.4
% 
97.1% 91.4% 48% 52% Na 
M 4 th  
2006 
27 77.8
% 
22% 100% 99% 45% 55.6% Na  
B 2th 
2006 
21 71% 38% 100% 57% 52.4%     47.6 Na 
J  10 th 
2004 
33 70% 18% 98% 73% 36% 55% Na 
J 11 th 
2009 
36 66.7
% 
19.4
% 
100% 63.8% 40% 61% 24% 
                                              
156 The author’s calculation on the basis of the W people’s congress annals(2000),383-388. 
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Source: the author’s calculation from the fieldwork data in WPC, MPC, BPC, and JPC in China 
during 2009-2011.  
7.1.2 Institutional constraints 
Clearly, many improvements have occurred with the process of LPC 
institutionalization. We probably can place high hopes on their performance 
because most literature suggests that a more institutionalized the legislature has 
a greater capacity to exert some independent influence on policy outcomes.157 
However, particular institutional constraints that probably complicate the 
accountability practices cannot be ignored in the Chinese context.  
First, the CCP still has a strong influence in the recommendation and election 
of congress deputies and SC members in practice, even if occasionally the 
results deviate from its will. According to the principle of bringing younger 
cadres to the leading posts, established in the era of China’ reform and opening, 
some leading cadres beyond a certain age limit in the CCP committee and 
governments were usually decided internally to hold office in LPCs or the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at the corresponding level. 
When the CCP still dominates the SCs and legislatures under the circumstances 
of no fair elections and no competitive parties, the danger is that there will be no 
accountability.   
Second, the political context mentioned above also brings some constraints on 
the equipment of leadership to the LPCs. Respondents described the main 
constraints as follows: overwhelmingly CCP members, stronger party and 
government background, less younger leadership cadre compared to those in 
governments, and shorter tenure in LPCs (ints.3, 6, 14, 23, 34, 46, 47, 50, 77, 
83). These are consistent with one sample survey on leadership structure in 9 
districts and county people’s congresses in Shanghai done by the M people’s 
 
157 The representing literature can be seen from P.Norton, “Introduction: The Institution of Parliaments”, in Norton, 
Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 7-13. 
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congress：more than 80% of the leaders are CCP members, few of them are less 
than 50 years old. Those who retired from the CCP committee and government 
branches accounted for a large proportion—more than 70%. However, about 
20% of the leaders have more than 5 year’s tenure (see table 7.4).  
   
Table 7.4 The sample survey on leadership structure in 9 districts and counties people’s congress 
in Shanghai 
Political 
status  
Age 
Between 
45-49  
 
Tenure in LPCs Work background （working positions before taking position in LPCs）
Characteristic 
 
 
 
 
 
Informants 
CCP（%） （%） 5 year（%） 
3 – 5 
years
（%） 
Below  
3 year
（%） 
CCP 
committ
ee（%）
LPC
（%） 
Govern
ment
（%） 
Judicia
l（%） 
Mass 
organizati
on（%）
Others
（%） 
The Head and 
deputy head 
to standing 
committees 
82.35 5.88 11.76 25.49 62.75 39.22 0 35.29 0 19.61 5.88 
The directors 
to working 
commissio
ns of 
standing 
committees 
94 4 24 26 50 36 8 38 4 10 4 
Source: data comes from the investigation and study report done by M people’s congress in 2005, 
“The exploration on tools to optimize the leadership structure of leaderships in LPCs.” In addition, 
the M people’s congress is one of the 9 district and county people’s congresses mentioned in this 
table.  
Furthermore, both the SC members and ordinary congress deputies in Chinese 
legislature politics have to follow a dual system of accountability under the 
Chinese political environment: on the one hand, most of these should be 
subordinated to the core leadership of CCP due to their identity of CCP 
members and previous close involvement with governments; at the same time, 
they also bear the accountability to the public as the representatives of the 
public. Thus, one dilemma appears within this one-party institutional 
framework: do they show loyal to the party-state or to the public as constituents, 
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if demands of the state or the CCP and interests of the people conflict with each 
other?  
Some controversial arguments have arisen regarding their impact on LPC 
accountability performance in the current research. Some argue that, in the 
Maoist era, the loyalty that most Chinese people’s congress deputies felt toward 
the state completely overwhelmed their sense of responsibility to their 
constituents. They were often faced with devastating sanctions if they felt 
otherwise. 158 Others state that, in the new era, their responsibility towards 
constituents overwhelms their loyalty to the Party-state even if most of them 
were CCP members. For instance, most congress deputies thought their role as 
the delegation of constituencies prevailed over the intention of party leaders 
when they were asked “What is your direct motivation when you cast your vote 
as deputies?” in a 1990 survey conducted by Zhao(see the following table).  
 
Table 7.5   One survey on local congress deputies’ motivation159  
   Motivation 
 
Survey areas 
Intention of the 
CCP Leaders   
Own conscience Following the 
general trend 
 
Constituencies’  
delegation 
Haidian district  
in Beijing 
9.8%  21.7%  17.4%  51.1% 
Dongcheng 
district 
In Beijing 
12.6%  28.2%  19.4%  39.8% 
Hangzhou city  13%  23.6%  21.7%  41.3% 
Source: Zhao(1990:203-237) 
Therefore, the exploration in the subsequent parts of the following questions 
becomes meaningful: whether LPCs can exert some influence on the decisions 
or actions of the CCPs and governments at the present time, even if sometimes 
they are still manipulated by them. If yes, then we will ask in which ways they 
use their room to maneuver.  
                                              
158 O’Brien KJ, “ Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies,” China 
Quarterly (1994), No.138: 359-380. 
159 Zhao Baoxu, Minzhu zhengzhi yu defang renda (Democratic politics and local people’s congress) (Shanxi 
People’s Publisher in China , 1990), 203-237. 
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7.2 Accountability activities and Influence tools from the SCs  
As the basic organizational configuration in LPCs, the plenary session is held 
once annually: this usually lasts four to seven days. In contrast, the standing 
committee meetings are held six or seven times per year during the 
intersessional meeting. Due to paucity of time and problems of large scale, the 
detailed business obviously cannot be dealt with in plenary sessions. Similar to 
the observation from Mattson and Strom in the Westminster parliaments, “much 
of the real deliberation takes place away from the plenary arena in much smaller 
groups of legislators such as parliamentary committees…committees have 
indeed become the main focal points of many representative assemblies,”160 it is 
true that thorough supervision and accountability of government activities 
mainly occurs at professionalized SCs in LPCs in the Chinese local context. 
How to obtain information and what kinds of tools as well as strategies adopted 
in practice are two crucial indicators to observe the performance of the SCs in 
LPCs.  
 
7.2.1 Information serving for accountability activities 
Central to any effective accountability activities is the provision of adequate and 
relevant information. According to current practices, LPC standing committees 
mainly have means of access to information in practice:  
The first access is the information from the CCP committee and congress 
deputies. On the one hand, while the CCP committees try to curb the rapid 
growth of LPCs, sometimes they still need to make use of the strength of the 
LPCs to control the local governments in the actual political environment. In 
this regard, LPCs and their standing committees work in close contact with CCP 
 
160 Mattson. I and Strom, K., Parliamentary Committees. In H. Doring, ed. Parliaments and Majority Rule in 
Western Europe(New York: St Martin’s,1995),249. 
  
154 
 
                                             
committees. They arrange part of their work around the central information and 
guidance from CCP committees, especially when CCP committees remind them 
to focus on some problems in governmental work. On the other hand, both 
constituency and social organizations can seek out the help of congress deputies 
when they encounter problems in public affairs or they want to express their 
opinions. The institutional linkage between them inevitably inputs some new 
information into SCs from the LPCs.  
A second is the regular contact with governmental agencies via particular 
commissions of standing committees involved in the oversight of all 
governmental activities.161 These commissions usually include the Financial and 
Economic Affairs Commission, the Internal and Judicial Affairs Commission, 
the Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Commission, the Urban 
Construction and Environment Protection Commission, Personnel and Deputies 
Affairs Commission, the Overseas Chinese, Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Commission, and so on. Among these, the Financial and Economic Affairs 
Commission mainly contacts the Development and Reform Commission, the 
Department of Finance, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Railways, Industry and Information Technology, the Department of Taxation, 
Banks, Bureau of Statistics, and other relating to money or finance. The Internal 
and Judicial Affairs is usually in charge of the work of civic affairs, social 
security, judiciary, and contact with related departments. According to 
respondents who are in charge of these commissions, they convene some 
communicating meetings with related governmental branches discussing the 
focus of accountability at the beginning of per year; of course, what kind of 
information should be actively provided by government departments is also 
 
161 LPCs at county or city level just have work commissions to assist the work of standing committee while some 
LPCs at vice-province or above level have established specialist committees working together with standing 
committee in China. 
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inclusive. In addition, they usually carry out some investigations concerning 
work scope to reduce their disadvantage position caused by information 
asymmetry (ints.1,17,18,24,25,50,54,55,59, 65,67) .  
The final, and perhaps most Chinese characterized access, is the information 
provided by the ordinary public, individually or collectively, via the channel of 
letters and visits ( xinfang 信访) to LPCs. While no specific organization is 
identified within the LPCs, the reception rooms for petitions were set up with 
the establishment of the SCs to deal with increasing social conflicts. Many SCs 
categorize information provided via the letters and visits to enhance 
answerability. For instance, the SC in the M people’s congress divides 
information into three main categories: giving suggestions and opinions on 
LPCs’ and governmental work, seeking resolutions and grievances. The related 
suggestions and petitions are then sent to commissions within the SC and the 
letters and visits offices established within the government and CCP committee. 
The latter should provide feedback on the settlement of issues at the SC 
meetings within the prescribed time (int.2). The numbers of letters and visits to 
the SCs show an obvious growth trend in recent years. Two main reasons 
contribute to this: for one thing, increasingly more public and social 
organizations are seeking help from the SCs, especially when they fail to appeal 
to governmental branches directly. According to the statistics from the W 
people’s congress, the numbers of letters and visits were 802 in 2000, 958 in 
2001, 1390 in 2002, 1561 in 2003, 1365 in 2004, 1463 in 2005, 1314 in 2006, 
1323 in 2007, and 1153 in 2008. 162 The other reason is that the governmental 
branches will not completely put livelihood issues aside when the SCs to local 
people’s congresses push them to solve these issues, due to the fact that the CCP 
 
162 This source belongs to restricted statistic data on letters and visits collecting from the W people’s congress in 
November, 2009 
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attaches great importance to these issues relating to social stability. These 
inevitably enhance public trust and contact with the SCs to the LPCs in turn.  
The sense of this information access can be seen from one example that 
happened in the M people’s congress: 
“Sending the banner to the SC of the M people’s congress instead of the previous chopping 
knife” 
 
Some problems reflected by the people via the channel of complaint letter and visit to LPCs can 
be resolved, especially for the urgent issues. For instance, one boss who came from Zhejiang 
province set up his factory building in the rented village land in the M district in Shanghai and 
had a better operating profit. However, the good days did not last long. His plants were stolen 
by the village when he spent the spring holiday in his hometown. He suffered several millions 
in losses. Therefore the village was sued by that boss for violating his business. The 
Intermediate People’s Court of the M district sentenced the village to pay damages to that 
boss. However, the Court’s judgment was not carried out because the village said they had no 
money to make compensation. The boss was agitated. He carried one chopping knife to our 
people’s congress saying that he would kill the village head and related villagers if his 
injustice could not be righted under the urging of the LPC. We felt that this thing was more 
grievous and reported to the leaders of the standing committee. An undesired result would 
occur if this could not be resolved quickly and efficiently. The leaders also attached great 
importance to this issue. The higher Court sentenced his case again and urged the defendant to 
implement the decision after the LPC communicated with the departments concerned. At last, 
his issue was quickly resolved. The boss was very satisfied with the result and sent a banner to 
the LPC to express his heartfelt thanks (Int. 2).  
 
7.2.2 The use of accountability tools 
It is also worth noting that the standing committees at the county level or above 
in China may secure governmental accountability by choosing the following 
legal tools: hearing and deliberation over special work reports, keeping on file 
and reviewing of regulatory documents, inspection of the enforcement of laws 
and regulations, questioning and addressing inquiries, investigation into special 
issues, examination and approval of public budgets, and deliberation and 
decisions on proposals for removals from office. Depending on the type of tools 
available and adopted by the SCs in different regions, the degrees of constraint 
on government activities may be higher or lower.  
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Table 7.6 lists the use of tools for supervision and accountability by the SCs 
in the four fieldwork LPCs, with a summarized ranking of their operating 
frequencies in practice.  
 
Table 7.6 The use of tools and performance for accountability by the SCs in the four LPCs 
    
Legally 
   Tools 
LPCs 
Inspect
ion 
Apprai
sal 
Appoint 
and 
removal
 
Budget 
supervi
sion  
Questioning
and  
addressing 
inquiries 
Reviewing 
of 
Regulatory 
Documents 
Investigat
ion into 
Special 
Issues 
 
W ++ ++ +- ++ + - - 
M ++ ++ +- ++ + - - 
B ++ + +-- + - - - 
J ++ + +-- + - - - 
 
Source: the data is one combination of interview materials, website information, and media 
coverage.  
Note: “++”dictates the high frequency used by LPCs, “+” manifests that it is used but has 
common frequency. “--”dictates that it is less or ritually used in practice while it is allowed by 
laws and regulations concerned. “+--”means it is used with common frequency but somewhat 
ritual.  
In view of the dominance of budget supervision in holding the authorities accountable under 
Chinese local context, there will have a special discussion in next chapter. Here the author will omit 
it.  
While all four SCs to the LPCs have gradually learned to use multiple tools to 
exert influence on governmental activities, the tools of inspection, appraisal, 
appointment and removal, and budget supervision are more popular than the 
tools such as questioning and addressing inquiries, the reviewing of regulatory 
documents, and the investigation into special issues. Furthermore, the W 
people’s congress and the M people’s congress seem to be more active and 
influential than the other two, even when it comes to the use of legal tools. 
Details are as follows.  
 
 
 
Inspection   
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Inspection of the Enforcement of Laws and Regulations or problems reflected 
by the public or social organization is one regular tool used by the SCs to keep 
government accountable. It is specified in Article 22 in the Supervisory Law; 
that is, the standing committees of the people’s congresses at all levels shall 
annually select a number of important issues which have a bearing on the 
overall situation of reform, development and stability and on people’s 
immediate interests and are of widespread concern, and make planned 
arrangements for inspection of the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations 
in respect of the said issues.  
This tool has been institutionalized in the four fieldwork LPCs. Inspections 
on related laws are listed as main work of the SCs at the beginning of year. 
Ambush inspections, unannounced visits, and joint investigations are popularly 
used in the W people’s congress, the M people’s congress, and the J people’s 
congress to decrease asymmetric information with related government 
branches. The leader who is in charge of related departments instead the head 
of departments should present reports after inspection results are sent to related 
government branches from the SC of the LPCs. Its strength in promoting 
accountability is obvious. In the J people’s congress, for instance:  
 
“We found the regulation of periodic medical examinations toward drug users was not 
completely carried out due to the lack of a budget during the process of inspection of the 
Anti-drug law in 2010. We voiced our concern about this in our inspection result report and 
government paid more attention to the problem of funds. After all, our appeal in that respect 
was closely linked to national policy. The Public Security Bureau that was in charge of this 
work felt very happy about our inspection and appeals, which inevitably would promote the 
implementation of that regulation” (int.75).  
 
 
 
Appraisal 
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Appraisal is one routine tool used to hold the executives and judicial 
accountable in Chinese politics. It is also one vital way to increase deputies’ 
information and help the government to improve their work. It was initially 
adopted by some LPCs in the early 1980s and then extended nationwide. 
However, the forms of appraisal vary by areas and periods. Cho tried to 
categorize them into two main types: (a) self-reporting performance appraisal 
(shuzhi pingyi), which are usually used by LPC standing committees to examine 
leading officials elected or appointed by the legislatures; and (b) congress 
deputies’ appraisal (daibiao pingyi) to oversee the conduct of government 
bureaus. 163 Although the first type was once regarded as an excessive but useful 
weapon to constrain leading officials by many LPCs’ leaders, the new enacted 
Supervisory Law in 2006 dictates one new appraisal type—the appraisal over 
special work—to replace previous performance appraisals toward department 
heads directly.  
The W people’s congress has achieved good performance using this appraisal 
type. For example, the Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision done by the 
SC of W people’s congress in 2011 included four stages in the whole process164: 
the first stage is the preparation of the unit candidates list of appraisal, the vote 
on formal units, the enactment of implementation plan, and the mobilization 
meeting after talking with the appraised units. The appraisal of the Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision is based on the recommendation from 
deputies and the vote by the standing committee members. It then moves into 
the investigation stage, which lasts for one and a half months. On the one hand, 
17 small groups consisting of several hundred congress deputies collect 
information separately in this unit via multiple channels, such as special 
investigations, forums, visits, and so on. Then they submit conclusive 
 
163 Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (Cambridge University 
Press,2009),58-59. 
164 Related data were collected from the website of the W people’s congress.  
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comments, opinions, and suggestions on this unit to the SC. On the other hand, 
the appraised unit should submit a self-inspection report to the SC on the basis 
of self-checking and correcting. Thirdly, the appraisal stage highlights 
face-to-face appraisal and the comments given by the SC. At last, it is the 
rectification stage. The vote on the final rectification report and subsequent 
satisfaction measurements done by the SC and the leader of each deputy group 
are required. To facilitate further supervision, related results are submitted to the 
CCP committee and opened to the public (int.57).  
The M people’s congress began to carry out work appraisal in 2011 by 
establishing a two-way communication mechanism between the SC and the 
evaluated departments. Although the procedure is not exactly the same with that 
of the W people’s congress, basic ideas are included such as answerability, 
transparency, and sanctions by voting or satisfaction measurements.    
 
Appointment and removal  
The SCs hold the authority to appoint and removal main officials, including 
deputy county or district heads of the people’s government, chief judges and 
associate chief judges of divisions, members of the judicial committees and 
judges of the people's courts, deputy chief procurators, members of the 
procuratorial committees, and so on. In practice, however, this tool does not 
have the same strength as it should to ensure government accountability. Due to 
the actual control of this power by individual CCP and governmental leaders, 
the dilemma becomes how to deal with the authority and the leadership of CCP 
that still exists. One respondent’s argument in the W people’s congress was as 
follows:  
 
“Appointment and removal of officials via the SCs is more sensitive in actual operation due to 
the touching on one important principle of the CCP, which is assuming the responsibility for 
cadres’ affairs. The whole process is affected by a strong CCP intention in practice. Frankly 
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speaking, this authority actually falls into the hands of the CCP committee. Even if it is 
necessary for SCs to collect sufficient information on cadres before they make appointment or 
removal decisions, they are usually put aside at the stage of recommendation and 
investigation. The only channel for obtaining information for the SCs is the rough 
introduction on candidates done by the CCP committee organization department before 
voting on appointment or removal of officials. The vice-ministers from the CCP committee 
organization department and publicity department are always members of the SCs. This 
informal but popular rule in arranging SC members is favorable for implementing the CCP’s 
intentions in the SCs to local people’s congresses (Int.54). 
   
Against this backdrop, the reactions from the SCs vary in different areas. Some 
members in the SC of the B people’s congress and the J people’s congress think 
that they have to obey the will of the CCP even though they can cast dissenting 
votes on behalf of the will of the people at the stage of final voting (ints.37, 39, 
67, 68, 69). One representative form of conduct was that the cadre candidates 
rejected by the SC on behalf of the public were recognized and put in important 
positions by the CCP. For instance, according to the nomination of CCP, the SC 
in the J people’s congress was given an order to remove the chief position of 
one 57-year-old cadre in the J city Water Resources Bureau and appoint a new 
cadre to take over that position several years ago. At that time, it happened to be 
a critical period of flood prevention, so the SC thought it inappropriate to 
remove the chief position of that cadre and voted against the removal. The CCP 
committee then undertook discussions with every leader of the SC over this 
matter. Finally, the cadre who failed to take over the chief position in the Water 
Resources Bureau was nominated as a deputy secretary-general for the 
government and party secretary by the CCP. In addition, the SC also voted 
against two cadres who showed poor performance, but their  appointment and 
removal proposals were passed via the efforts of the CCP committee after three 
months (ints.72, 75).  
However, the SCs of the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress 
have tended to adopt some strategies to cope with this issue. The SC of the W 
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people’s congress prefers to use reversed transmission of the pressure to correct 
improper appointment and removal nominations imposed by the CCP. It tries to 
make timely reports to the CCP after collecting sufficient information and 
forming its own opinions on the candidates. It is not surprising that the 
candidates with bad qualities fail at the stage of SC voting, especially when the 
CCP still follows its initial nomination of the candidates challenged (ints.44, 50, 
51). The SC of the M people’s congress tries to strive for certain initiatives in 
the final appointment and removal decision by establishing a good relationship 
with the CCP committee at the corresponding level. Some respondents’ 
arguments were as follows: “the phenomenon of the CCP’s appointment of the 
cadres voted against by the SCs also appeared in our district, especially when 
the CCP secretary co-chaired with the chairman of our SC before 2004. Now, 
we have a good communication mechanism established between our SC and the 
CCP committee. It is very clear that nomination of cadres resides in the CCP’s 
hand, but we have the right to express our opinions on the candidates and vote 
electronically on them. We do not hesitate to cast true votes and we tell the CCP 
committee that many committee members are satisfied or dissatisfied with 
candidates in advance. Usually, the CCP will reconsider the candidates if we 
express our strong dissatisfaction about a candidate before holding the SC 
meeting. One time, one candidate declined the appointment to the chief of one 
government department after knowing the dissatisfied opinions of our SC” 
(ints.11, 13,14). 
 
Questioning and addressing inquiries 
Theoretically, this is one powerful weapon that lets the officials explain what 
they have done and how they are viewed concerning public affairs. If many 
deputies in the SC meeting or the plenary meeting are not satisfied with the 
performance of officials, they also can make use of legal procedures to sanction 
  
163 
 
them. However, this tool is not popular in many SCs due to its strong political 
influence, especially when it comes to addressing inquiries to officials.  
In practice, many inquiry proposals are turned back due to unexpected 
political influence before they are passed to the assembly. Fortunately, these 
failed inquiries are solved quickly because they attract great attention from the 
CCP and the government (ints.9, 74). Both the W people’s congress and the M 
people’s congress adopt alternative methods for active constraint of officials. 
For example, they set a procedure for the officials to exhibit their 
decision-making basis and respond to questions from the SC, the public, and 
social organizations, in participatory budget reform. After that, related officials 
are required to report their rectifications concerning public opinions within a 
fixed period of time. Similar forms can bring pressure on government leaders 
and department officials. The author found that some officials could not stop 
sweating and blushing when they received more questions or failed to respond 
to them in a participatory budgeting meeting on-site observation. The SC in the 
M people’s congress had raised questions about the officials in the budget 
hearing held by finance department but not with institutional innovation by 
itself. For the SC in the B people’s congress, use of this tool is random.   
 
The investigation into special issues 
Some outstanding problems are of widespread concern or have a relationship 
with public interest but no clear facts involved. In these cases, the SCs of the 
people’s congresses may set up investigation commissions on special issues. 
This is a powerful tool that exerts an exceptional accountability effect in 
practice. For instance, the SC in Jingzhou city, Hubei province, passed the 
investigation of a special issue of a hybrid rice seed business survey report in 
January 1997, stressing the necessity to hold related units and personnel 
accountable via timely and severe punishments. This is not the solely case. In 
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April 2002, the SC of Laian County, in Anhui province, organized a 
commission on specific issues, identifying a problem of nearly 4 million RMB 
of the litigant appropriated by the county court. 165
However, one statistic shows a minimum usage frequency for the 
investigation into special issues among all of the supervision tools, which also 
was confirmed at the author’s fieldwork sites. It is rarely utilized in any of the 
four SCs of the studied LPCs. Many respondents think this tool is highly 
political and worry about its influence on the tension among the CCP, the 
government, and the LPC. 
 
Reviewing of regulatory documents 
This tool can produce potential constraints on the executive and judicial 
department as well as the CCP. After all, the LPC supervision should involve 
the issues relating to personnel, the institution, and the policy. The CCP also 
should obey the supervision from the LPCs once the policy issued by it is 
proved illegal (ints.55,75).  
However, related files or documents are less frequently or ritually reviewed in 
practice even if they violate laws or erode public interest. For example, farmers 
are required to show a license to avoid pollution caused by burning their corn 
stalks. How is it possible to send a license to so many farmers? The government 
issued this document on its own way, nevertheless. We had also received 
complaints about a government document stipulating to add points to the 
students. They can get extra 10 points if their parents had invented an enterprise 
with more than 10 millions of assets in our region. Similarly unfair documents 
have continued until today. In addition, some unfair documents are seldom 
reviewed. Two reasons contribute to the absence of this tool: on the one hand, 
 
165 Zhongcao, “Difang renda jiqi changweihui zuzhi teding wenti diaocha kaoliang yu fansi (The evaluation and 
reflection on special issues investigation done by standing committees of people’s congress) ,” The Study on 
Chinese Legislature, No.3(2011). 
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most LPCs lack the incentive to review regulatory documents; on the other 
hand, the government tends to be under the wing of the CCP and escapes the 
review and punishment from the LPCs by jointly issuing documents (int.75).  
 
 
7.3 The perceptions of congress deputies on their influence in ensuring 
accountability  
The superiority of authoritarian rule within the one-party system is prominent in 
Chinese political culture. From the perspective of the individual level, we know that 
congress deputies are the main actors in strengthening the influence of legislatures and 
promoting the authorities who are accountable in democracies Is it then possible for 
Chinese congress deputies to influence the authorities in a different context? How can 
they? Their involvement in the issues of the executives and the judicial and the 
followed perceptions provide a valuable platform for us to respond to these questions 
in a local Chinese context.  
According to the information provided by the respondents, we find that the power of 
influence exerted by congress deputies on the executive and judicial affairs increases, 
but remains uneven among the four LPCs. They are classified as different types based 
on their perceptions of the extent of influence: great influence, moderate influence with 
political risks, and minimal influence.  
 
Great influence  
In the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress, most respondents show a 
positive response when asked “As a congress deputy, do you think you can exert some 
influence on the issues relating to the executives and judicial branches?.” When it 
comes to influence and strategies, they are different between congress deputies as 
standing committee members and ordinary deputies. Usually, the former shows a 
strong influence on policy issues if the policy is desired. The standing committee 
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members in the W people’s congress pay more attention to influence on policy 
initiatives such as public participation in budget decision making, environmental 
protection, public transportation, food safety, tourism facilities, the justice of law 
enforcement, industry, worker and farmer welfare, and so on (ints.50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 
58, 60). Congress deputiesthink that they can play a positive role in the settlement of 
detailed public affairs. Except for routine channels to assert their role, seeking the 
support of main leaders and members in the SC is regarded as a powerful way to gain 
influence for most deputies (ints.44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 57, 58, 59). However, it is worth 
noting that the influence will be decreased if the CCP is always opposed. In this regard, 
prior communication with the CCP via active responsibility is vital to guarantee the 
smooth working of the W people’s congress. In the words of the chairman of the W 
people’s congress:  
“It was not easy to obtain our current progress. The CCP did not agree with our initiatives 
such as an open government budget, the appraisal of sensitive work, and so on, at the 
beginning. I had persuaded our CCP secretary by showing sufficient pre-surveys and support 
from experts many times. More importantly, I promised to undertake the responsibility if our 
work brought about unexpected results. I was willing to take a political risk for our 
innovations. At last, he reluctantly agreed.” (int.51).  
For those in the M people’s congress, the influence of congress deputies is extensive. 
The leaders and members interviewed in the SC consider that they are influential in 
many fields, such as public budget, construction safety, food safety, public 
transportation, environmental protection, judicial justice, the balanced development of 
compulsory education, and other livelihood issues. Making use of the legal power and 
personal influence are their common ways to work (ints.1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 
19, 22). Their influence on policy issues also can be observed in several cases provided 
by two standing committee members: 
 
 
 
Case 1: Promoting the response of main leaders to civic prosecution (int. 7) 
When it comes to administrative adjudication on issues of the public suing government 
departments, we heard that related government leaders seldom appeared in court in our district. 
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The public also had a lot of complaints about having to face lawyers employed by the government 
who usually failed to explain their reasons clearly. We selected more than 20 cases involving 
different government departments to listen to over 2 years by taking advantage of the chance to 
inspect the implementation of “the Administrative Procedure Law.”Ultimately, we were strongly 
impressed by the absence of department leaders and the subsequent weak response to civic 
prosecution. Therefore, we wrote a report that pointed out the problems in our district and outlined 
better practices for the main leaders’ responses in courts in other districts.  
The chairpersons inside the LPC paid much attention to our report and asked the court to 
prepare a special report. Subsequently, the government began to take the issue seriously. 
Regarding what we had proposed, they introduced “the provisions to cope with administrative 
proceedings” in the second half of 2006, to regulate that the leaders must appear in court to 
respond to civil complaints, especially when it comes to those cases that have significant impact on 
the overall situation.  
This is meaningful for leaders of departments to understand the overall work and the 
aspirations of the people. At the same time, government departments with defective work would 
receive a judicial recommendation and a reminder to correct their improper behaviors. Compared 
with many public grievances before the presence of main leaders in courts, some cases were 
carried out of court for mediation or were peacefully settled after receiving reasonable 
explanations from main leaders at the scene. Now our district ranks in the top in Shanghai with 
respect to reforms in this area.  
 
Case 2: How I promote the government to optimize decisions (int. 1) 
Case 2.1  I had participated in one governmental project evaluation meeting when I was a 
member of the standing committee in the M people’s congress. The district government agencies 
had one vacant office space as a result of reform organizational change. They were prepared to 
allow one unit named the bidding center to work there, and the cost of renovation was RMB 17.7 
million. I expressed different views against the selection of the bidding center there although I 
agreed with the necessity to move in a new unit: the vacant site was next to residential areas and a 
huge project would inevitably affect their quality of life. It seemed better to arrange one unit that 
would provide door-to-door service for the public outside due to limited plant locations there. The 
district government carried out deliberate argumentation and adjustment of the budget and scale of 
the new unit after identifying with my views. At last, a Food Inspection Agency was allowed to 
move into the vacant place instead of original planned unit after making detailed comparisons 
among several units. The decision change was beneficial to the government and to the public: on 
the one hand, the investment/cost was decreased from 17.7 million to 1.5 million by replacement 
with the Food Inspection Agency; on the other hand, the new decision also eased traffic tension 
because most staff needed door-to-door services outside, which reduced the noise and protected the 
surrounding environment to some extent.  
Case 2.2  The efforts to implement affordable housing for low and medium wage earners was 
limited although the district government kept its eye on housing improvements for disadvantaged 
social groups early in the plenary meeting of the people’s congress. At the same time, the 
government attached more importance to the building of talent apartments. That is to say, 10 
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million talent apartments would be built to attract more white-collar workers to work in this 
district, and 10 million affordable houses would be used to solve the housing problems of 
low-income families. However, the government regarded the issue of talent apartments as one of 
practical projects and the issue of affordable housing was classified as routine work (the 
government usually shows more preference for practical projects rather than routine work because 
practical projects have more potential to benefit ordinary people and earn their support). I 
personally thought that the arrangement of these two issues was in the reverse order: providing 
affordable housing should be the mainstream of society and it was a key issue proposed in the 
plenary of people’s congress. In addition, 10 million affordable housing units were not enough and 
the number should be increased. Afterwards, my view was accepted by the government. The 10 
million talent apartments and the 10 million affordable housing units were both listed concurrently 
as practical projects.  
 Case 2.3  Early in the plenary meeting of people’s congress in 2008, I saw that a lot of people 
had begun to raise pets with the improvement in their living standards. I reflected on that issue 
later: on the one hand, it was one kind of personal hobby; on the other hand, the result would be 
very serious if epidemic problems arose. In view of the fact that government’s management in that 
respect had many disadvantages in practice, I submitted a written suggestion that would strengthen 
the investment in vaccinations for epidemic prevention as well as for subsidies for pet holders’ 
education. Finally, the government paid more attention to my suggestion and discussed how to do it 
best with me.  
 
Except for the role of ties between the constituency and government, congress deputies 
responded that they usually act as the promoters for the settlement of many public 
affairs, especially for those of concern to their constituencies. The main public affairs 
are listed as follows when the deputies were asked “As an ordinary deputy, can you 
specify successful cases promoted by you to the authorities to solve for your 
constituency?” In the M people’s congress: the establishment of more job positions, the 
construction of community facilities, the opening of bus routes and cable television, 
the extending of ferry sailing times, skills training for reemployment, the increase in 
enterprise retirement pension, the establishment of a medicare pharmacy, green 
projects, the improvement of the living environment, correction of imbalances in 
compulsory education, the problem of the village collective economy, farmers’ 
pensions, rural sewage treatment, the improvement of road conditions, relocation of 
polluted industrial zones, flat to slope transformation of house roofs, the negotiation 
between enterprises and labors, unity service facilities, infant care facilities, public 
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transportation, unequal treatment of medical staff, the establishment of a community 
property management committee after negotiating with district land departments, the 
establishment of a district emergency aid center and a community health care center. 
At the same time, they also showed their failures in some proposals; for instance, the 
establishment of a commercial trust system, the establishment of nighttime out-patient 
services at the community health center, interference problems caused by metro light 
rail, the connection between two roads, the construction of elder care institutions, the 
setup of a 500-meter greenbelt, bonus allocation, and income security for landless 
peasants during urbanization. We can see these failed cases mostly relate with policy 
issues that demand more money and more coordination among multiple departments.  
In practice, congress deputies have learned to adopt distinctive strategies according 
to different situations. For example, one famous old deputy stated the following 
strategies to achieve success: a) Keep an eye on issues that can be handled and seek 
immediate results: I would pay strict attention to the issues reasonably raised by the 
public, especially when the government could deal with them within their jurisdiction 
at the same time. For instance, the public had a lot of complaints about poorly 
developed public transportation in my constituency. I thought the opinion of the public 
was reasonable because there were no any bus lines to go outside along the western 
direction from where they lived. The key question was how to get the government 
agents concerned to coordinate. Therefore, I insisted on giving a proposal to establish a 
No150 bus line during the period of the second session people’s congress. b) Invite 
media, experts, high-level deputies, and leaders to bring pressure regarding issues that 
the governments can handle but hesitate to do so. C) Seek the understanding of the 
public and wait for the settlement of some issues relating to complex coordination as 
well as big policies (int.10).  
The results from the questionnaire conducted by the author in the M people’s 
congress in 2009 shows that submitting suggestions and motions, consistently urging 
government to solve problems, and directly reporting to senior leaders ranked as the 
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top three means for the deputies to promote the settlement of public issues. At the same 
time, promoting face-to-face communications with government branches and the 
voters is gradually being adopted by deputies as a new strategy. In addition, just as 
with the analysis of the tools adopted in the Standing committee, the deputies point out 
that interpellation is not frequently used in their experience.   
 
Table 7.7  Ways chosen by congress deputies to urge governments to deal with public issues that 
constituency voiced or they interested in  
 
Q: How to urge governments to deal with public issues 
that constituency voiced or you interested in? 
   (n=106 congress deputies, 106 is valid) 
      Yes   
rcentage)    
         No 
   (Percentage)
Submitting suggestions and motions during LPC’s plenary 
meeting 
     81.1    18.9 
Submitting written suggestions during the LPC’s 
intersessional period 
     83    17 
Interpellation       1.9    98.1 
Consistently urged government to solve      41.5    58.5 
Directly reporting to government branches or promote 
their face-to-face communications with the voters 
     26.4    73.6 
Appealing through related meetings or forums      13.2    86.8 
Directly reporting to senior leaders        33    67 
Source: the analysis on questionnaire done by the author in 2009 in the M people’s congress. A 
total of 106 congress deputies responded to this questionnaire within 106 returned questionnaires.   
 
More interesting, the experience of one congress deputies shows that all ways 
mentioned above are useful in gaining influence if you use them properly. His 
successful cases in holding the authorities accountable are meaningful.   
 
Strategic accountability  
When I was a congress deputy in session one (year 1993-1998) and session two (year 1998-2003) 
in the M people’s congress, I encountered a lot of obstacles when I communicated with the 
government. I remembered that I handed in more than 50 pieces of opinions during the process of 
the first session of M people’s congress. I solved some small issues by myself after classifying them 
and the rest were transferred to relevant governmental branches. These branches complained that 
my motions were too much: first, I told them that those are the people’s opinions, not mine, which 
also was the result of administrative omission. All of those opinions came from my fieldwork during 
my contact with the voters. If I gave those opinions irresponsible, you could blame me. If you felt 
that my opinions were too much work, then I would ask you to go to my constituency and tell them 
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to recall me. Second, if you were afraid of presenting these issues to the main leaders, you could 
decide to change your positions. Third, some government officials asked me how to solve these 
issues. I told them to see my written suggestions. If they did not plan to solve issues, I would prefer 
to communicate with their key leaders instead of talking with them. Congress deputies have the 
right to evaluate them by signing satisfied or less satisfied or dissatisfied. If we indicate 
dissatisfaction towards them, they would feel nervous and pay more attention when dealing with 
related issues.  
 For example, Fengqing Road did not exist in reality, although it was approved in city planning. 
Both residential accounts and their estate licenses showed signs of that road for the past ten years. 
Considering that the government should put the planning into practice, I wrote a written opinion to 
the government branches concerned in 2006. They first responded that they would keep it for 
reference. I was dissatisfied with their answer and submitted my opinion again. After one week, 
they said they would plan to solve the issue but had no deadline about when they could. I was still 
not satisfied with the obscure deadline although I appreciated their good attitude in dealing with 
the issue. I told them that I could present the issue to the director of the district government if they 
felt it was too difficult for them to solve it. They immediately resolved it by attaching a deadline of 
31th, March, 2007. In practice, it had been postponed to July before the final settlement. I had kept 
track of them 15 times during this process. Not until June 31, when I went to the scene to see their 
progress, did I cross satisfaction in the corresponding column. I also prepared an explanation for 
the voters because they needed timely feedback (int.9). 
 
The use of interpellation power 
Some opinions went on for seven years before they were resolved. For instance, the trade market in 
my constituency was located on a north-south road coupling with two bus lines and bikes. This led 
to both chaos of public traffic and an increase in robberies. Many residents were strongly 
dissatisfied. I insisted on raising written opinions within 6 years but failed during the period of 
session two of the district people’s congress. When the 7th year came, I made a proposal for 
addressing inquiries to related governmental departments to the standing committee of the M 
people’s congress after obtaining ten deputies’ joint signatures and launching the signs from my 
constituency. Afterwards, the main leaders talked with me and ask if I could withdraw my inquiries. 
Due to the fact that the district chief agreed to hold a meeting and deal with the issue on the spot, I 
agreed to give up inquiries to governmental departments. At the same time, I said if the meeting 
failed to solve the issue, I would re-write a proposal for addressing the inquiry, which was a very 
important “weapon” for congress deputies to hold the government accountable.  
The director of the district government attached more attention to the issue, and they sponsored 
the meeting on the spot, attended by 35 officials concerned, on the first working day after the 
closing of the plenary people’s congress. Every official in charge of related issues made promises 
about their time arrangement to solve their task. The issue was soon carried out under the auspices 
of the government (int.9).  
                 
Moderate influence with political risks 
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 In the J people’s congress, most congress deputies responded by saying that they 
played some role in holding the authorities accountable when asked the same question. 
However, they also noted that the influence of congress deputies is usually limited as 
the result of the control from the CCP and the disregard from the government (ints.65, 
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77). Three representative cases can give some snapshots 
of this opinion:  
One comes from the experience of a standing committee member. He, as the 
vice-chairman of the SC, raised a strong objection when government leaders advocated 
changing the fixed urban planning. Although his view was consistent with the voices 
from the public and other deputies, the CCP persuaded him to cooperate with the 
government and took the overall situation into consideration through the party whip in 
all related meetings. Ultimately, he had to yield to political pressure, saying that the 
plan change should be promptly report to the SC afterwards. The changed urban plan 
was passed by the SC with less against. In his view, few committee members as 
deputies dare to challenge the government and the CCP in the J people’s congress. On 
the one hand, it needs political encouragement against the Chinese political culture 
where most members get used to adopting submissive ways. On the other hand, it is 
useless in the end if the CCP is against your opinion. As a Chinese proverb says, the 
wagon must go whither the horses draw it（int.77）.  
Another stems from the story of one ordinary deputy. She said that she had 
succeeded in promoting the solution of some issues; for example, the moving of dog 
markets from traffic arteries and residential areas, the governance on teenagers’ 
addiction to the internet, the protection of workers’ rights, and so on. Submitting 
suggestions, motions, or bills and taking part in the inspection as well as appraisals, 
were main channels that affected the authorities. Sometimes she contacted the leaders 
in the executive and the judicial directly to facilitate the settlement of issues. One 
impressive failure was in promoting the fair settlement of a civil case due to the 
indifference of the court. The details are as follows:  
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One woman visited my home to complain about the injustice from the court. However, when I 
contacted the court, I was told that the woman was a vexatious petitioner. To figure out the 
inconsistencies between the woman and the court, I invited two other deputies from a higher 
level people’s congress to observe the new trial on the case of the woman. We showed our 
intention to the court leader when we arrived there. The leader showed extreme coldness to us. 
We realized that we were not welcome although we were very angry about the attitude of court 
leader. It was also embarrassing to be involved in that case after the first hearing, so we did 
not continue to be involved in the case after that. However, I expressed our dissatisfaction 
when we presented our appraisal on the court’s report at the plenary meeting of the people’s 
congress. The CCP secretary urged the leader of court to establish a useful channel to assist 
the work of congress deputies on the spot (int.73).   
The other case is about a part-time standing committee member in J city who 
endeavored to perform his responsibility even if he faced some political risks. Except 
for the routine channels such as suggestions, motions, and so on, he found it very 
effective to correct inappropriate behaviors of the CCP and the government by 
combining the strength of deputies, media, experts, social organizations, and main 
leaders. He had successfully solved one serious pollution issue via this strategy, but 
unfortunately he was refused as congress deputy at the stage of the CCP’s nomination 
during the new election due to his active pursuit of accountability by the authorities.  
 Many local governments had been enthusiastic on inviting outside investment with the 
transition of Chinese society from a planned economy to a market economy at the beginning of 
the 1990s. J city also followed the trend and attracted one rare earth enterprise to the Jiefang 
district in 1996, which not only polluted the air but also produced radioactive waste solids. 
The villages nearby suffered from bad luck: chicken eggs became soft, pigs produced freaks, 
leaves turned yellow, and crops failed to grow. The farmers struggled with that enterprise and 
sued but failed many times. The CCP committee and government favored the enterprise. They 
asked for my help one day. I was shocked by the serious pollution and incalculable harm done 
to the surrounding peasants. First, I contacted with environmental experts and 15 congress 
deputies to make in-depth investigations after carefully planning. We took many pictures and 
collected data on serious pollution. Due to the opposition of the CCP committee and the 
government to close the enterprise, we then hired the television station in Henan province to 
make a documentary and showed it the SC members for 40 minutes. They were shocked by the 
situation and gave our proposal to the CCP committee. The CCP committee held two meetings 
regarding this issue and invited four experts from Beijing to prove that there was no problem 
with that enterprise. Congress deputies had a verbal battle with those experts when they said 
the pollution was not serious. We ultimately won by showing our academic data on pollution, 
an appellate paper from the peasants as well as pictures of dead animals, crops, and sick 
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people surrounding that enterprise. That issue was listed into a motion to hold the government 
accountable. In December 1997, the CCP committee and government made a joint resolution 
that the rare earth plant was to be permanently closed(int.74).  
 
In addition, keeping consistent with the CCP’s work center is another strategy for 
gaining influence. Both the CCP and the governments at all levels attach substantial 
importance to people’s livelihood issues relating to environment, education, 
transportation, water, health care and so on. This deputy paid more attention to 
environmental and education issues during the 15 years that he was continuously 
elected as a congress deputy. One successful case was given as follows:  
 
When I visited enterprises in 2002, I was told that the residents had been plagued by polluted 
water from one Hydro-geological Exploration Company for two years. They said that “You 
would do a great thing for the people if you could solve their drinking water problem.” The 
Hydro-geological Exploration Company is an enterprise in charge of exploring for water wells 
for others. However, they had been faced with the challenge to have clean drinking water since 
2000: they had a 500-meter depth private well providing water for production and employees’ 
daily living. The quality of water was good after being tested in the past. However, the chloride 
rate in the well water increased every year, reaching 5 times the normal standard for drinking 
water. The water was heavily polluted, and it was too salty to drink or to use for cooking. As the 
company failed to supply clean water themselves, more than 300 residents in this company had 
to buy high-priced water (more than 5 times the price of ordinary water) from a nearby 
enterprise in order to sustain their daily lives. More than 300 residents had to carry a variety of 
water bottles and wait to buy water in front of that enterprise every morning and afternoon 
because the enterprise only sold water from 10:30-11:00am and 17:00 pm. This went on for two 
years. 
I was surprised that I had not known this information before. After elaborately planning,  a 
group of congress deputies, television and newspaper personnel, and I went to the scene the 
next day. Most of us were moved to tears when we saw residents struggling to purchase water 
and carry it home. What caused this bad result? We heard that one chemical plant had piled up 
three hundred thousand tons of waste soda in the upper streams of the Qunying River across the 
city. That waste soda, including sulfates, had infiltrated and polluted the groundwater. Why not 
borrow water from the water utility? The Hydro-geological Exploration Company said that they 
had no money to pay for 80 million port fees to the water utility due to poor economic 
conditions.  
At that time, the case was first exposed by television, radio, and other media. I wrote one 
motion and sent it to the mayor by myself after it was jointly signed by our congress deputies. 
The general content of the motion was that “The problem of caused by the hydro-geological 
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exploration company in Jiaozuo Coal Industry demonstrates that the underground karst water 
has been severely polluted. We hope that our government will not only solve the problem of 
residents’ daily water but will also attach further attention to groundwater contamination as 
soon as possible.” The mayor was much annoyed after reading the motion. At that time, it was 
Friday. To solve issues raised by the congress deputies, he convened 17 bureaus including the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Planning Bureau, the Health Bureau, and so on, and 
some deputy mayors, to set up a site office the next day. Many residents rushed to report the 
situation to the leaders; one old lady among them picked up a white porcelain bowl and gave it 
to the mayor and said: “You can try the taste of water in your month, but do not drink it because 
it is poisonous. The mayor promised to pay the port fee by the government and solved the water 
issue within 30 days. It turned out that after 27 days the residents could enjoy clean water. They 
regarded me as savior when they met me later (int.74).  
 
Minimal influence 
Most congress deputies in the B people’s congress consider that their role is limited to 
public issues unless the CCP and government need their help to ease the pressure on 
governance. Against this backdrop, one of their strategies is to support the work of the 
CCP and the government. Another is to focus on the issues that are ignored by the 
government or strongly voiced by the public. The main leader in the standing 
committee shared one example with the author: 
  
 Education is a work focus of the chief executive in our district government. As the leader of the 
standing committee, organizing congress deputies to carry out inspection on weak schools is 
listed as one of the tasks of our standing committee. During the process of investigation, we 
found many dangerous school buildings where the students still study inside. The government 
and the CCP secretary were shocked when we submitted our investigation results to them. 
After three days, the government departments began to renovate the teaching buildings for 
those schools mentioned in our report. At the same time, a deputies’ proposal to increase 
infrastructure funds for schools was also approved (int.37).  
 
For many deputies, participating in the inspection organized by the SC, submitting 
suggestions and motions, and reviewing the work reports during the plenary meeting of 
the people’s congress are the main channels for their involvement in affairs of the 
executive and the judicial branches. Many deputies think that they serve as good ties 
between the constituency and the authorities, although they would lack control if the 
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voices and complaints were all handled by the authorities. However, they also admit 
that it is possible to have greater influence if the CCP committee at their level gives 
them more autonomy. (ints.23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38).  
 
7.4 The driving forces behind the increasing role of LPCs in Horizontal 
accountability 
Except for the institutional development mentioned in part 1, other possible driving 
forces to explain the increasing accountability and the differences among the deputies 
can be identified from the data from interviews and questionnaire obtained for the four 
LPCs: 
First, public consciousness of the role of the people’s congresses increases with the 
development of the modern economy and political democracy in Chinese society. The 
deputies and the officials are gradually realizing that legal powers empowered to the 
LPCs provide a critical backing for influencing public affairs. The key point is whether 
the LPCs put their legal powers into practice (ints.9, 10, 36, 57, 62, 74). For the public 
and social organizations, LPCs can provide a good platform for them to express their 
demands or seek their interests. In the case of horizontal accountability, LPCs have the 
power to urge the settlement of unfair issues or to carry out sanctions toward the 
authorities at the corresponding level. Therefore, the election of members to LPCs has 
become more competitive than previously. Lastly, but most importantly, both the CCP 
committee and the government find the channel of the LPC provides a good way to 
ease social conflicts as well as governance pressure. Support and control coexist when 
it comes to the general perceptions of the CCP and the governments toward people’s 
congresses at the corresponding level.  
Secondly, leadership personality and related political context are important factors 
in understanding the performance differences of different LPCs. The main leaders of 
the SCs in the four LPCs have different influences (see table 7.8 below):  
  
Table 7.8  The sketch of main characteristics of the chairmen of the SCs in the four LPCs 
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 Professional 
experience 
before taking 
position in LPC 
Date 
of birth 
Dominating 
political  
ideas and 
aspirations 
Does CCP 
secretary 
co-chairs 
the position 
of 
Chairman 
of SC 
Main attitude 
towards the CCP 
committee 
CCP’s 
attitude 
toward the 
LPC 
W Main leader in 
government, 
CCP committee 
and Political 
Consultancy 
Meeting 
1959 Strong 
democratic 
Ideas and 
has certain 
political 
pursuits 
No Cooperation and 
asserting 
Respect 
but  
occasionally 
reluctance
M The chief of 
Personnel 
department in 
Shanghai 
municipality 
1949 Strong 
democratic 
Ideas 
No Cooperation Respect 
given more 
autonomy
B 
（the 
standing 
vice 
chairman 
of the SC） 
The leader in 
government 
1951 Limited 
democratic 
ideas 
Yes Obedience  
 
Respect 
but  
preferring to 
dominate 
J The leader in 
government 
1949 Limited 
democratic 
ideas 
No Accommodating Respect 
with  
Source: Data stems from the interviews by the author in four LPCs in China  
 
The chairman of the W people’s congress contributes a lot to the rise of the W people’s 
congress. He has fruitful political experience with a distinguished reputation in W city. 
He is willing to innovate to realize his political aspirations. After all, he is younger 
than other chairmen of the SC. Many leaders in the CCP committee show respect to 
him but occasionally show reluctance, especially when it comes to sensitive 
innovations. In the M people’s congress, good political context between the CCP 
committee and the LPC is a major feature for the development of the M people’s 
congress. The CCP secretary, a previous law professor, is very open-minded with 
respect to promoting the reforms carried out in the people’s congress. Therefore, fewer 
political obstacles are in place than when the chairman of the SC based his actions on 
his democratic ideas. The standing vice chairman in the B people’s congress is not so 
lucky, as his co-chair, the CCP secretary, inevitably puts some pressure on him. 
Muddling through and absolute obedience are not bad choices for him due to his 
approaching retirement. The chairman of the J people’s congress has a strong 
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consciousness about the domination of the CCP and government due to his previous 
work experience. Although he has a good personal relationship with the CCP secretary, 
he chooses to closely follow in the footsteps of the CCP rather than make good use of 
autonomy under a good political economy.    
Thirdly, the change in the relationship between the LPCs and society is another 
structural variable that contributes to the LPC performance. Unlike the previous 
absolute isolation from social variables, many LPCs have learned to cooperate with 
social actors, media, and so on via a number of institutional channels. This is more 
prominent in the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress. On the one hand, 
most reforms in the W and M people’s congresses originate from the strong support of 
experts as well as scholars. On other hand, they continue to invite related social forces 
to participate jointly in their recent reforms or to promote their roles. It is easy to gain 
additional social legitimacy by increasing their actual role. In contrast, the B people’s 
congress has little interest in cooperating with social forces. It is a somewhat alert to 
outside participation. The J people’s congress lies in between positive cooperation and 
negative alertness toward societal forces.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The assessment of the function of LPCs as horizontal accountability institutions shows 
considerable discrepancies between their traditional rubber stamp role and their current 
performance. Evidence shows that both collective-level SCs and individual-level 
congress deputies can play roles in holding the authorities accountable. However, 
political constraints still exist within the one party system. The SCs tend to seek tools 
for inspection, appraisal, appointment and removal proposals, and budget supervision, 
in order to assert their political position. Although tools such as questioning and 
addressing inquiries, and investigation into special issues are powerful theoretically, 
they are rarely used in practice due to the misgivings of bringing a tight relationship 
with the CCP and the government. The behaviors have a close connection with 
  
179 
 
political context, although most congress deputies assert that they can produce 
influence in some cases.  
The distinctive performance of the four LPCs provides an opportunity to observe 
the extent of the influence political constraint or political dilemmas stressed at the 
beginning of this chapter. The W people’s congress and the M people’s congress tend 
to be more active. The J people’s congress shows a moderate influence with political 
risks. In contrast, the B people’s congress has limited influence. The reasons for this, 
the study found, are mainly the following: First, different levels of institutional 
development result in different influences on government activities. Second, increased 
consciousness on the role of LPCs both from the CCP and other actors at the 
corresponding level provide opportunity for their further development. Third, 
leadership personalities and appropriate political context have a great influence on 
performance. It is noteworthy that an appropriate match between the leadership in LPC 
and the CCP is very crucial. Finally, good cooperation with social forces also can 
contribute to the improvement of performance.  
Therefore, we can say that accountability performance of the LPCs varies with 
institutional variables, structural variables, and personal factors. Any sole factor is not 
sufficient to determine performance, but we should admit that the political effect of the 
CCP is still one important variable in Chinese political context, although it is no longer 
the decisive one.  
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8. Co-governance for accountability in the 
budgetary process 
Studies of accountability relationships usually are concerned with (1) vertical relations 
between voters and elected representatives and (2) horizontal relations between 
legislatures and governments. However, we should also distinguish between 
relationships in different policy areas; for instance, legislative accountability in 
budgetary matters compared to other policy areas. After all, legislative scrutiny of the 
budget, and the control of its execution, is a democratic principle celebrated in most 
forms of governments, and is considered to be a crucial mechanism to enhance the 
influence of the legislature and to hold governments more accountable.  
Although extensive literature has converged to emphasize the function of 
legislatures in the modern budgetary process for decades within established democratic 
countries, in Latin American countries, and in a few African Countries,166 there are 
comparatively few studies on the corresponding role in China, either theoretically or 
based on in-depth empirical studies. This may partly depend on the rather 
old-fashioned impression that Chinese People’s Congresses at all levels are 
traditionally seen as “rubber stamps” in political life, with insignificant influence on 
the powerful Communist CCP and the dominant government institutions. In addition, 
the legislature’s own deficiencies may also reinforce its unnoticed function in 
budgetary processes. These deficiencies demonstrated by the legislatures of developing 
countries, in Joackim Wehner’s opinion, include insufficient legislative involvement in 
 
166 See several representative works, Oppenhei, B.I, “How Legislatures Shape Policy and Budgets,” Legislative  
Studies Quarterly, Vol.8, No.4 (1983): 551-597; Schick, Allen, “Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective 
Voice in Budget Policy?” OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol.1, No.3(2002):15-42; Wehner, Joachim, “Parliament 
and the Power of the Purse: The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of African 
Law, Vol.46, No.2(2002):216-231; Wehner, Joachim, “Back from the sidelines? Redefining the Contribution of 
Legislatures to the Budget Cycle”, Working Bank Institute,2004; Wehner, Joachim, “ Assessing the Power of the 
Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions”, in Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective , 
eds by Stapenhurst R, Pelizzo R, Olson D.M, Trapp.I.V,World Bank Institute,2008; Santiso Carlos, “Legislatures 
and Budget Oversight in Latin America: Strengthening Public Finance Accountability in Emerging Economies”, in 
OECD Journal of Budgeting,Vol.4, No.2(2004):67-76. 
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budget priority settings, as well as limited formal authority and organizational capacity 
to inspect the annual budget. Furthermore, several factors, such as large deviations 
from approved budgets, ineffective auditing processes, low levels of fiscal 
transparency, and weak political dynamics, also undermine legislative authority and 
prevent its functioning as a guardian of control.167   
However, recent experiences from the Chinese People’s Congresses show a different 
performance from the traditional rubber stamp description, especially at local levels. I 
can point to two concrete examples: First, one government budget draft was actively 
debated and vetoed in the 1995 plenary meeting of the Raoyang county People’s 
Congress, Hebei Province, because of its failure to guarantee regular payment 
arrangements for its civil servants and teachers.168 Secondly, in the 2003 plenary 
meeting of the People’s Congress in Wuhan city, Hubei Province, delegates also 
debated and vetoed investment in a RMB three million government infrastructure 
program. The main criticism was that the program lacked the required evaluation 
procedures and also demonstrated improper use of public funds.169  
The vetoes and abstentions were used by the delegates as means to express their 
general disagreement with the overall budgeting arrangements. At another plenary 
meeting held in 2005 by the Guangzhou municipality People’s Congress, some 
delegates severely criticized the leaders of the financial bureau. As examples of their 
claims they asked: “Why have you, as a guardian of public purse, agreed to a luxury 
budget application of RMB 25,000 for government procurement of one computer?,” 
“There are 177 staff on the regular payroll of the municipal office, and they are 
entrusted with 172 cars. How can they spend 1.15 million RMB only on maintenance 
 
167 See Wehner, Joachim, “Strengthening Legislative Financial Scrutiny in Developing Countries”, Report paper for 
the UK Department for International Development, 2007. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk.  
168 Wang Zhiguang and Zhou Shijie, “ Raoyang County People’s Congress and its Standing Committee approved 
government budget strictly and legally,” Renda Gongzuo Tongxun[ National People’s Congress Newsletter], 
Vol.20(1995) 
169 Peng Jin, “The 11th People’s Congress in Wuhan city: strengthening supervision on behalf of public opinions”, 
the Website of People, 18 December 2006(available at http://npc.people.com.cn /GB/14528/5183616.html) 
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items? This money is hard earned by the taxpayers, and must be used carefully and 
responsibly. The budget report went for an overall vote by 458 delegates: only 92 were 
against and 52 abstained.170   
In the literature, only a few authors have documented this new trend. Yang may be 
one of them as he observed that the emergence of legislative- and audit practices that 
investigate governmental finance now indicates the development of what we may term 
as “horizontal accountability” in China171. Ma and Ni also pointed out how Chinese 
legislatures have gradually gained real supervisory power over government budgeting, 
and are beginning to challenge, as a form of checks and balances, the government’s 
decision-making on budgets. This has come as a direct consequence of the budget 
reform of 1999.172 While the above examples and related studies provided some 
snapshots of how the Chinese People’s Congresses have begun to play a positive role 
and to make governmental budgeting accountable (i.e., responsible to the publicly 
elected congresses), many unknown facts remain about how and why these new trends 
have happened and what kinds of challenges are still faced, as well as the overall 
political implications of the reforms. Therefore, a good understanding of how Chinese 
People’s Congresses strategically increase their accountability function in the 
budgetary process, within the one-party-CCP system, calls for in-depth empirical 
analysis.  
This chapter is organized as follows: First, I will address how the accountability 
function of the Chinese Local People’s Congresses is legally and actually structured 
within the budget decision process, and I will give some thoughts regarding the 
historical setting; Secondly, I will focus on the important empirical cases in East and 
Middle China. The intention here is to describe the increasing accountability function 
of the Chinese Local People’s Congresses since 1999 in the budgetary process; 
 
170 Tian Biyao, “ Strengthening Budget Supervision behaviors of Chinese People’s Congresses,” the Website of 
People, 17 May 2006(available at http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/14528/4380582.html). 
171 Yang, D.I, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004):278-288. 
172 Ma, J. and X. Ni, “Toward a Clean Government in China,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol.49, 
No.2(2008):119-138. 
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Thirdly, I will explore the driving forces behind the improvements in the LPC 
accountability function in the budgetary process. Finally, this paper concludes with a 
brief summary and a discussion regarding how the increasing accountability function 
of the LPCs in the budgetary process can indicate greater implications for the 
realization of general political accountability. 
 
8.1. The early legal and historical setting of LPC budget accountability:  
In 1949, in the early days of the new Chinese Republic, China’s leader Mao realized 
the importance of constructing detailed government budgeting institutions. He formed 
the Ministry of Finance to administer the macroeconomic policies and to take 
responsibility for the National annual budget.173 The establishment of the Chinese 
People’s Congresses in 1954 complemented the initial budget institutions and power 
arrangements. These included budget formulation and execution power that was 
administered by the government, while budget examination, approval, and execution 
oversight power were firmly in the hands of the People’s Congresses at the same 
levels. These institutions remained the same until now. The budget power was shared 
by both the National People’s Congress and the Local People’s Congresses, and is 
deeply rooted in the 1954 Constitution and in the 1982 revised Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China. The 1994 Budget Law of the People's Republic of China 
further emphasized the supremacy of budget power by the LPCs; for example, article 9 
points out that the budget approved by the people’s congress at the corresponding level 
shall not be altered without going through the procedures prescribed by law. This 
formal institutionalization undoubtedly laid a solid power foundation for the 
implementations of the LPCs’ budget accountability. 
However, the supremacy of budget power legally given to the LPCs is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to ensure a safe process of budget accountability. With the 
 
173 Aiyu liu,Trans, “ Speech of Mao Zedong to the fourth session of the Committee of the Central People’s  
Government”, December, 1949.Constitution of the People's Republic of China, and the article 9,12,13 of Budget 
Law Of the People’s Republic of China.    
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intent to grasp the actual accountability function of the LPCs in historical 
circumstances, we will always have to investigate the actual budget relationships 
among different actors along the legal foundations. Although the Chinese Constitution 
and the Budget law did not specify in detail the function of the Chinese Communist 
CCP in the budgetary process, in the real budget world, its leading position is still 
considered as very crucial due to the distinguishing political characteristics of public 
budgeting. 
Before 1999 (the starting point of series budgetary reform initiation), the actual 
involvement of LPCs was virtually limited in the budgetary process, not to mentioning 
the guarantee of basic budget accountability. Instead, the LPCs had been almost 
marginalized in the budgetary process in most local governments as of 1999. At that 
time, this obvious gap—between the formal powers and the actual role—was caused 
not only by external setting factors but also by the LPCs’ inner deficiencies.  
Firstly, the budget decision process was strongly dominated by the CCP and 
government, which excluded LPC involvement. At the time between 1978–1999, the 
gradually formed budgetary process could be outlined in the following 6 steps (see 
Figure 8.1):  
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  Step1: Budget request agencies submit their annual budget demands to the     
Government financial department. 
  Step2: The Finance department makes a preliminary budget draft based on general 
classification and requests that amount from budget request agencies, and submits the 
request to the Financial and economic leadership group administered by CCP 
committee. 
  Step 3: The Financial and economic leadership group, administered by the CCP 
committee, returns the general budget allocation “intentions/priorities” on how to cut 
the overall finance “cake” (including priority programs that match their policy goals) 
to the Finance department. The Finance department then makes up a balanced budget 
draft that combines the intentions of the Financial and economic leadership group 
charged by the CCP committee, law stipulations, actual finance conditions, and other 
political factors. 
  Step 4 and step 5: The Finance department submits the decided upon budget draft to 
the Finance and economic Working Commission and the standing committee insider 
LPCs for examination, and then to the annual plenary meeting of the Local People’s 
Congresses for approval before the beginning of budget year.  
  Step 6: According to the budget approval from the LPC, the Finance department 
transfers budget allocations to the relevant local government agencies (Ints.1, 
22,38,42,61,62,66, 82,83). 
 
During this process, the Financial and Economic leadership group, administered by the 
CCP committee, plays a crucial function in the overall budget allocation. For example, 
it decides how much of the budget “cake” should be cut for the health and medicine 
field, or what amounts would be allocated for expenditure on governmental 
reconstruction. It forms a closed decision mechanism with just a few participants; for 
instance, the Financial and economic leadership group administered by the CCP 
committee, usually participates, along with several leaders from the CCP committee 
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and governments, including the CCP secretary, the CCP vice secretary who is in 
charge of finance work, heads of government, the leaders of the Finance department, as 
well as the director of Development and Reform. As some interviewees pointed out:  
“The pre-1999 Reform was characterized by a situation whereby the CCP had the final 
say about how to allocate the budget, and with very little participation from the leaders of 
the LPCs or any other budget actors. It was also impossible for a LPC to oppose a budget 
draft that was confirmed by the CCP. When the Finance department submitted its budget 
draft to the LPC and the LPC sent its final budget approval back (step 4 and 5), it 
ordinarily remained without any changes.” (ints.1,83). 
 
Secondly, another external obstacle faced by LPCs was the prevailing tendency for 
random budget allocations inside the government, with no transparency or control. At 
that time, budget management was in a chaotic condition due to the existence of a large 
number of extra-budgetary funds and the absence of budget rules. These conditions 
made it more difficult for the Finance department, the guardian of public money inside 
government, to clearly know how much private savings the budget request agents 
owned or what criteria should be used for allocating the money to different agents. 
That also provided opportunities for politicians to influence budget allocation decisions 
through their political powers. One interviewee’s experience proved this point: 
 
“In the past, the Finance department allocated public money to agencies leisurely and secretly 
because it had no formal rules to obey. That situation could be compared to adults giving a 
“packaged red bag” to kids on China’s spring festival, and one kid did not know how much 
money adults gave to other kids. When the Finance department made its budget allocation 
proposals, budget requests from agents with strong political relationships would receive more 
attention and more budgets could be expected. If they were on bad terms, they got less money. 
There was no room for criticism or objections from dissatisfied budget agencies, since there 
were no rules or traditions and they had to resort to the thinking that they were just 
unsuccessful (int.61). 
 
One of the finance officials expressed his feelings in the following manner: 
 “When I was the director of the budget sector in 1998, I had to face the challenge that no 
institutional rules or forms existed for budgeting. One of the outstanding problems was the 
“private political instructions (da zhaohu) from the main leaders, which were usually requests 
for larger budgets for specific departments. This informal rule brought about a lot of trouble. 
For example, at every spring festival, when the budget agencies knew the time had come to 
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allocate money, they would try their best to ask for help from the leaders who had “strong ties” 
with the finance departments. In their opinions, it would be disastrous if they did not take part in 
this—da zhaohu—competition. The director of the Finance department had to hide in the 
background in order to avoid being perceived as too involved in connection-based 
(guanxi-based) money deals. He also felt a strong sense of annoyance at being ‘used or almost 
politically blackmailed' during this process”(int.61). 
Obvious consequences from this way of budget drafting and making budget 
decisions were the inevitable increase in the difficulties that the LPC had in carrying 
out effective examination and approval. Without a scientific budget proposal submitted 
by the government, there was really no base to perform proper budget examinations, or 
to forward alternative allocations of money. 
Thirdly, weak political will impeded the LPCs from taking a stand in the budgetary 
process. One the one hand, taxpayers (voters) seldom pressured the LPCs. During that 
period, the dominant economic policy had a strict planned economic characteristic 
(1949-1978), budget institutions were normally regarded as a kind of “national” 
budgeting—an accounting process rather than a public budget decision. Governmental 
demands received more attention than did taxpayers (voters)’ needs. Although the 
1978 reform created an open policy turn on market-oriented financial reforms, the 
slow-rising consciousness of public budget accountability did not produce direct 
pressure to counteract the LPCs’ indifference to budget issues. On another hand, LPCs 
were not anxious to violate the CCP and the “will” of the local government under this 
condition of no public pressure. One interviewee’s experience proved this point:  
 
“The budget is the blood of the overall governmental activities and how to allocate money is of 
utmost importance for any ruling party. As merely members of the LPC, we were reluctant to 
get into the crucial domain of budget decisions. We were not only afraid of the wolf (the CCP) 
in front of us, but also the tiger (local governments) behind us, especially when the CCP 
secretary took the part-time position as our Chairman and the first leader of the government 
was the CCP vice secretary. Therefore, at that time, the wise way for us was to conduct only 
some symbolic activities and to keep away from substantial budget examination.”(int.66) 
 
In addition, the LPCs’ deficiencies also hampered their budgetary role. The very 
short window available for examination of the budget, the limited examination options 
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given to the LPCs, and the imbalance of information and expertise among the LPCs, 
the local government and the CCP, gave the LPCs very little influence in the budgetary 
process. These main disadvantages were described by interviewees as follows: 
 
“At that time, the LPC did not have much leverage to affect budgets. For one thing, by the 
time they held the plenary meeting (it was not very stable in different LPCs, and usually 
happened between January-April per year at the local level), the budget had been set by the 
government (the budget year begins the first day of January every year). For another thing, 
important pieces of information, for example, “extra-budgetary funds,” “government debts” 
and so on, were not positively forwarded to the LPCs or communicated with relevant 
committees in dealing with the budget. These committees inside the LPCs did not have enough 
staff or the expertise to screen all of the financial documents forwarded by the 
government”(ints.13,14,37,51,69). 
 
Generally, from the statements presented above, we can clearly see that no 
consistency existed between the formalized statutes in the law and the practical 
influence of the LPCs. The feeble situation of the LPCs in this decision-making 
process was therefore very close to the concept of the LPCs’ as having a rubber stamp 
role. As seen in one interviewee’s response: 
 
“At that time, the function of the LPC during budgetary process (laughing……), the LPC was 
just in charge of raising hands to let the administrative budget draft pass (still laughing), 
other roles were also feeble. Because our financial systems were “administrative finance,” 
the CCP committees played the function as the only superior, leaving no power to the LPC” 
(int.61).  
 
Some scholars have given the similar comments based on their investigations:  
 
“During the era of 1978-1999, the legislatures at all levels were unable to ensure that 
governmental bureaus and officials would make budgetary decisions of appropriate quality 
and with sufficient responsibility. In the process of the budgetary examination, it was 
impossible for the legislature to have any input of its own in the budgetary process and it was 
impossible to identify the direct misuse of public funds. The governmental budget was 
presented to the legislature for examination and approval. It was so short and written only 
with summarized, aggregate figures, that the legislature’s annual budget examination had 
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simply become a symbolic act. The legislature always approved the figures as presented by the 
government”.174
8.2 Increasing function of LPCs via co-governance in the budgetary process after 
1999 
Although LPCs had virtually a feeble function in performing budget accountability 
during the previous historical period, after 1999, things gradually began to change. 
Based on the conceptual framework of “accountability for what” and “how to achieve 
accountability,” I have started to carry out an in-depth empirical investigation, which I 
will outline below. This concerns three accountability contexts: i) the budget drafting 
stage, ii) the examination and approval stage, and iii) the execution, supervision, and 
performance control stage after approval. More importantly, strategies, mechanisms, 
and powers that LPCs used to move towards budget accountability—making budgets 
more transparent, controllable and answerable—will be explored at these continuous 
budget stages, which are deeply rooted in local innovation cases both in East and 
Middle China.  
 
8.2.1 The budget drafting stage 
Formally, budget drafting, the first step in the budgetary process, is in the hands of the 
executive. The budget drafting issues for next year usually start to be considered 
around June (there are no uniform time requests) in the current fiscal year. Compared 
to the previous messy budget drafting system with its strong connection-based 
(guanxi-based) features, many local governments began after 1999 to adopt a new 
department-based institutional model. It required that the government budget had to be 
compiled on a comprehensive department basis. Thus, one hoped to avoid the previous 
“disperse budget allocation” in the drafting stage. Budget request agencies were told to 
integrate all of their revenues and expenditure requests into one departmental budget. 
They also had to abide by standardized budget formats as provided by the Finance 
 
174 Ma, J& Niu, M.L, Modernizing public budgeting and financial management in China. In Public Financial 
Management(New York: Taylor& Francis,2006):691-736. 
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department. The finance department, in turn, needs much energy to respond to their 
budget requests, in line with budget rules, to make some balance between budget 
realities and political intentions from the CCP leaders and directors of governments 
during the budget drafting process.  
However, this does not mean that the LPCs should absolutely stay away from this 
process. On the contrary, the LPCs, as the agents of the taxpayers, now began to 
perform a significant function in promoting budget transparency and bringing public 
preferences into the formerly closed budget drafting process. This took place through a 
series of strategies and mechanisms.  
One of these was to urge the drafting of the budget to be detailed and with all 
relevant information revealed openly. The hidden logic was that, without a detailed 
budget, the public would be unable to grasp and understand the realities of the budget, 
and the LPC itself did not need such details and relevant information simply to 
examine and supervise the process. Both the town People’s Congress and the 
county-level People’s Congress made these requests to their finance department. 
The new budget drafting can be described in details as: 
 
In the W1 people’s congress, there were three large budget revenue programs in the 
2009-budget drafting. The total was 118.6 million RMB; and 14 special budget expenditure 
programs, also totaling 118.6 million RMB. There were also 96 specific sub-projects listed in 
the budget so that the public and the deputies could easily understand the detailed use of 
budget funds. In the W people’s congress, for example, for the Water department budget for 
2009, more than 50 budget expenditures were described in detail and the public were thus 
given a genuine opportunity to look into the details of the overall budget and follow its 
implementation later. 175
 
The M people’s congress also set a good example in these aspects. It pushed the 
Finance department to present a detailed budget that drafted a “performance index.” 
For instance, in 2009, they carried out performance-based budget drafting reforms on 
 
175 Internal data on Participatory budgeting reform from the W people’s congress and the W1 people’s congress, 
2009.  
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five important domains of people’s livelihood programs (education; health; labor, 
employment, and social security; public safety; and increasing farm income). In the 
basic budget proposal, they had to include past performances on these five livelihood 
programs and, in advance of the next year’s budget for these programs, provide the 
budget allocations for the public (during August to September) through their websites, 
and in the media for one month.176   
Other typical mechanisms resorted to by the W1 people’s congress was the 
“participatory forum on the budget.” This is a combination of the originally democratic 
dialogue innovation (between public and government) and the new LPC’s budgeting 
supervision. The mechanism is regarded as a kind of mutual communication channel 
among the public, the LPC, and other bodies, and the government, in the budget 
decision-making process. Through these fora, the LPC members, the public, the social 
organizations, and the interest groups can freely forward ideas, express opinions, and 
debate with the government agencies. These fora again bring to the LPC a new 
function as mediator between public opinion and government executions at the 
different stages of the decisions on the budget.  
For example, the 2010 budget drafting in the W1 Township showed that W1 
received many applications from different factions after publishing their intention to 
hold a participatory forum on the 2010 budget. This was to be held well before the 
final decision on budget proposals. More than 100 persons obtained invitations to 
participate. Among these were the LPC deputies, the village cadres of the CCP, some 
business owners, and other interested members of the public. During the participatory 
process on drafting of the 2010 budget, the participants were organized into three 
discussion groups: “the economic development group,” “the social enterprises group,” 
and “the towns and villages construction group.” They expressed their questions, 
formulated opinions, and forwarded demands. People from the local government 
responded and took notes. After this forum, the same town held a broad, open meeting 
 
176 Fieldwork reports on the construction of public budgeting supervision system in the M people’s congress, 2009 
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to involve more public opinions relevant for their budget drafting work. In the end, the 
LPC was able to use these opinions and responses to ensure that the government 
budget draft behavior matched with the public desires. 177  
In the J city, in middle China, similar participatory practices in the budget drafting 
process have, in the recent years, been gradually institutionalized: in the budget 
drafting stage, information on the budget, the way the agencies apply to the finance 
department, and its own examination of these applications have been put to the public 
for democratic discussions, experts’ argument, and social hearings. These are all aimed 
at ensuring transparency and a responsive budget debate before examination and 
approval in the LPC. Based on these institutional procedures, ordinary public and 
elected deputies have better chances to influence budget drafting, which so far has 
been totally dominated by the executive. At the end of 2007, 60 budget programs 
proposal were publicized on the internet to let the public and the deputies have their 
voice. Eventually, 10 new programs were included in government budget.  
In 2008, experts’ arguments and social hearings on key budget programs were held 
twice; in April and in October, involving budget proposals of 42 projects worth 276.6 
million RMB. Budget application agencies, LPC leaders, elected deputies, agents from 
finance departments, both leaders and staff, various outside experts, media, and 
citizens from the local area participated.178 Their opinions were treated as important 
information and included in the final formulation of the budget proposal.  
Another strategy to ensure more accountability was the early involvement of the 
LPC deputies and the Financial and economic Working Commission (FEC) of the LPC 
in the executive budget drafting process. This proved to be a success in the M people’s 
congress  
 
177 The participatory observation data on Deliberative discussion forum on 2010 budget drafting in one township of 
W city, Zhejiang Province, December 18, 2009. 
178 Finance department in the J city, The reporting on 2008 budget hearings to the Finance and Economic Working 
Commission in the J people’s congress, December 10,2008. 
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According to the introduction to the M people’s congress by several leaders, the 
main practices are followed:  
“First, in April of the budget year, deputies and the Financial and Economic Working 
Commission usually joined in the discussion on relevant budget issues rather than having the 
opportunity to interfere at this stage. This corresponds to the rule that budget drafting mainly 
is the responsibility of the executive (government). However, this did not mean that the LPC 
was absent from the drafting process. They do possess different information from what the 
governments have, due to frequent interactions with people in various electoral districts and 
from many different sources outside the government’s usual domain. The main purpose of 
early involvement is to bring people’s ideas to the government and to make budget decisions 
more reasonable. In addition, due to a shorter time for the LPC budget examination, our 
Financial and Economic Working Commission participated in the budget drafting process 
ahead of time, through pre-evaluation of the proposed budget programs above 20 million 
RMB (budget programs above 5 million RMB should be made known to the public). In 
November, 2009, we joined with the Finance department and the committee members of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and spent about one week to 
evaluate 45 budget programs. These included much of the fiscal budget, comprising five 
people’s livelihood programs (education, public health, social security, public safety, 
science) and nine requests from budget agencies. In order to absorb more public ideas 
mentioned in the public meetings, we also, before pre-evaluation, sent out publicity material 
and consulted the public through radio, television, and government websites. These 
strategies made it possible to overrule some of the budget proposals already agreed on by the 
government or the CCP leaders before submission to the LPC. In 2008, more than 40 budget 
programs were taken out because they failed to comply with the relevant information 
gathered”(ints.1,11,19). 
 
Let me then explore several rejected budget programs by the M people’s congress via 
the early involvement in the 2008 budget drafting stage, as these show the positive 
function of the M people’s congress in preventing the finalization of budget proposals 
that went against public interests (see table 8.1): the two programs (1 and 3) proposed 
by Public Security Bureau were cut due to its deviation from public budget rules 
(“performance orientation,” “reasonableness and efficiency” were three of the crucial 
financial criteria to evaluate these budget programs). This happened although the 
leader of this budget agency was one member of the CCP standing committee and has 
a strong influence. The budget program on Venture Funds aimed at helping 
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entrepreneurs to promote employment (program 2), failed to be accepted because it 
contained considerable risks of wasting public funds. 
 
Table8.1 Several rejected budget programs by M people’s congress in early involvement in the 
budget drafting stage in 2008 
 
 Program name Budget request agency  Budget amount  Rejected reasons from FEC, M people’s 
congress 
1. Intelligent 
lights  
installed in traffic 
intersection 
Public Security bureau 
 
More than 77 
million 
Although the electronic and intelligence 
are future development direction, they are 
not fundamental to solve traffic 
congestion problem. Because the main 
cause did not depend on whether there 
have intelligent devices or not. The 
implementation of this budget proposal in 
M district will cause a lot of casualties’. 
2. Venture fund 
aimed at helping 
entrepreneurs to 
promote 
employment 
Social Security bureau 10 million The M district was previously involved in 
a similar Venture fund and a there 
remained lot of uncollected debts. Similar 
budget request should be restrained before 
institutionalized monitoring mechanisms 
were followed. Thus, this budget proposal 
could not pass under current institutional 
context. 
3. Standard 
buffer zone to 
ensure 
transportation 
safety 
Public Security bureau 
 
6 million Both construction equipments and 
technical demands are difficult to meet in 
the district. In order to avoid inappropriate 
budget expenditure, this budget program 
should be cut off.  
Source: the author’s interviews and participatory observation in the M people’s congress in 2009 
Note: The budget amount is accounted by RMB, China; FEC stands for financial and economic 
Working Commission insider M people’s congress. 
 
8.2.2 Budget examination and approval stage 
After the first stage of budget drafting, mainly carried out by the government, budget 
examination and approval power is described in the Constitution and the Budget law, 
and they provide a powerful say for the LPC to insure governmental budgeting 
transparency and control. However, for a long time, the LPCs were reluctant to deal 
with political constraints, challenge procedures, pointing out imperfect power 
provisions, etc. Recent innovations in LPC behavior shows new tendencies by some to 
deal with the above challenges during this crucial stage. In view of poor information 
and shorter time during the Annual plenary meeting, examination and final approval of 
only half a day or one day were allocated for budget discussion. Now the LPCs have 
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begun to act strategically and they have extended their concerns to examination and 
approval by all deputies at the annual plenary meeting into a preliminary examination 
process held by the Standing committee of the LPC.  
 
Budget examination and approval regulations 
Few detailed formulations are available regarding how the examination and approval 
should take place in the LPC, although article 37 in the Budget Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (1994 revised version) contains some general outlines on 
procedures. The Financial departments in the governments of the counties, autonomous 
counties, and cities not divided into districts or municipal districts, shall, one month 
before the sessions of the people’s congresses at the corresponding levels, submit the 
main contents of the draft budgets. This will be the preliminary examination of the 
standing committees of the people’s congresses at the corresponding levels. At town 
level, the LPC is the only subject in charge of budget examination and approval, due to 
the fewer organizational capabilities (they are without standing committees).Thus, they 
lag far behind in controlling random government budgets, as stipulated in the 1999 
Reform. Therefore, initiating detailed budget examination only gradually is regarded as 
a good chance and new basis for many LPCs to enhance their budget authority. Until 
the end of 2002, according to statistics, e more than 30 LPCs (province People’s 
Congress and municipality People’s Congress) had enacted and adopted their own 
budget supervision provisions.179  
For those LPCs below the provincial level, this budget behavior of the Province 
People’s Congress was usually the platform for them now to assert power within the 
system. For instance, one official in the J people’s congress, the lower level within 
Henan province, lobbied the CCP secretary (the part-time chairman of the standing 
committee in the LPC) to allow enactment of provisions for budget supervision 
 
179 Yu Guangyuan and Chen peng, “ The statistics on budget examination and supervision provisions enacted by 
Province People’s Congress,” China Election and Governance,Oct 13,2003, 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=81919. 
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regulations for J city. This had been rejected by a previous Chairman of the LPC due to 
his worries about its sensitivity. One of reasons given for his action was that the Henan 
Province had passed similar regulations. That became the pioneer city for public 
budgeting reform, and he said it was necessary to follow this new trend and avoid the 
waste of public budgets. At last, budget supervision regulations in J city were passed 
on January 10th 2005 at the Annual plenary meeting of the J people’s congress. The 
detailed formulations for examination procedures, for discussion of “sensitive” debt 
funds, and for matters of budget publicity were included. If the People’s Congress at a 
higher level had not set the example for us to follow and the CCP leader had been a 
conservative, it would not have succeeded. The leader of the CCP would have 
considered that the LPC was challenging him in the struggle for budget power, or that 
they were, in reality, against the CCP’s budget policy (int.69). The W people’s 
congress and the M people’s congress also enacted similar regulations, respectively, in 
2005 and 2007.  
 
Participatory budget examination through deliberative discussions  
This mechanism was regarded as “the invention from W city,” one relative developed 
area in the East of China. The adoption of this mechanism by the W people’s congress 
can be seen as an evolutionary process. This area is characterized by a well-developed 
private business economy and thus with higher demands for pluralism and democracy. 
From the beginning in 1999, the introduction of deliberative discussions at a grass 
roots level government was aimed to alleviate public complaints, meet the demands of 
public participation, and give oversight of local governance, by establishing a dialogue 
forum with the government. At the same time, the government and the CCP decisions 
could benefit from the involvement of the public. Although earlier dialogues involved 
many important topics (education, public infrastructure, environmental protection, etc.) 
and produced good effects for general decisions on public affairs, conflicts also arose. 
This innovation could not last if the main leaders as successors would not want to 
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continue it. Thus the actors outside the system would not be longer involved 
(ints.40,41,42,52).  
Owing to the LPC’s statutory budget control power, the connection between the 
deliberative discussions on budget topics and the local People’s Congresses system 
could be possible by institutional reforms. Faced with increasing public demands on 
reducing budget waste and the pressure for better transparency, the deliberative 
discussion mechanism could provide a real opportunity for the LPC to change its role. 
Therefore, institutionalizing this participatory mechanism within the institutional 
framework of the LPC was an important step (int.50). 
Deliberative discussions first started in the W1 people’s congress in 2004 and were 
extended gradually to other townships, the W people’s congress introduced similar 
reforms from 2008. 180 According to statutes in the Budget Law in the China People’s 
Republic and Budget supervision regulation in the W people’s congress, the Finance 
department should submit the finished department budget drafts to the Finance and 
economic Working Commission and the Standing committee for preliminary 
examination one month ahead of the City People’s Congress Annual plenary meeting. 
Participatory budgeting through deliberate examination was usually arranged after the 
budget draft was submitted, but before the plenary meeting, which was usually held 
between November and January. 
    Since 2008, the W people’s congress has paid more attention mainly to those 
department budgets that comprise the larger funds, the ones with stronger public 
concern, and those where budget transparency was lacking. The public transportation 
budget, the construction and planning budget, and the water conservation budget are 
typical examples. Here, the participatory examination process also led to discussions 
 
180 Compared with the W people’s congress, the W1 people’s congress is one of the lower-level township people’s 
congresses within the same administrative divisions. Usually, the higher level people’s congress plays a guiding 
role in the reform process of lower level people’s congress although there has no leadership between them. The 
spread of innovative reform practices from the lower level people’s congress is easy after getting the approval of 
the higher level people’s congress in China.  
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about the 739 million transportation department budgets, which were held by the W 
people’s congress in January 2010.181  
Through various ways of voluntary registration and by separate invitations, more than 
80 persons from a wide range of interests participated in this meeting. They were: 
3 city leaders,  
20 city People’s Congress deputies,  
16 members of the general public,  
11 representatives of social organization and experts,  
4 CCP cadre members,  
7 LPC leaders at township level,  
9 relevant government departments,  
11 committee members of finance and economic Working Commission  
and other members of standing committee.  
The deliberative discussions were set up in the following way: 
Firstly, the Reform and Development bureau, the Finance department and the 
Transportation department presented drafts related to issues on transportation, and the 
Finance and economic Working Commission in the W people’s congress made a 
pre-inspection report on the draft of the transportation budget. Secondly, with the 
intention of making participants discuss in depth and fully express their opinions as well 
as recommendations, they were divided into four groups. The criteria were geographical 
distribution and backgrounds of interest representation. Thirdly, they took part in the 
discussion of the deliberative procedure. After the four group leaders reported on their 
groups’ detailed opinions, other participants (deputies, public, members of social 
organizations, and standing committees) could inquire on their concerns, or debate with 
the leaders from the departments. This last procedure gave a broad summary and 
prepared the conclusions of the city leaders for the entire Transportation budget.   
 
181 The following data on deliberative examination discussion on 2010 transportation budget came from author’s 
participatory-observation as well as related communication with standing committee members in the W people’s 
congress, 2010-1-17. 
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The standing committee kept a watchful eye on how government departments 
integrated the arguments from the discussions and recommendations when they 
improved the proposal of the Transportation budget. Meanwhile, the W people’s 
congress carried out an in-depth coverage and publicity on TV, in the newspapers, on the 
W people’s congress website. This made the whole process of the budget into a 
deliberative discussion known to public, and inevitably pressed the governments to 
change their earlier random budgeting proposals.  
 
 Budget hearings and the fate of a budget proposal in the M people’s congress 
In order to promote further budget transparency and expand public participation during 
the preliminary examination stage, the standing committee in the M people’s congress 
inserted in 2008 what can be called the “budget hearing mechanism.” Two budget 
program hearings in 2008 and five programs hearings in 2009, on a 190 million budget, 
were carried out. All of these hearing programs created strong attention and much local 
public interest. Further hearings, including those on the Social security budget, the 
Public transportation budget, and the Education budget etc., were also announced to the 
public.  
When it comes to the evaluation of the effect produced by this mechanism, one may 
conclude that they did not only add more public information on government budgeting, 
but also gave more sound control on some unreasonable and ill-planned budget 
proposals. 
One very interesting case appeared in the withdrawal of the budget proposal of the 
Creating Harmonious Labor Relations Enterprises program in 2010. Although it was 
strongly supported by government and the chief of this district (the vice party secretary), 
this could happen. The hearing was held by the Standing committee in the M people’s 
congress. 182
                                              
182 The following data on this budget program hearing came from author’s observation on budget hearing on 
December 10,2009 in the M people’s congress. The tracking information on the use of hearing results was also 
included. 
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One and a half months before the formal hearing, the M people’s congress made 
extensive publicity through media and websites. The intention was to attract more 
voluntary participation outside the formal invitations. The hearing took place on 
December 12th 2009 and was chaired by the Chairman of Working Commission .The 
main participants were leaders from the Finance bureau (budget managing departments), 
chiefs from the Human resources and social security bureau (budget request agency), 
from the Standing committee members (the main hearing actor), several elected LPC 
deputies took part, as well as some individuals from the Auditing bureau, and several 
other from “outside.” 
The detailed procedures and the process were as follows:  
First, the budget request agencies and the budget management department would use 10 
minutes to make the general program statements. The Human resources and social 
security bureau (budget request agency) introduced the budget proposal of “Creating 
Harmonious Labor Relations Enterprises program.” They pointed out that the goal was 
the realization of enterprises with harmonious labor relationships through government 
rewards. The program was primarily targeted at enterprises that depended on a tax base, 
on social security payment, and on public location of management and labors within the 
M District. If these enterprises could meet the 10 required “demands”: no cases of labor 
dispute arbitration lost, no punishment from the labor security supervision, no safety 
deaths accidents, no history of refusing to sign collective contracts, a net increase of jobs 
over a certain target, no penalties or warnings reported from tax, business, environmental 
protection, quality supervision etc., they could apply and participate in the assessment of 
"Harmonious Labor Relations Enterprises.” Then the Government would give special 
financial rewards to the enterprises that met the requirements. The total financial rewards 
were expected to reach 50 million. This budget program was planned to last for three 
years. The Budget bureau, as the manager of government budgeting, then gave opinions 
on the program. Secondly, deputies and people outside the LPC expressed their opinions; 
every person was allowed speaking for five minutes. Thirdly, experts gave their 
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comments on this budget program; again, everyone was given five minutes. Fourthly, the 
leaders and members of the Standing committee inquired about the budget program. 
Finally, the program entered the “debating stage” between all actors concerned, a 
discussion which lasted for 20 minutes to half an hour.  
The Human resources and social security bureau tried to test the reasonableness of the 
many and detailed opinions of multi- participants. The Finance bureau was then faced 
with several political and financial dilemmas: one was that this program proposal had 
strong political support from the head of the government (who was the CCP vice 
secretary and possessed a vital position in the CCP standing committee) and therefore 
some extra communication and negotiations inside the government were needed. The 
Finance bureau was also worried if this budget program would receive the expected 
positive acceptance. As expected, more questions followed and an even tougher debate 
began between the budget request agencies and the budget “responsible.” factions. 
Several of my short “snapshots” below illustrates this conflict and they are based on my 
position as a participant observer to the actual meeting: 
 
Snapshot 1:  
Chen (the Chairman of education, science, culture and health Working Commission; he 
had been the director in district finance bureau and audit bureau before becoming a 
member of standing committee in the M people’s congress) (Q represents question, the 
following A means answers; HSB, the Human resources and social security bureau was 
the budget request agency; FB, the Finance bureau, was the budget management 
department): 
Q (Chen): I have several questions: is it necessary to use financial rewards in order to promote 
the establishment of harmonious labor relationship enterprises in our district? In other words, 
is there direct link between our reward policy and the objective realization of harmonious 
labor relations here? Please give us your reasons for the proposal. 
A (HSB): Documents and policies did not imply explicit regulations about why the rewards are 
necessary. But the higher level government and our district government points out that more 
measures are needed to stimulate enthusiasm of enterprises. Based on the financial conditions 
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of the enterprises in our districts, we requested to support this budget program. Moreover, it is 
really useful to help with money the enterprises to get them through the present financial crises. 
A (FB): We may consider supporting this budget program, but how much money should be 
allocated, how about the effectiveness, will 50 million RMB per year during a three years 
period be sufficient? We need to have answers to these questions, even if this program had not 
been implemented during 2009. More communication and supervision are therefore welcome. 
Q (Chen): I am not satisfied with the answer from the Financial Bureau. As a guardian of public 
money within government, the arrangement of budget programs should be carefully 
considered. It is very inappropriate to reward enterprises in terms of public goods. How do you 
consider, as the leader of the financial sector, the present situation on this budget proposal? I 
want to get a full understanding of this problem. If this award continues to be paid, do these 
expenses involve us to pay the same for a long time? Frankly, in my opinion, this reward is a 
payment directly to bosses of the enterprise instead of promoting harmonious labor 
relationships. 
A(FB): To be honest, these financial resources are far enough to satisfy these multiple needs. But 
when we look at the name of this project, we really feel it necessary to protect the rights of the 
laborers. Moreover, related laws and regulations also required local governments to pay more 
attention to laborers rights. We should give some clear financial response to that. I am not sure 
if you are satisfied with my arguments this time (All participants laughing) 
 
Snapshot 2:  
 Q (Ling, the vice chairman of Standing Committee, vice secretary of party organization): I added 
some ideas on the question raised by Mr Chen, are these 50 million RMB rewards is for 1 year 
or for 3 years? From budget year 2009 to 2010, is it 1 year or 2 years? 
A((HSB): Frankly, we did not find detailed basis if it should be lasting or just carried out for 1 
year. From my opinion, this program should be continuous as we planned, and be listed among 
the budgets.  
Feedback from Ling: Were there formal documents to stipulate the continuing execution in 2010? 
Establishing harmonious enterprises was a long task, especially for district governments, but it 
did not mean the rewards should last for 3 years. If your vague basis provides some reasons for 
your 2009 budget, now we are talking about the 2010 budget drafts. I thought this budget 
lacked reliable basis. Until now, I did not see the related documents.  
Q(L): It seemed that the finance bureau needed to adjust the budget because in 2009 this budget 
program did not carry out. At the end of this month, you must report this issue to the standing 
committee, and adjust this budget. 
A(FB):We have had consulted with related government departments before we plan to adjust it; we 
were advised to cancel it. After all, we did not want to arrange this budget program again from 
the bottom of our hearts (all participants laughing). However, there needed some communication 
within governmental departments.  
Feedback from L: The disadvantages of our current budget formulation are fully exposed through 
this issue, especially when it comes to the science, accuracy, and strictness characteristics of the 
budget.  
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Snapshot3:  
Q (Gu, the chairman of finance and economic Working Commission, the member of standing 
committee): As a guardian of the public purse, I thought the attitudes of finance bureau were 
more ambiguous (all participators laughing) towards this project. The budget items approved 
last year have not carried out until now; on the contrary, if you continue to arrange 50 million 
RMB budget to this project in next year, I would like to ask you, how to ensure strict financial 
implementation? The budgets approved by District People's Congress should guarantee strict 
implementation and related accountability. This issue must be clear. 
A(FB): This issue was also giving rise to debates within our government. FB thought this budget 
was not implemented last year and advised it to be cancelled, The HSB pointed that they had 
made a lot of publicity; it would bring bad effects if it was cancelled. So we have to keep this 
program after consulting with political leaders and budget departments. This kind of game still 
exists between budget departments and guarding departments; it was a very troubling thing for 
us (all participators laughing). We hope budget openness reform and budget supervision from 
LPC will help us to reduce similar annoyances, although it sounds a little bit idealistic. 
 
Snapshot4:  
Comments from Yang (the chairman of urban construction and environment protection Working 
Commission, the chairman of standing committee): I have another idea. If this budget program 
proposal was passed, there would have an exemplary effect for other budget applying 
departments. For example, the education bureau wants to apply for budget on rewards for 
harmonious teacher-students relationship, the public security department tries to apply for 
budget on rewards for harmonious police-public relationship, or women’s federation eager to 
apply for rewards to establish harmonious family relationship. How to deal with these similar 
budget request agencies with limited public budgeting (all participants laughing)? 
 
Following this hearing, the hearing opinions were formally sent simultaneously to the 
Finance bureau and the budget request agencies. The CCP standing committee also 
received a brief report about the hearing. The local government was requested to give 
feedback on the uses of budget opinions, to be also forwarded the results to the 
Standing committee in charge of the hearing. The media did not only have a wide 
coverage of the hearing, but it also kept track of the budget hearing effects. Under even 
extended inquiries from the public, from elected deputies, from standing committee 
members, the government had to withdraw this 50 million budget program when the 
whole budget proposal were submitted to be voted in annual plenary meeting of the 
LPC. 
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This example, as illustrated in my five “snapshots,” may look like a very ordinary 
debate in the Western, pluralist political systems. Politicians and people do always ask 
questions and make comments to government’s financial proposals. But in the Chinese 
setting, this was rather unusual. Such examples, as well as several others in my 
empirical project, will then give important confirmation to the main hypothesis of the 
gradual change function of LPCs in budget accountability. The more examples of the 
same kind we can find, the clearer we can establish empirical support for the new trend 
away from “the rubber stamp” situation that was prevalent prior to 1999. 
 
Power use and influences on government budget proposals in the Annual plenary 
meeting of the LPC 
The legal procedure of the examination and approval of the entire proposal by the 
government budget is concentrated on the Annual plenary meeting of the LPC. The 
deputies are thus the key actors in controlling unreasonable and irresponsible budget 
proposals. In my empirical investigations, I found this to be true: power to submit 
motions and suggestions, and power to amend budget are now used by deputies to 
influence government budget proposals. Let me develop this topic a little.   
Power to submit motions and suggestions183
During the annual plenary meeting of the LPC, the government first opened with a 
budget report. The Financial committee then gives a preliminary examination report 
and invites deliberative discussions including getting opinions from different 
budgeting hearings. After these two basic steps, it enters into a one to two day 
examination procedure of the budget by the delegates of the LPC (in the form of 
 
183 Both the article 18, 19 in Local Organizational Law and the article 9, 18 in The People’s Deputies Law of 
PR.China stipulate the deputies have power to submit motions and suggestions to the LPC or its Standing 
Committee at the same level. The latter is in charge of handing over these deputies’ opinions to related government 
branches to deal with as well as make responses. For those LPCs without laws initiations, deputies’ motions and 
suggestions can produce some binding on improper or unfair government decisions. Usually, motions have stronger 
binding than suggestions, and government must carefully response for motions once they were approved by LPC. 
But the number of motions accepted each year in LPCs is quite limited (1 or 2 per year), and there had no 
limitations on the numbers of suggestions. The following budget amendment, one typical motion, has also stronger 
binding effect on government behaviors. 
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deputy groups or different department budget items), and the deputies now have the 
legal power to give their suggestions on the behalf of their voters, no matter what the 
budget report says or what is detailed as department budget expenditures. At the same 
time, the government has obligations to communicate with the deputies and respond to 
their opinions. 
It is possible to change part of government budget proposal through deputies’ 
motions and suggestions in Chinese LPCs, especially under a better political 
“ecology.” The W people’s congress set a good example in promoting positive 
relevance between deputy’s suggestions for input and output of government budgeting 
changes, through the public dialogues. 
According to internal statistics184,  
In 2006, there were 13 deputies who pointed out questions and revising opinions on 18 
sub-programs;  
In 2007, 10 deputies submitted suggestions, referring to 13 budget aspects (industry 
zones, social security, the adjustment on campus networks, etc.)  
In 2008, 13 deputies showed their suggestions and comments on transportation, 
education, and other 11 budget programs  
In 2009, 12 deputies expressed their opinions on farmers housing budget, garbage 
disposal budget, and so on, involving 17 different aspects.  
 
These examples from the overall statistics suggest how the process of budget approval 
has passed through joint conferences among the annual plenary meeting presidium of 
the LPC, finance and economic groups, and the government.  
Specifically:  
In the 2006 approval budget, 2 contents were modified, 13 programs were adjusted, 
and 1 new program was added, amounting to 8.28 million RMB;  
 
184 The reporting on participatory budgeting reforms with deliberative budget discussion mechanisms in one 
township people’s congress at the lower level of the W people’s congress, provided by the W people’s congress, 
September 1,2009. 
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In 2007, there were 2 changed motions with 0.12 million RMB funds; 2 changes and 4 
adjustments  
In 2008, changes invo1ved 0.7 million RMB funds;  
In 2009, there were 6 changed contents, 5 adjustments and 1 new program, amounting 
to 0.9 million RMB funds.185   
The influence of deputies on government budget proposals can be identified through 
cases examined in detail during the LPC’s plenary meeting. For example, in the W 
people’s congress, just as expressed in two interviews: 
 
   “During the budget examination and approval process of the 2009 Annual plenary meeting, 
one deputy expressed his suspicion about a government investment budget proposal. He 
mentioned similar commercial projects should be operated through the market mechanisms 
instead of being part of public financial support. We felt his suggestions were reasonable. By 
the end of the meeting, our chairman of the Standing committee informed the related 
department leaders of the deputy’s suggestions, and asked them to correct the original 
budget proposal. They told us that the budget project—establishing one entertainment plaza 
with petty bourgeoisie taste of coffee bars— had been decided by the CCP secretary before 
the Annual LPC meeting. The total budget of this initiative was 80 million RMB, and the 
intention was to attract more commercial investment. The government then promised to allot 
a 30 million RMB budget to build bridges and some basement constructions. We were not 
satisfied with such an unreasonable budget proposal, and sent our suggestions to the 
government leaders before the formal vote. At last, we succeeded. We believed that, from 
then on, political leaders would reduce similar random budgets and take LPC’s suggestions 
into account (int.50).”  
 
Power to amend budgets 
Compared with the right to suggest changes, power to amend the budget is more 
important. The the government has to revise the budget proposals accordingly, once 
they are decided by the LPC’s vote. Although this power of the legislature is 
recognized in 184 worldwide countries, related laws are not introduced in the People’s 
Congresses in China. Fortunately, since 2006, the W people’s congress is beginning to 
                                              
185 The reporting on participatory budgeting reforms with deliberative budget discussion mechanisms in one 
township people’s congress at the lower level of the W people’s congress, provided by the W people’s congress, 
September 1,2009. 
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introduce comparable procedures as a crucial “weapon” to influence government 
budgeting proposal during the Annual plenary examination and Approval stage.  
The process is now as follows: 
During the annual plenary meeting of township People’s Congress, budget amendment 
proposals cannot become effective unless they are successfully passed through the 
following procedures:  
1) Five deputies have rights to propose amendments jointly on budget vetoes, cuts, or 
increases. Budgets must be kept balanced. For example, the proposal on increasing X 
budget funds in A items should also include the information about where to get an 
equal number of funds.  
2) The draft budget amendments must then be reviewed by the LPC presidium before 
they are effective.  
3) Since 2008, the W people’s congress has instigated a new inquiry procedure that 
follows with the presidium review, which is intended to guarantee all deputies the right 
to know and right to express their views. This procedure required the leading deputy 
firstly to state the contexts and basis of budget amendments, and then all deputies 
could freely inquire on what interested them.  
4) The last procedure would enter into the vote stage by raising hands or secret ballots, 
and vote results would be the final say about whether budget amendments would be 
put into effect. 
In the W1 people’s congress, the total number of budget amendments was 50 from 
2006 to 2009 (8, 16, 17, and 9 respectively). After the Presidium review, only seven 
budget amendments remained that could be submitted to a vote by the deputies, mainly 
due to the lower standardization level and the deviation from valid criteria. These 
included: budget amendment proposals that did not change the budget amount, they 
deviated too much from the budget topics, they failed to meet the budget amendment 
format, and that were supported by fewer than five deputies. In addition, unclear policy 
goals and ambiguous projects description caused some amendment proposals to be 
  
208 
 
changed into ordinary “suggestions.” It is worth noting that different voting methods 
could lead to very different results. For instance, in 2008, two valid budget 
amendments failed when it came to the secret vote (see table 8.2).  
Table 8.2 Budget amendments from 2006 to 2009 in the W1 people’s congress 
  Initial 
numbers of 
Budget 
amendments 
proposed by 
deputies 
 Initial inspection results on 
budget amendments by presidium 
during plenary LPC meeting
Vote methods 
and vote 
results of formal 
budget 
amendments  
Items information entering 
into voting  
Procedure 
 2006    8 2 (submitted for vote) 
6(invalid proposal, treated as 
ordinary suggestions) 
Raised hands 
2 passed 
1 “Cutting 0.5million from 
1 million family planning 
investigation budget, and 
transferring this money to 
rural village 
renovation(pass) 
2 “Allocating additional 
0.5 million to garbage 
dealing issue from town 
reserve funds”(pass) 
2007   16 1( submitted for vote) 
1(this budget amendment 
proposal involved a large 
amount of money, which 
needed to be considered again 
after investigation) 
14(invalid proposal, treated as 
ordinary suggestions) 
Secret ballot  
1 passed 
3 “ Reducing 1 million 
budget on industrial zones 
is unacceptably and 
unreasonable”(pass) 
 
 2008   17 2 (submitted for vote) 
2(valid proposal, treated as 
ordinary suggestions after 
further discussion) 
13(invalid proposal, treated as 
ordinary suggestions) 
 
Secret ballot 
item by item 
0 passed 
4 “Increasing budget 
expenditure on older city 
construction” (not passed)
 
5 “ Amending budget on 
Changma road”(not 
passed) 
 2009    9 2(submitted for vote) 
2(valid proposal, treated as 
ordinary suggestions after 
further discussion) 
5 (invalid proposal, treated as 
ordinary suggestions) 
Secret ballot 
item by item 
2 passed 
6 “Increasing environment 
and health funding, 
especially the servicers’ 
salaries” (pass) 
7 “Increasing o.2 million 
public security 
budget”(pass) 
Source: based on the author’s interview data from the W people’s congress and one of its lower level people’s 
congress (ints.40,41,43,44,47,50). 
 
One of amendments, named “Amending budget on Changma road,” was voted down 
due to the increased attention by the local constituency, rather than for overall interests, 
and after an intense debate. The leading deputy of this amendment cried when she saw 
it had failed. For herself, at the beginning, she could not understand why this 
amendment proposal was rejected because she had forwarded it, not only on the behalf 
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of her voters, but also because she thought it was a seemingly indispensible road that 
would be good for many villagers around the city. Although it failed to be an effective 
amendment proposal, it provided useful information for the government to improve its 
accountability later. In the end, the government helped to solve this problem (road 
building) by sharing the expenditure between governmental finance and her villagers 
(ints.41, 44, 45, 49,50). 
Similar budget amendment power was also advocated by the M people’s congress 
beginning in 2008. In contrast with the budget amendment regulation in the W 
people’s congress, as a district People’s Congress, the M people’s congress stipulates 
that 10 deputies together, rather than five deputies, can jointly bring up balanced 
budget amendments. During the annual plenary meeting of the M people’s congress, 
the deputy could submit their budget amendment to the finance and budget 
examination committee of plenary meeting, and the related inspection opinions would 
be given. Based on amendment proposals and inspection opinions, the presidium 
would carry out the vote and decide if it would become effective.  
For example, one budget amendment, in the 2010 annual plenary meeting of the M 
people’s congress, was jointly proposed by ten deputies; it was named the “budget 
amendment on adjusting nine million RMB cadres’ education and expenditure in the 
Organization department budget.” These deputies pointed out that cadres’ education 
and expenditure should be paid by themselves instead of by public funds. They thus 
suggested to cut this budget program and use the funds instead for the transformation 
of older communities within their districts. At the same time, they considered that the 
“exercise expenditure” of cadres should be cancelled altogether or the name in the 
budget should be changed. Although this proposal failed to get the support of the 
Finance and Budget examination committee, and then to enter into the formal 
presidium vote on procedure, the leaders of related budget departments faced strong 
public pressure. They also had to explain patiently these budget proposals to the 
deputies during the process. The leader of government department said he should 
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strictly check the department budget proposal next year to meet eventual deputy 
criticisms (ints.42, 44,51,57,80). 
These pioneer practices in the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress 
undoubtedly demonstrated the potential of budget amendment power to revise 
improper government budget proposals. These examples brought more pressure on 
government leaders to plan in detail and improve their random budget behaviors. 
Otherwise, more amendments from deputies would be unavoidable. More importantly, 
the hard debate and the discussion on voting procedures also made many deputies 
realize that only high-quality budget amendments, in accordance with public interests, 
would be put into effect. Therefore, the crucial significance of budget amendment 
practices lies in their impact on the awareness of overall budget accountability, 
concerning the position of government leaders, the LPC leaders, or for the deputies 
themselves. 
    
8.2.3 Supervision stage: budget execution and control 
After the LPCs’ formal approval, the government is in charge of executing the budget, 
starting at the beginning of the Annual budget term (1st of January). However, this does 
not mean that LPCs should be passive observers. On the contrary, the supervision in the 
actual execution (“use of public money”) and the tight control of it, are closely 
associated with LPC’s accountability role.  
Institutionally, information on government fiscal revenues and related expenditure 
must be reported to the Finance and Economic Working Commission of the LPC’s 
Standing committee every third month. Budget adjustments proposals, during this 
execution process, should be reported in time to the Standing committee (in the county 
or above county level), or to the Plenary presidium of the LPC (at the township level). 
Three standing committee meetings are usually held on budget issues within one fiscal 
year (six to seven standing committee meetings per year in total): one of them is 
half-a-year meeting on the budget execution accounts held in July; the other meeting 
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takes place in October with the emphasis on mid-term budget adjustment. Then, at the 
end of November, the meeting focuses on the budget execution performance of the 
current fiscal year, and the budget arrangements for the next fiscal year. The Finance 
and Working Commission within the LPC, the Audit department, the Finance 
department, and related government budget departments, are required to take part in 
these standing committee meetings.  
It is worth mentioning that the Audit department, the unit that aids the LPC in legal 
matters and enhances execution, supervision, and performance control, is in charge of 
keeping track of budget execution information and reporting finalized execution 
performance to the standing committee within one fiscal year, especially information 
on improper adjustment, misuse, or embezzling of public budget funds. However, 
owing to China’s administrative-type of audit system, the independence of the Audit 
department and professional aid to the LPCs is limited.  
In view of this serious information asymmetry between the executives and the LPC, 
the latter tried to develop some new, identifiable strategies to enhance its role. One was  
to broaden the input channels of public opinions during budget execution supervision. 
For example, with the goal of enhancing budget transparency and answerability, the J 
people’s congress selected ten projects by deputies’ vote from the approved Annual 
total budget in 2008, and invited the public to express their opinions on the execution 
of these programs. In addition, public opinion will be known through the link between 
deputies and voters, and has to be regarded as important basis for the J people’s 
congress budget execution control (int.67).  
The other strategy was to improve organizational strength. For example, at the 
township level, no permanent financial supervisory organization existed, except for the 
Temporary finance examination committee working during the annual plenary meeting. 
After the adjournment of the plenary meeting, no supervision was available for the 
budget implementation since no professional group was developed to do it. The W 
people’s congress passed a resolution in the 2005 plenary meeting to resolve this 
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obstacle, and transformed the Financial Examination group during plenary meeting 
process into a Permanent financial and economic group, which is mainly in charge of 
budget execution supervision after the end of the plenary meeting. This group consisted 
of the vice chairman of the Town People’s Congress and seven other deputies who had 
profound budget knowledge and were familiar with the local economic developments 
(int.44).  
Another strategy was to find ways for cooperation between the Audit department, 
some experts, a few social organizations, and the media. For instance, the M people’s 
congress usually carried out performance control aided by the Audit department. More 
interesting, the M people’s congress would now engage in coordination among 
government budget departments, the Finance department, and the Audit department, as 
well as when the Audit department faced political obstacles within the same 
administrative system. At the same time, it also established experts group to design “a 
performance index” and to implement a neutral performance evaluation. During the 
process, the continued media coverage functioned to strengthen the LPC’s image and 
authority (int.1). 
Last but not least, personalized influence was again important for strengthening 
budget control. One interviewee told me how he had a successful experience in the W 
people’s congress to get more control on sensitive budgets that CCP did not have the 
impetus to promote on their own, and which was achieved through an interesting 
interpersonal game: 
 
   “We began to examine and supervise government debts since 2005, which took several rounds 
between our CCP secretary and me. At that time, he acted as the part-time chairman of the 
Standing committee in the W people’s congress. I was the vice chairman of the Standing 
committee in charge of finance and budget supervision work. Although he was party secretary, I 
was not afraid of him because I thought I acted on these matters in the public interests. My 
personal sense of justice was known to all when I acted as vice secretary in the Disciplinary 
Inspection Committee of the CCP before I began to work in the W people’s congress. Also, I did 
not worry about not being promoted.”  
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One time our CCP secretary was in charge of one chairmen’s meeting inside the LPC. I 
reported to the Conference the content from higher People’s Congress and mentioned the 
necessity of supervising government debt. He was strongly opposed. At the second meeting, the 
vice chairman chaired the meeting; he was busy and absent. As the leader in charge of the 
Finance and economic Working Commission, I was asked to express opinions on the financial 
examination and the supervision arrangements. I said that the government debt and 
industry-cities budget must be reported to the Standing committee and accepted for supervision. 
The Standing vice chairman said that these issues were very sensitive and he wanted to first 
communicate with the CCP secretary since he, after all, was first leader in the W people’s 
congress. I told him no matter what happened, these issues must be dealt with. Many deputies 
and the public had strong complaints on the rapid increase of government debt, as well as on 
budget execution problems of industry cities. The W people’s congress had no other choice but to 
respond to the public and the deputies’ opinions.  
After two reports, the CCP secretary did not express his opinions. Our standing vice chairman 
was advised to supervise another sensitive budget program, instead of the two previous 
mentioned. I was firmly opposed. At last, he agreed with me. I also made a concession, so that 
the government debt budget was examined by a standing committee, and industries questions 
should be reported to the chairmen’s meeting within the W people’s congress. The chairmen of 
the meeting passed my suggestions. After that, we made in-depth investigations on the industry 
cities program and found the illegal use of 290 million RMB! The head of the industry cities 
program admitted the illegal use of public funds and accepted the strong criticism at the 
chairmen’s meeting. He admitted that strict abiding by financial discipline was 
required(int.59).” 
 
8.3 Explaining the increasing of budget accountability function of LPCs 
The above analysis not only demonstrated that it is possible for LPCs to influence 
government budget, but it also showed how they improved their function throughout the 
entire budget accountability process. The following question then arises: what forces 
drive these changes that ensure budget accountability, especially under current 
circumstances? 
First and foremost, the growing public awareness of vertical accountability brought 
pressures on the closed administrative budgetary process as well as giving the LPCs’ a 
stronger attitude in their budgetary role. Since 1978, public interest awareness began to 
be stimulated by the market-oriented economic reforms. The taxpayers gradually became 
aware that their resources collected in taxes had to be used for the people, which was a 
basic principle. LPCs, the institutional guardians of the public purse, gradually came into 
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focus as the means for taxpayers to express their budget demands. Thus the LPCs’ 
function became regarded as way to exert pressure, as was seen in W. One interviewee 
expressed this as the following:  
 
“One driving factor behind the W people’s congress budget reform was the development of 
private economy and individual economy. Some private enterprise owners obtained extensive 
experience and achieved democratic awareness. Interactions with a variety of economic 
cooperative entities then brought great pressure to local governments, as well as to individual 
politicians. More importantly, as significant taxpayers, their concerns about responsible budget 
allocation, especially at the township or city levels, inevitably pushed the government and the 
LPC to focus much more on budget accountability(ints.1,79).” 186
 
 Secondly, institutional budget reform occurring since 1999 not only provided 
technological support for LPC budget control, but also highlighted LPC function in 
balancing the budget. On the one hand, with the rising reorganization of private property 
and tax democracy, the traditional, fragmented budget drafting was lagging far behind 
the required reality for integrating public needs and making efficient budget allocations. 
For the LPCs, the obscure budget proposals received from the government were the main 
obstacles for them to understand, not mention to supervise or control, the misuse of 
public funds. Department budget reforms, Treasury management reforms, Government 
procurement reforms, all initiated in 1999 and connected with “performance-based” 
budget drafting reforms, reinforced the institutional construction of complete 
expenditure budget drafting. When the new budget drafts with clearer and detailed 
budget information were submitted to the LPCs, this made it possible to request 
justification from the government budget departments or to add more input of voters’ 
opinions. Therefore, we can conclude that these budget reforms were indispensible as 
basis for promoting LPC budget oversight.  
On the other hand, these budget reforms reshaped the budget power relationship and 
posed new challenges to the previous “connection-based” (guanxi-based) budget 
 
186 The Chairman of Finance and Economic Working Commission in the M people’s congress and one researcher 
having the cooperating relationship with the M people’s congress, had visited the W people’s congress and the W1 
people’s congress to learn how to promote budget supervision in Aug, 2009. Interview by author, Sep 2009. 
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allocation model. Faced with the dilemma of new budget allocation rules, and 
unavoidable political pressure during the budgetary process, the Finance department or 
Auditing department resorted to getting direct support for the LPCs under current 
contexts. As one finance official said:  
 
“Within governments, our Finance department is in the same bureaucratic level with other budget 
request departments. It is difficult to directly refuse to exaggerate budget requests from other 
department leaders due to the ‘acquainted connection’ or the positional power of the CCP (some 
leaders were members of CCP standing committee). When I cannot make the balance between 
that political ‘factor’ and scarce budget funds, I have to communicate with CCP leaders and the 
department leaders. For the LPC, it is different. Both the leaders or ordinary deputies can make 
objective evaluations on budget proposals with reference to public interest(int.22).”  
 
One leader in the M people’s congress also gave similar comments:  
 
“In recent years, it has become more frequent for government leaders to ask for our help in 
balancing political relationships in the game process of the budget. The head and vice head of 
the government who are in charge of public finance have difficulty in saying yes or no when 
other leaders (at the same levels) want to get more budgets for their departments. Under that 
circumstance, the LPC can say this money should or should not be allocated, referring to the 
voters’ perspective. With the support of our standpoints, the Finance department or the 
Auditing department found these political relationships became easier to cope with(int.19).”  
 
Similar experiences were reported in J, where it provided the platform for the J people’s 
congress to assert its function in their budgetary process.”   
Thirdly, good political context can provide stronger political incentives for LPCs to 
reinforce their role, especially the relationship between the party and the LPC. The 
Chairmen of standing committees held much the same opinion on the importance of how 
obtaining the CCP’s support is a dispensable prerequisite for the enhancement of the 
LPCs role. Without the CCP’s agreement and support, any reforms and innovations of 
the LPC will equal zero. There is no exception for crucial budget issues (ints.14,51, 
77).187 The practice in the M people’s congress provided proof for this opinion: In 2008, 
 
187 The chairman from the W people’s congress, M people’s congress, J people’s congress had similar comments. 
Interview by author in Nov 13 2009, Aug 12 2009, and July 22 2010 respectively. 
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the documents for strengthening the leadership on financial matters passed at the plenary 
meeting of the Party committee, clearly stipulating that the CCP would support the LPC 
to perform its legal role. I would also strengthen its supervision, and enhance the 
decision power of the LPC on major financial and budget issues. With the CCP’s support 
in enhancing the LPC’s budget supervision, the trial ordinance on budget amendments in 
the M people’s congress was successfully enacted after five months in 2008, which 
strengthened function of the LPC and its deputies. Truly, both the support by the current 
CCP secretary in the M district (he had acted as a law professor and possessed stronger 
democracy awareness) and the promotion from external experts contribute to the role of 
our LPC (int.13).  
Fourthly, from the view of horizontal accountability, the enhanced budget function can 
be associated with the personal charisma of political leaders. They were active in 
innovation and possessed what I might call stronger accountability senses. These features 
have been observed within the literature, where it has been pointed out where similar 
individual leaders had taken the lead on policy changes and were named “legislative 
champions” or “policy entrepreneurs.” Through creativity, networking, and persuasive 
argumentation, these leaders brought ideas on how policy innovation should be a 
common currency to promote policy change.188 Take the W people’s congress as an 
example: the Chairman of the standing committee would be considered this type of 
political entrepreneur. He persuaded the CCP to accept his reform by advocating 
“Participatory budgeting examination and supervision through deliberative discussions.” 
He described this as follows:  
 
“When we tried to introduce ‘Participatory budgeting examination and supervision through 
deliberative discussions’ into our city level, from the township levels, we suggest first to hold 
deliberative discussion on the Transportation and Water conservancy department budget. These 
two departments were responsible for large amounts of budgetary funds; they were also of very 
 
188 Mintrom, M, “Political entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation,” American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol.41, No.3 (1997):738-770. 
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high public concern. The CCP secretary and government heads worried much about our 
suggestion. The first time that I talked with them, they disagreed. After that we made intensive 
investigations, then I went to see the CCP secretary and government heads for the second time. 
I told them there was no problem to carry out this innovation. On the contrary, it had the 
potential to improve budget accountability and gain a lot of public trust. Moreover, our 
deputies had good qualities to engage in this issue and look at it from a complete public 
interests’ perspective. In addition, we also had carefully prepared for the budget deliberative 
meetings. At last, they reluctantly agreed. When continuing this practice, it proved that we were 
right. This innovation exerted great function in curbing budget waste and promoting a better 
democratic allocation acceptable to public opinions. The CCP secretary and government heads 
felt very happy. Of course, similar reforms or innovations have some risks. They pose 
challenges as well as opportunity to enhance our function in budgetary accountability. If we 
had no sense of accountability, it would not be necessary to persuade the CCP and government 
again. If some uncontrolled result had arisen for the execution of these innovations, I would be 
the first person who would have had to take the responsibility. After all, the party and the 
government would not allow you to do this again. Therefore, the personal accountability sense 
is very crucial (int.51).”  
 
Fifthly, vertical actors, such as experts, social organizations, as well as the media, give 
additional impetus for the LPCs to make budgets accountable. This is the same in the W 
people’s congress, W people’s congress, M people’s congress, and J people’s congress. 
The roles of the budget actors have become increasingly more prominent. For instance, 
the budget function reform of the M people’s congress was strongly supported by an 
expert panel composed of layers, LPC leaders from higher level of the National People’s 
Congress, think-tank-leaders, professors from the university and research institutions. 
They lobbied and were in communication with the CCP secretary in M. Thus, a good 
political foundation was laid for subsequent budget innovations in the M people’s 
congress. These experts and social organization members also provided necessary 
consultation and training services for deputies in the M people’s congress. Media 
attention and publicity on LPCs budget examination innovation is not only important to 
enhance LPC’s authority but also crucial to train or stipulate public opinion.  
 
8.4 Concluding analysis on the contribution of budget accountability to political 
accountability 
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What we learn from the four examined cases of the Chinese LPCs is the observation of a 
concrete change from previously acting as a “rubber stamp” to a current position as an 
active local government in terms of budget accountability. Although some roads remain 
to be chosen to achieve the same position as seen in the Western countries, the LPCs are 
now “the bridges,” which today connect vertical- and horizontal accountability of the 
budgetary process in China.   
Under China’s one-party system, the strengthening of the LPCs’ function in the 
budgetary process is also consistent with CCP’s current political goals. As the leading 
force in Chinese society, the CCP has now to face the challenges from the public as 
general distrust, as complaints on unfair budget allocations, and for claims of huge 
budget waste. Under the present circumstances, the CCP has become more open to 
governance innovations and pays more attention to the voice of the public. By enhancing 
budget transparency, introducing more stringent controls, and demanding more 
answerability, the CCP will feel that it achieves stronger legitimacy, and that it will be 
more able to curb budget corruption and regain public trust. However, there are still 
Party leaders who are reluctant to provide positive support.  
The importance of this change has also been recognized and accepted by officials in 
the LPCs. One LPC leader expressed his experience as follows:  
 
“For LPCs below the provincial level, the main legal power is the power in personnel 
appointment and in removal of cadres, in the supervision power, and in stronger 
decision-making influence on crucial issues. When it comes to personnel, the present CCP has 
inherited a nomenclature system which is a real break for truly sharing this power. Thus it feels 
meaningless to try to put too much effort in this aspect. The legal foundation of the power in 
decision-making on crucial issues is stated in the Constitution, and is definitively great, but not 
clear in practice. Moreover, with the increasing misuse and waste of public funds, the public 
response and demands on the budget will gradually increase. Government activities cannot be 
operated without direct budget decisions, and supervision over its use will have potentials to 
curb improper government behaviors and motivate elected deputies. Since I was elected as the 
chairman of M people’s congress, I mainly paid more attention to the work of budget 
supervision and how we could increase the deputies’ link with voters, as they can ensure 
frequent inputs of public opinions and demands. Following this route, then, our LPC will 
became more prominent in the future(int.14). ” 
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 Compared with the Western relationship between legislatures and governments, the 
strategic cooperation with the CCP Party and the governments will lead to the gradual 
coming of an Opposition; i.e. “political entrepreneurs,” within which the LPCs will play 
a great role. Linking LPC behaviors with public interests, and at the same time getting 
support from the CCP, will be a necessary format for achieving the function of an 
Opposition like the ones in the West. This idea is consistent with O’Brien’s observation 
that the LPCs pursued an “embeddedness strategy” when trying to make the expanded 
jurisdiction more explicit, and increase the organizational capability, so that they would 
be “entwined” with the party, rather than kept at a distance (autonomy) from it. 189   
To overcome the self-deficiencies, like the imbalance of information, the lack of 
professional budget knowledge, and shortages of staff, the LPCs can also construct a 
“co-governance accountability mechanism” to assert their role. Thus, the LPCs invented 
a series of “accountability fora” in the budgetary process, like involving actors both in 
the vertical- and in the horizontal accountability process. These innovations opened the 
way to previously closed budgetary processes, especially by drawing support from 
voters’ voices, media coverage, social organizations, and various experts. In this sense, 
we can say that the changing accountability function of LPCs will be achieved by 
cooperation among multiple actors rather than as isolated efforts from the LPCs.  
Enhancing the accountability function of LPCs in the budgetary process may lead to a 
potential increase in political accountability in general. The cases in the W people’s 
congress, the W1 people’s congress, the M people’s congress, and J people’s congress 
have shown that budget issues do connect the public, the elected deputies, the LPC 
standing committee, the government officials, the Auditing department, the financial 
department, and the CCP. Therefore, the LPCs’ position in the governmental budgetary 
 
189 O’Brien, K J, “Chinese People’s Congresses and legislative embeddedness,” Comparative Politics Studies, 
Vol.27,No.1(1994): 80-109. 
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process will not only activate deputies’ responsibility to the voters, but will also enhance 
LPCs direct control on improper budget allocations by the government.  
The multiple accountability interaction will inevitably break the previous budget 
“black-box” behavior. That kind of presumably non-election accountability also touched 
the roots of political accountability, due to its close connection with elections and power 
checking. As Funnell and Cooper pointed out, for political accountability to have any 
substance, it must be accompanied by financial (budgetary) accountability because the 
government needs money to fulfill its policies. Continuation in office will depend on 
access to the public purse and the ability to use public resources to implement the 
government's policies and programs—denying government access to funds is a means of 
driving the government to another round of elections. 190
Evidence in this paper shows that the function of the LPCs’ budget accountability 
involves several challenges. If tendencies towards more plurality and openness increase, 
the non-elected local officials and deputies will have less decision-making power in 
budgets. Then one may also see that improvements in the Chinese electoral system may 
emerge. When the current limit of administrative-style auditing is removed and higher 
professional strength is introduced, this again may also enhance LPC budget 
accountability. Serious information asymmetry between LPCs and governments will still 
remain, so that the potential of budget amendment powers cannot be fully explored, if 
these challenges are not met properly.  
 
190 Funnell W and K Cooper, Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in Australia(Sydney: University of New 
South Wales Press,1998),10. 
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9. Conclusison : The Accountability Development of 
LPCs and Local Governance 
 
According to the power principal-agent relationship, the developments of the 
accountability function of Chinese LPCs can be generally observed along with the 
chain of accountability in vertical relationships between constituents and elected 
deputies, and in horizontal relationships between government and legislature. 
Specifically, four detailed aspects embedded into accountability relationships 
mentioned above are given more attention: the electoral process from constituents and 
candidates to elected deputies, the accountability linkage between constituents and 
elected deputies, the accountability from legislatures to governments in terms of 
general duties, and the budget accountability between legislatures and governments. At 
the same time, a theoretical framework emphasizes three criteria that ensure effective 
accountability—controllability, transparency and answerability—to assess the 
performance of accountability in specific aspects. In addition to negative control and 
sanctions in conventional wisdom, the concept of effective accountability also relates 
to positive dimensions that promote the transparency of power operation, and the 
answerability to citizens’ expectations for how power agents deal with their voices, 
fulfill fiduciary duties, formulate policies, and provide public goods as well as services. 
191  
 
9.1 Main findings  
9.1.1 The deviation from the zero-based monopoly model  
 
191 Related study on the attributes of the concept of accountability can be seen from: Lawson Andrew and Rakner 
Lise, “Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania”, Research report in CMI, 2005; Derick W. 
Brinkerhoff, “Taking Account of Accountability: A Conceptual Overview and Strategic Options”, Paper reports in 
U.S.Agency for International Development, 2001. 
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With regard to the first question: to what extent have Chinese LPCs developed in the 
performance of their accountability function?, we return to the “zero-based model” 
defined at the beginning of this study.  
This model is treated as a departure to observe deviations and new developments 
and it portrays a situation under complete control within one party state, based on 
Marxist ideology and communist party doctrines. The idea underlying this model 
simply states that electoral accountability is taken care of by the party leadership 
without disturbing involvement from below, and that accountability both in terms of 
ordinary supervisions and budgetary decision-making constraints exerted by 
legislatures is purely ceremonial or ineffectual in the face of a powerful CCP as well as 
government institutions. The deviations of accountability function in the four aspects 
will be briefly summarized and compared.  
 First, regarding the electoral accountability, fieldwork data show that this has 
gradually moved beyond its previous symbolic and ritualized function since 1980s, 
although its performance is still limited. 
On the one hand, the introduction of a semi-competitive rule since 1979 in the 
election of ordinary congress deputies, vice chairmen of standing committees, and 
main leader positions in government, courts, and procuratorates, has produced 
unexpected results: it has created the possibility for ordinary candidates to be 
nominated collectively by voters and, without organizational support, to be elected. 
The election of increasingly independent candidates, emphasized in chapter four, can 
be seen as one prominent proof. In contrast, candidates strongly nominated and 
supported by the CCP as well as related organizations are not bound to succeed in this 
new electoral context. Consequently, intensified competition exhibits certain potential 
to bring public pressures to irresponsible congress deputies, to pose challenges towards 
governmental interruptions, as well as to constrain the monopoly of the CCP in terms 
of nominations and elections.  
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 On the other hand, semi-contested elections and related recall rules at the macro 
level potentially enhance deputies’ sense of constituency in perception while they are 
confirmed to be insufficient to motivate most elected deputies to be accountable for 
their actions. To some extent, this role serves as one incentive for some congress 
deputies to cast substantial attention toward the interests and affairs relating to their 
constituents. Interest-driven incentive also becomes prominent at the present, partly 
due to the gradual awaking of interest awareness held by congress deputies on the 
behalf of multiple social interests.    
In addition, as a remedy for the imbalance between higher public demands on 
deputies’ accountability and lower institutional capability at the macro level, 
institutional rules at the micro level stand out in shaping the incentive of congress 
deputies toward responsible action. This study has found that the more LPCs pay 
attention to establishment of transparent and answerable institutional arrangements, the 
better the congress deputies contact their constituents and serve their demands. This is 
defined by author as institutional constraint incentive to perform electoral 
accountability. For instance, the W people’s congress and the M people’s congress had 
more emphasis on transparent and answerable institutions and also performed better 
than the other two LPCs, both in terms of congress deputies’ self-esteem on the behalf 
of their constituents and in the constituents’ evaluation of the LPCs’ performance. 
Evidence about contacts and answerability from congress deputies to constituents also 
reflects important institutional changes to govern social conflicts and enhance 
state-society relationships. 
Notwithstanding, it should be noted that the non-candidate-centered election system 
characterized by limited competition has obvious deficiencies with respect to 
sanctions. For instance, candidates supported by the CCP are regularly able to avoid 
proper scrutiny, and some elected deputies who make few attempts to serve their 
constituents or do so incompetently still can escape public sanctions.  
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Second, in contrast to vertical electoral accountability, this study has shown, along 
with institutional developments, that LPCs have an enhanced horizontal accountability 
function vis-à-vis governments. On the one hand, they have gradually gained influence 
by strategic use of legal powers and tools during the governance process of public 
affairs. Legal tools, such as inspection, appraisal, appointment and removal proposals, 
and budget supervision, are widely used to hold the authorities accountable. In 
contrast, the investigation into special issues and interpellation power are rarely used in 
practice due to the misgivings of damaging the tight relationship with the CCP and 
government, although some congress deputies have realized their potential to impose 
strict sanctions on improper behaviors of public officials. On the other hand, three 
kinds of patterns that distinguish the accountability performance have been identified 
both from the perspective of congress deputies and the public as voters: LPCs with 
greater influence, LPCs with moderate influence, and LPCs with minimal influence. 
Besides the wider use of legal accountability powers and tools, their performance 
differences are related to a range of other factors, such as structural variables, 
personified-centered political cultures, and so on. All of these inevitably contribute to 
LPCs’ movement beyond their previous function as “rubber stamps” within China’s 
political power structures.   
Finally, the budget aspect of accountability, one emerging area connecting 
horizontal power-checking and vertical electoral accountability, has also been 
significantly altered since the 1999 budgetary reforms.  
One change concerns the increasing openness of department budget information and 
deepening involvement of LPCs in the budget process, along with institutional reforms 
instead of traditional formalistic scrutiny and oversight.  
Another change involves institutional innovations and their impact on budget 
accountability. For instance, participatory budget deliberations carried out by the W 
people’s congress and the public budget hearing initiated by the M people’s congress 
have demonstrated immense influence in terms of ensuring transparent budgets and 
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amending inefficient or unfair budget decisions as well as enhancing public trust in the 
LPCs. Their performance could also be confirmed both from the interviews with 
congress deputies and the participatory observations on budgetary processes. Even for 
the B people’s congress and the J people’s congress, where budget accountability has 
not been given due attention, the settlement on increasing deputies’ suggestions and 
motions for constituency’ issues could indirectly change predetermined budget 
allocations made by governments.  
More importantly, compared with the marginalized status of Chinese LPCs in 
budgetary power structure before 1999, budget accountability exerted via LPCs’ power 
of purse today provides a promising path to avoid politically sensitive issues and to 
reshape power relationships among multiple actors, such as the constituents, the 
elected deputies, the standing committees, the government officials, the Auditing 
department, and the Financial department, as well as the CCP.  
 
9.1.2 Explaining the enhancement of accountability function of LPCs 
While important deviations have taken place, there are few or no signals that the 
zero-based-model has been completely given up. In other words, the rule of the 
authoritarian, and the fact that the CCP tries to control and penetrate into the operation 
of the LPCs have always existed. Against this backdrop, both individual congress 
deputies and expanded LPCs as a whole have to seek for appropriate strategies to 
expand their spaces to function. The highlighting strategies can be summarized as 
follows: gaining support of the CCP, accommodating divergent views while keeping 
harmony with the governments, asserting legal powers and mechanisms, developing 
new devices within legal frameworks to enhance transparency and answerability, and 
seeking support and participation from ordinary citizens, media, and social 
organizations, as well as concerned stakeholders.  
This study found strategies that were appreciated and exhibited by LPCs in 
accountability practices that partly pertain to two informal rules: one is the increasing 
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resilience of the CCP to reasonable opposition and rising attention to public affairs in 
recent years, along with the pressure of strong social demands. However, the 
precondition is that the opposition would not pose threats to its ruling. The other 
relates to Chinese political culture that highlights political harmony. Strategically 
lobbying for the CCP, strategically confronting governments, and decision amending 
that is constrained to the elite groups in advance are workable methods for LPCs to 
pave ways for better accountability, although bold confrontations with the CCP and 
governments will usually face the risk to be far away from predetermined goals.   
 Further concerns are that the analysis in terms of multiple accountability aspects 
also provides an opportunity to sum up why these deviations or improvements 
happened. They can be grouped into three categories relating to the driving forces 
behind the improvements of LPC accountability functions: structural variables, which 
define the possible political rooms and feasible strategies that LPCs can maneuver to 
gain political influence; institutional variables, consisting of new institutional rules to 
reshape the behaviors and incentives of main actors as well as power relationships; 
actor-centered variables that emphasize the impact of political perceptions, political 
culture, and personality of actors on the LPC accountability function.  
Specifically, structural changes opened a new space for the growth influence of 
LPCs in holding the authorities accountable. First, the growing public awareness on 
political accountability and economic interests brought certain pressures and 
challenges to conventional power operation. For instance, increasingly more voters 
began to compete with candidates who have strong CCP support to seek for election to 
congress deputy’s positions. Similarly, the public as taxpayers in China now pay more 
attention to the allocation of public budget and budget performance evaluations. 
Secondly, the changed state-society relationship is found from increasingly active 
interaction among people’s congresses, governmental departments, experts, and social 
organizations, as well as the media. Third, regarding the power structure among the 
CCP, LPCs, and governments, prominent changes have arisen from CCP’s willingness 
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to promote the growth of LPCs since 1978. This is the result that allows the CCP to 
solve legitimacy crises in a new governance phase. After liberation, the revolutionary 
Party was thrust into the role of governance, where the utility of, and indeed the need 
for, the kind of rigid compliance with ideological and rule of man that characterized 
the revolutionary period came into question. Disagreement arose over the exact nature 
of the ideological guidance that was to serve as the source of party policy. Thus, 
enhancing the function of people’s congresses was recognized as a wise choice for the 
CCP to gain political legitimacy via constructing a legal foundation of socialism, 
accommodating the plurality of social interests and responding to multiple social 
conflicts.  
Following the political logic set by the ruling party around 1980s, a series of 
institutionalized reforms at a macro level were carried out to enhance the strength of 
LPCs. One influential example is the enactment of contested election in the amended 
version to electoral law in 1979, which not only challenged conventional 
accountability perception but also constrained the monopoly of the CCP in the 
nomination and election to congress deputy’s positions as well as main political leader 
positions. In addition, some institutionalized innovations at micro level, for instance, 
deputy workstations in the W people’s congress and institutionalized contact between 
congress deputies and constituents in the M people’s congress, are useful for reshaping 
the incentives for congress deputies to serve their constituents responsively. The LPCs 
with more organizational developments and institutionalized innovations at the micro 
level tend to have stronger accountability performance in terms of transparency, 
answerability, and controllability. This partly accounts for the varied performance of 
the LPCs emphasized in this study.  
The actor-centered variables, such as bureaucratic and elite culture dominated 
Chinese politics, still play great role in the local scene. In practice, admittedly, the 
LPCs’ obedience to the CCP and concordance with governments in most occasions has 
a close bearing on this kind of culture. However, the role of the elite, especially the 
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distribution of personification power possessed by the CCP, governmental, and LPCs’ 
leaders in local scenes, should not be neglected when it comes to the increasingly 
institutionalized innovations in some LPCs with certain political risks. This is another 
side of the coin named as China’s long-term tradition of the rule of man. Significant in 
explaining the higher performance of accountability in the W people’s congress and 
the M people’s congress is the pushing and support from main political leaders with 
new reform ideas. For example, these two LPCs successfully carried out a series of 
budget deliberation reforms by persuading or negotiating with the CCP, whereas 
budget power is the critical thing for the secretary of the CCP at both the local and 
national levels. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that they intended to institutionalize 
effective reforms to avoid the disadvantage of rule of man in the future. More 
interesting, the enhanced involvement of the J people’s congress in budget 
accountability benefits a lot from the leading role of the CCP leaders and governmental 
leaders with enlightened budget reforms ideas, although the current chairman of 
standing committee in the J people’s congress did not attached importance to this arena 
at the beginning.  
At the same time, authoritarian ideology and behaviors still accompany the 
accountability improvement of LPCs. For instance, the CCP’s penetration into LPCs, 
in terms of formal or informal ways, still can have huge impacts on LPC performance.   
9.2 Main contributions  
This thesis makes three major contributions on the basis of previous studies on the 
same topic: 
First and foremost, it develops a conceptual framework for accountability through 
an exploration of vertical and horizontal power connections to assess the function of 
LPCs within a non-democracy context. This holistic framework of accountably is 
different from previous study that solely focused on part of roles of LPCs to assess 
their development. It is not only useful to identify why some accountability aspects are 
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effective and others not within a one-party regime, but it also furthers the exploration 
of the possible trends and paths for China’s political development. The deep 
exploration of the accountability function of Chinese LPCs can shed light on the 
peculiar accountability in the context of China’s authoritarian system compared with 
the experiments in western democracies. After all, the issue of accountability is critical 
to governance in all forms of governments. No institution can be properly 
comprehended without exploring its unique social and cultural contexts.192  
Secondly, it offers an in-depth detailed description of the skills and strategies needed 
to collect more firsthand data in the still relatively closed Chinese society, especially 
how to get in touch with political elites. Admittedly, it is still hard to conduct elite 
interviews and to obtain data related to political issues in contemporary Chinese society. 
However, changes have occurred. Most politicians and bureaucrats have formed more 
open ideas, along with economic and social globalization, whereas political and cultural 
barriers still determine whether valuable information will be given to political 
researchers. Against this background, some strategies mentioned in methodological 
chapter proved to be effective due to their roots in Chinese political culture.  
According to my experience and knowledge, acting as an insider for a relative long 
period is one strategy for digging out comprehensive data relating to political issues in 
China. It is time-consuming but rewarding. Similarly, deeper understanding of Chinese 
political culture makes fieldwork challenges less difficult. Through this strategy, I 
collected much data marked by other scholars as sensitive and hard to get; for instance, 
the electoral data, detailed information of elected deputies, as well as their interaction 
with constituency, budget data, the archive of chairmen’s meetings and standing 
committees indicating power operation, and data relating to the perceptions of 
politicians.       
 
192 Selznick Philip, “Institutionalism ‘Old’ and ‘New’ ,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.41, No.2 (1996): 
270-277. 
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Thirdly, it offers empirical evidence and detailed analysis for a promising but 
neglected accountability arena in Chinese politics. Beyond election, budget 
accountability is one critical aspect to observe the accountability function of LPCs. 
This is partly due to the power of the purse embedded in the Constitution and related 
laws. Budget deliberation and oversight is one legal weapon for LPCs to ensure 
accountability. The budget is the life-blood of the government; the budget is a 
reflection of what the government does or intends to do. 193Due to the fact that 
government needs money to fulfill its policies and provide public services, the 
amended or denied proposals on public budget allocations by LPCs are meaningful to 
ensure accountability.  
However, several seminal works directly concerning the Chinese people’s congress, 
especially the LPCs, did not show due attention to this aspect. For instance, O’Brien 
made an excellent analysis on the role of law making, supervision, and representation 
of NPC but little related to budget oversight.194 Oscar simply focused on the aspects of 
political participation and the exercising of political power to explore the role of 
LPCs.195 Cho emphasized local legislatures’ supervision over governments and LPCs’ 
relationship with other actors.196  For some Chinese scholars, Xia attached more 
attention to the developmental process of provincial-level legislatures and strategic 
calculations of legislative leadership.197 He was concerned about the growth of county 
people’s congress most in terms of legal, organizational, and actor aspects.198 While 
 
193 Wildavsky Aaron, “Political Implications of Budget Reform: A Retrospective,” Public Administration Review, 
Vol.52,No.6 (1992):594-599. 
194 O’ Brien, Kevin J, Reform without Liberalization, China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics of 
Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press,1990). 
195 Oscar Almen, “Autoritarianis Constrained: The Role of Local People’s Congresses in China”( PhD dissertation, 
Goteborg University, 2005). 
196 Cho Young Nam, Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition (Cambridge University 
Press,2009). 
197 Xia Ming, The People’s Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance     
(Routledge, 2008). 
198 He Junzhi, Zhidu Dengdai Liyi: Zhongguo Xianji Renda Zhidu Moshi Yanjiu(System that waiting for interests: A 
Study on Institutional Models of Chinese county people’s congress) (Chongqing Press China, 2005). 
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Chinese scholars Sun and Cai mentioned the power of purse in the study of National 
People’s Congress of China, that was not one of the focuses of their study. 199
In contrast, this study conducted an in-depth inquiry on new local experiments in 
this theme due to its importance to the accountability development of LPCs. Empirical 
data suggest that effective budget accountability with the support of series of strategies 
not only contributes to break the closed power operation, but has the potential to 
strengthen the political influence and legitimacy of the LPCs. For instance, LPCs try to 
make use of joint forces from the public, media, and other social organizations to gain 
more influence in bargaining with the CCP as well as governments. More importantly, 
it also shows a close relevance with other aspects of accountability, vertically and 
horizontally, by involving multiple actors. An integrated co-governance model of 
accountability seems to be emerging. The accountability performance of LPCs depends 
on the combination of multiple aspects of accountability.  
9.3 Implications 
In general, the development of LPCs in terms of accountability pertaining to the unique 
Chinese political context provides some implications for future political development: 
 My fieldwork and observation on Chinese politics indicate that responding to the 
public demands of accountability and good governance via institutionalized LPCs, 
rather than the democracy and democratization, is the main concern of the political 
elites and bureaucrats in contemporary China.  
This is closely related to the CCP-dominated reform model in China. One prominent 
trigger of LPC institutional change in the early stage stems from the demands of the 
CCP to establish political legitimacy rather than to promote democracy. In this sense, 
the CCP was the promoter rather than the interrupter in the sense of conventional 
wisdom for the initial institutional development of LPCs. The reason that it provides 
 
199 Sun Zhe, Quanguo Renda Zhidu Yanjiu ( A Study of the National People’s Congress of China) (Law Press in 
China, 2004); Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu (Chinese People’s Congress system) (Law 
Press China, 1992). 
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reform spaces and allow for new innovations in LPCs under current circumstance is to 
give it a stronger bearing on the demands to enhance legitimacy within the 
authoritarian context. In the words of Gilley, China’s rapid economic development 
increases the potential number of domestic crisis points. Corruption, land grabs, 
environmental and resource degradation, governance and health problems, rising 
inequalities, and fiscal-financial instability provide a rich array of potential problem 
points.200 Against this background, Chinese people’s congresses are good institutional 
channels to release these social complaints and reduce social conflicts, and further ease 
the challenges toward the CCP’s legitimacy. For instance, congress deputies have 
reported in our interviews that they usually make responses to constituents on the 
issues of public budget, construction safety, food safety, public transportation, 
environmental protection, judicial justice, the balanced development of compulsory 
education, and other livelihood issues. 
They also provided a stronger stimulus for the CCP to make a certain retreat from 
conventional monopoly in terms of elections, personnel appointments and removals, 
law making, budget decision–making, etc. In Chinese local scenes, it also shows that 
the upshot of an increased LPC may appear along with enhancement of the CCP’s 
legitimacy rather than its reduction. Thus, reforms and innovations initiated by LPCs 
that aim to involve more transparency, answerability, and controllability in the political 
process, are usually allowed if they are not estimated to threaten the dominance and the 
ruling of the CCP in Chinese society.  
However, it is noteworthy that most CCP elites are still sensitive to the competitive 
election and separation of political power intrinsic to western democracies. This can be 
seen from the negative attitude towards informal candidates in the election to LPCs and 
the positive attitude towards transparent budget reforms from the National authorities. 
Given the dominant technical attributes and implicit political attributes of a public 
 
200 Gilley Bruce, “ Elite-led Democratization in China,” International Journal, Spring 2006:354. Accessed at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/intj61&div=30&id=&page. 
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budget, it seems to open a more promising arena than the electoral issue to enhance 
accountability at present.  
 In retrospect, these characteristics of political development are somewhat similar, 
but different than those in other Asian countries. In Vietnam, for example, a single 
party county in East Asia, more in-depth accountability practices and political 
development than seen in China are carried out within the controllable range. For 
instance, competition elections in the National parliament and Communist Party have 
been carried out. Similar development relates to the stronger institutional rules 
characteristic of more openness and competition. The reliance of Party elites on 
institutions and the willingness to embrace more political demands contribute to this 
change.201  
 In short, the system is changing. Connecting the change with the political future of 
China, this is not a symbolic alteration returning to conservative stagnation, nor a 
fundamental transition toward western democracy. Rather, it is an institutionalized 
change to enhance the legitimacy of the existing political system along with increasing 
governance problems in contemporary Chinese local scenes.  
Lastly, it is worth noting that the above conclusions heavily rely on the fieldwork of 
four empirical cases from LPCs in East and Middle China, while the linkage with 
broader areas has been covered. Whether the conclusions are applicable to other LPCs 
in China still needs to be tested by widening the scope of the empirical investigations 
and applying more quantitative measures. 
 
 
 
 
201 On the political accountability and reforms in Vietnam, see Regina Abrami, Edmund Malesky and Yu Zheng, 
“ Vietnam through Chinese Eyes: Comparing Vertical and Horizontal Accountability in Single-Party Regimes” 
(paper presented at the meeting for the Regime Resilience in China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba, 
Dartmouth College, May 25-26, 2007); Mattew Carlson and Mark Turner, “ Popular perceptions of political 
regimes in East and Southeast Asia,” Democratization, Vol.16, No.2(2009): 377-398. 
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Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 
Code                        Occupation                          Interview time 
 
M District 
1   Director of working commission of Finance & Economy, Standing Committee member of 
LPC                                  December 2008, May 2009 and Sep 2009 
2   The Staff of Letters and Visits Office in LPC                       June, August 2009 
3   The director of Comprehensive Division in Standing Committee Office     June, July,      
October, December 2009 
4   Vice Director of Working commissions of Finance & Economy               June 2009 
5   Standing Committee member at district People’s Congress level, Chairman of Town 
People’s Congress                                                  June 2009 
6   Municipality Deputy having more contacts with district                                              
June 2009 
7  Director of Working commission of Domestic and Judicial Affairs, Standing Committee  
member of LPC                                                  July 2009 
8  Vice director of research office, the standing Committee member          July 2009 
9   District Deputy                                                July, 2009  
10  District Deputy                                                 July, 2009 
11  Retired Standing Committee member, District Deputy                  July 2009 
12  Municipality Deputy having more contacts with district                                          
July 2009 
13 Vice Director of Standing Committee, Standing Committee member                                        
August 2009 
14  Chairman of Standing Committee                                April, August 2009 
15   Director of Working commission of Personnel appointment, removal and representative 
elections, Standing Committee member                           August 2009                  
16  The Chief of Secretary Division in Standing Committee Office         August 2009    
17  Director of Working commission of Education, Science, Culture and Health, Standing 
Committee member                                             Sep, 2009  
18  Director of Working commission of Urban Construction and Environment Protection, 
    Standing Committee member                                   September, 2009 
19  Vice chairman of Standing Committee                             Sep, 2009 
20  Secretary of working commission of Personnel appointment, removal and representative 
elections                                                June, July, Sep, 2009 
21  The Chief of Administration Division in Standing Committee Office      Sep,2009 
22  One financial official in the Finance Bureau                             January, 2010 
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B District 
23  Director of Working commission of Personnel appointment, removal and representative     
elections                                                             Oct, 2009 
24  Director of Working commission of Education, Science, Culture and Health   Oct, 2009 
25  Director of Working commission of Domestic and Judicial Affairs          Oct, 2009 
26  The vice chief of Secretary Division in Standing Committee Office         Oct, 2009  
27  District Deputy (party secretary of grass-rooted Community, female)        Oct, 2009  
28  District Deputy(Chairman of grass-rooted community committee)          Oct, 2009  
29  District Deputy(Logistics director of Water Resources Department)         Oct, 2009                  
30  District Deputy, Chairman of People’s Congress at street level              Oct, 2009                  
31  Group interview with 2 district people’s congress standing committee members,  
      and 3 related researchers                                         Oct, 2009                  
32  District Deputy ( Vice secretary of party committee in Road Transport Bureau ) Oct,2009 
33  District Deputy ( the head of one primary school, female)                  Oct,2009  
34  District Deputy ( one famous announcer, female)                         Oct,2009  
35  The vice chief of government office                                   Nov,2009 
36  The chief of government office                                       Nov, 2009  
37  Vice chairman of Standing Committee of District People’s Congress          Nov, 2009 
38  Director of Working commission of Finance & Economy, Standing Committee member of 
      LPC                                                           Nov, 2009  
39  Vice chairman of Standing Committee                                  Nov, 2009 
 
W city 
40  Chief of theory research office, Publicity department; the chief of democratic consultation 
center                                                 Nov,  2009  
41   The staff of Publicity department at X town level                     Nov, 2009                  
42   Deputy Mayor                                                  Nov, 2009 
43   The secretary in town People’s Congress                             Nov, 2009 
44  City Deputy, vice director of town People’s Congress                 Nov, 2009 
45  the staff of Publicity department at Y town level                      Nov, 2009                 
46   Chairman of the sweater industry association                           Nov, 2009 
47  Representative of public opinion at town level                          Nov, 2009                  
48  Deputy at city level, the party secretary of one village                    Nov, 2009 
49  Town People’s Congress Deputy                                     Nov, 2009 
50  Group interview with director and vice director of Working commission of Finance &  
Economy, Standing Committee member of LPC                         Nov, 2009 
51  Chairman of Standing Committee, LPC                                Nov, 2009 
52  Group interview with the staff of Z town publicity department and the secretary of Z town 
People’s Congress                                            Nov, 2009 
53  Vice chairman of standing committee office                            Nov, 2009 
54  Vice chairman of Standing Committee, LPC                            Nov, 2009 
55  Vice chairman of Standing Committee                                 Nov, 2009 
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56  Director and vice director of Law Working commission                   Nov, 2009 
57  Director of standing committee office                                 Nov, 2009 
58  Vice chairman of Standing Committee                                 Nov, 2009 
59  Vice chairman of Standing Committee, LPC                            Nov, 2009 
60  Director of Letters and Visits Office                              Nov, 2009 
                           
J district-level city  
 
61  Vice director of budget section                   September, 2008 and December 2009 
62  Vice director of finance department                August, 2008 and December 2009 
63  Chief of performance evaluation section, finance department    
October, 2008 and December 2009 
64  Staff in budget office, finance department                       December 2009                  
65  Director of Committee of Ethnic &Overseas Chinese & Foreign Affairs, the member of 
Standing Committee                                           December 2009   
66  Director of Working commission of Finance & Economy,  
the member of Standing Committee                             December 2009                  
67  Vice Director of Working commission of Finance & Economy      December 2009   
68  Director of Letters and Visits Office                            December 2009 
69  Vice Secretary Chief of Standing Committee, LPC, the member of Standing Committee  
                                                                 December 2009 
70  Director of Standing Committee office, the member of Standing Committee 
                                                                 December 2009 
71  Director of Working commission of Domestic and Judicial Affairs 
                                                                 December 2009 
72  The staff in the Secretary Division in Standing Committee Office         December 2009 
73  City Deputy (female, non-CCP member)                                July, 2010 
74  City Deputy (male, non-CCP member), the member of Standing Committee    July, 2010  
75  Staff in Working commission of Domestic and Judicial Affairs               July, 2010 
76  Staff in working commission of Personnel appointment, removal and representative elections                 
J u l y , 2 0 1 0 
77  Vice chairman in standing committee                                   July,2010 
78  Researcher                                                      Sep, 2009                  
79  Researcher                                                     Jan,2010   
80 The leader of one political think tank                                 Sep, Dec, 2009 
81 Researcher                                                          Sep, 2009        
82 Researcher                                               Sep, 2009 and Jan, 2010  
83 Researcher                                                       Sep, 2009 
(Notes: the interviews on the ordinary congress deputies and the members of SC in the LPCs are 
generally guided by the following questionnaire in 2009. For interviews with other stakeholders, 
the focus is on their perspectives on the accountability function of LPCs and congress deputies 
relating to political ecology, political influence, powers, incentives, reforms as well as obstacles ).  
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Appendix 2: The Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaire in 2009    
 
Interview number -3 digits:   (     )  
 
A. Individual background 
Let me first ask you a couple of questions of your background). 
 
1. Gender:  （1）Man           （2） Woman  
 
2. In which year were you born? ___ (year) 
  
3. Where were you born? (Name of Province)_____________________________ 
 
4. How long have you lived in this city/district area: _____ years 
 
5. What is you profession and how long have you been this profession?         
     ___________________ 
6. What kind of education have you finished? 
______________________________________________ 
 
7. Are you a member of CCP?  （1）Yes         （2）No  
 
8a. If Yes: When did you join the CCP? : ______________ Year 
 
8a1.What kind of CPC position did you take or hold now? 
 
8b. If no: why did you not join the CCP? _____________ 
 
9. Are you a member of any non-governmental organization (NGO)? Like a neighbourhood 
organizations, a philanthropic organization and the like? _______________ 
9a. If Yes Which organizations are you a member of? ___________________ 
 
B. Personal, local experience 
(You are a member of the Standing Committee in LPC or congress deputies of this area. I will first 
ask you some questions on how you are elected the position and how you evaluate your 
experiences.) 
 
Election and parliamentary experience 
10. When did you first become the member of LPC in this area? _____ (year) 
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11. From which nominating body/list where you elected to the LPC for latest election (For 
example, nomination by CCP, social orgaminzations, constituents or self-nominated)? 
______________________ (write name + other information) 
 
12. Are you the member of the Standing Committee in the LPC?  
 （1）Yes        （2）No  
 
If you answered “no”, please proceed to Question No.13!  
 
12a. If yes, how many times have you been elected as a member of the Standing Committee in this 
area?    
(1) One time    (2)Two times    (3) Three times    （4）More than three times  
 
13. How much time do you spend on work within or connect to the position as congress deputies 
per month? __________________________  (hours) 
 
14. Which topics/tasks in the local politics of your district/city are you most interested in? Can you 
name three topics in the order from one to three according to your priority of interests? 
Topic 1:_____________________________________________________________ 
Topic 2.____________________________________________________________ 
Topic 3:_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Political influence  
15. As a congress deputy, do you think you can exert some influence on the issues that constituency 
voiced or you are most interested in (For example, some topics as you mentioned above)?  
(1) Very big    (2)Fairly big    (3) Not too big    （4）None  
 
16. What ways have you chosen to urge the governments to deal with the issues that constituency 
voiced or you are most interested in (one or multiple choices)?  
 (1) Submitting suggestions and motions during the LPC’s plenary meeting            
 (2) Submitting written suggestions during the LPC’s intersessional period             
 (3) Interpellation                                                          
 (4) Consistently urged government to solve                                      
 (5) Directly reporting the issues to government branches or promoting face-to-face 
communications between government branches and the voters                  
(6) Appealing through related meetings or forums                                
(7) Directly reporting to senior leaders                                         
  (8) Others, note please_____________________________________________         
 
17. How many times have you succeeded in these efforts? 
  (1) Zero time                                                            
   (2) One or two times                                                      
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(3) Three - Five times                                                     
 (4) More than five times                                                   
17a. If possible, please specify the failed cases or the sucessful cases that you have experienced 
    _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Congress deputy—Constituent Connection  
18. How often do you communicate with your constituents per year? 
 (1) Never    (2) one time    (3) two times    （4）More than two times  
  
19. Do you think the ordinary citizens can exert some influence on local affairs in your area? 
(1)  Very big    (2)Fairly big    (3) Not too big    （4）None  
 
19a. If possible, please specify some cases relating to citizens’ influence on local affairs. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. In what ways do you think that the ordinary citizens usually resort to exert influence on local 
affairs in your area (one or multiple choices)? 
  (1) Reporting issues to governments through internet or letters                      
(2) Reflecting their problems by visiting congress deputies                         
  (3) Seeking for help via Vistis and Letters offices insider the LPCs                   
  (4) Petititon directly to related governmental departments                          
  (5) Complainting to leaders or congress deputies when they visit citizens as constituents  
  (6) Others, please note_______________________________________________ 
 
Perceptions on the main functions of LPC as well as personal performance   
21. Do you think the LPC in your area can have some influence in the budgerary decision making? 
(1) Very big    (2)Fairly big    (3) Not too big    （4）None  
 
22. Do you think the accountabity function of the LPC in the budgetary issues has improved in your 
area? 
(1) Very big    (2)Fairly big    (3) Not too big    （4）None  
 
22a. If possible, please specify the impetus or the obstacles in affecting the budgetary 
accountability function of the LPC. 
   ____________________________________________________________________ 
23. Do you think the influence of the LPC has enhanced in the personnel appointment and removal 
aspect? 
  (1) Very big    (2)Fairly big    (3) Not too big    （4）None  
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24. What are your incentives to be congress deputies? 
   (1) Positional demands or organizational arrangement                             
   (2) Political honor                                                         
   (3) Expressing demands for interests and impact government decision-making         
  （4）Really wanting to do something for the voters, good deputies will be respected and 
supported                                                               
   (5) Accumulating interpersonal relationship and political resources                   
   (6) A good chance to learn and self-improvement                                
   (7) Other_____________________________________________                     
 
25. How to evaluate your performance as congress deputies? 
  (1) Very postive    (2)Fairly positive    (3) Not too positive    （4）None  
 
26. Which factor(s) do you think affect your performance to ensure accountability as congress 
deputies under current circumstances (one or multiple choices)?  
(1) No enough time and energy to perform the function due to the part-time arrangement as 
congress deputies                                                         
(2) It does not work to be positive due to the impossible solving on recommended issues                        
  (3) Limited capacities and resources to perform the function                                   
(4)The obstacles from the existing political systems                               
(5) Others, please note_______________________________________________ 
 
C. Political power among SC and the Government Departments as well as the CCP 
27. In what ways do you or your group usually work with people in related administrative branches 
or judicial departments to the topics you often discuss? 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
28. In what ways do you think the SC in the LPC has been made improvements in playing their 
function as horizontal accountability institution towards the government in this area? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
29. The CPC in China is often taught of having strong influence in local politics. In what way will 
you say that there has been any change in this situation in the recent year? 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
30. Your general evaluation on the accountability function of the LPC within China’s context 
(including further suggestions on how to improve the accountability function of the 
LPCs)________________________________________________________________________ 
That’s all, many thanks for your help!!
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Questionnaire in 2010 issued for constituents in the M people’s congress 
    ( Main concern is congress deputy—constituent connection) 
1. Gender:  （1）Man           （2） Woman  
 
2. In which year were you born? ___ (year) 
 
3. Educational level  
  (1) Primary school          (2) High school      
(3) College and University   (4) Post graduate and above 
 
4. Your Professions 
  (1) Student    (2) Worker   (3) Individual businessman   (4) Private entrepreneurs  
 (5) State-ownered managers    (6) Collective-ownered managers     
(7) Civil servants       (8) Staff in the public instiutions        (9) Peasants  
(10) Freelace and jobless    (11) Retired people    (12) Others, please note__________ 
 
5. How much do you know the People’s Congress system 
  (1) Very much     (2) Fairly much     (3) Not too much    (4) Not at all 
 
6. How much do you know the responsibility of congress deputies 
  (1) Very much     (2) Fairly much     (3) Not too much    (4) Not at all 
 
7. Your experience and perspectives on the election to congress deputies 
  _____________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you know the congress deputies within your election district, if yes, please  
  write their name_________________________________ 
 
9. Do you have any experience resorting to the congress deputies when you need help? 
  (1) Yes                (2) No 
 
10. How often do you visit the congress deputies within your election district? 
  (1) Very often    (2) Fairly often    (3) Not too often   (4) Never 
 
11. If you had contacted with congress deputies , how to do it  
  (1) Contacting congress deputies on own initiative 
  (2) Contacting congress deputies when they visit constituents 
  (3) Others, please note___________________________________ 
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12. Your evaluation on the function of congress deputies to reflect public opinions within your 
district 
  (1) Very positive    (2) Fairly positive  (3) Not too positive  (4) Negative 
13. Ways that you have chosen to reflect issues  
  (1) Reflecting issues via village cadres or residence cadres 
  (2) Reflecting issues to government via possible ways 
  (3) Letters of complaint 
  (4) Petitions to higher authorities for help 
  (5) Others________________________ 
 
14. Which way do you think is most effective mentioned above? 
  (1) Reflecting issues via village cadres or residence cadres 
  (2) Reflecting issues to government via possible ways 
  (3) Letters of complaint 
  (4) Petitions to higher authorities for help 
  (5) Others________________________ 
 
15. How do you want congress deputies to deal with the issues reflected by constituents 
  (1) Reflecting and urging govermental departments to deal with them 
  (2) Solving issues by themselves 
  (3) Providing chances for constituents to face-to face communicatin with related department 
leaders  
  (4) It does not matter 
  (5) Others__________________________________________________ 
 
16.What kinds of issues do you think that congress deputies should voice for constituents 
 (1) Issues relating to public interests 
 (2) Personal issues from constitutents 
(3) All issues  
(4) Others___________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Your perspectives on the activities of congress deputies—constituents connection and further 
suggestions on how to promte the responsibility of congress deputies. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
       
 
            ____Thank you very much!___ 
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Questionnaire in 2010 issued for congress deputies in the M people’s congress  
        ( Main concern is congress deputy—constituent connection) 
 1. Gender:  （1）Man           （2） Woman  
 
2. In which year were you born? ___ (year) 
 
3. Educational level  
  (1) Primary school          (2) High school      
(3) College and University   (4) Post graduate and above 
 
4. Your Professions 
  (1) Civil servants       (2) Staff in the public instiutions  
  (3) Cadres in village or resident committee   (4) Worker    (5) Peasants 
  (6)  Enterprise staff        （7） Business manager 
 （8）Freelace and jobless    (9) Retired people    (10) Others, please note__________ 
 
5．Your election district and nominating body/list where you elected to the LPC for latest election   
(For example, nomination by CCP, social orgaminzations, constituents or self-nominated) 
 
 
6． Your perspective on the activities of Deputy-Constituent connection 
     (1) Very necessary    (2) Fairly necessary  
     (3) Not too necessary  (4) Unnecessary 
 
7． Your perspective on the role of the activities of Deputy-Constituent connection in expanding  
the input of public opinions into political arena 
     (1) Very effective   (2) Fairly effective  (3) Not too effective  (4) Invalid 
 
8． Your incentives to contact constituents and hold accountability to them （multiple options） 
    （1） The response to institutional requirements 
    （2） Phychological pressure from other deputies with good performance 
     (3)   The accountability sense to constitutents  
    （4） Demands from my constituents 
    （5） Seeking for re-election  
(6)   Benefiting for self and personal work  
(7)  Showing in front of the leadership of LPCs and CCP 
(8) Others_______________________________________________ 
 
9.  How often do you visit your constituents per year 
(1) one time        (2) two to three times 
(3) three to five times         (4) More than five times 
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10. How often do your constituents visit you and reflect their issues or public issues per year 
 (1) one time                 (2) two to three times 
(3) three to five times         (4) More than five times 
 
11. Ways that you usually resort to contact your constituents (multiple options) 
   (1) Symposiums      (2) Personal visiting     (3) Publicly reception 
   (4) Via key contact persons     (5) Participating related letters and visits activities 
   (6) Making use of internet tools, such as deputy email, telephone , microblog and so on. 
   (7) others________________________________________________ 
11a. Do you think which is the most important one among the ways mentioned 
above_________________ 
 
12. In which cases you usually contact your constituents 
   (1) Connecting with own work 
   (2) Abiding by the arrangements of congress deputy group 
   (3) On own initiative 
   (4) In response to the issues reflected by constitutents 
   (5) When governmental departments need the help of congress deputies to solve public issues 
   (6) Others_______________________________________ 
12a. Do you think which one is most important among the cases mentioned 
above_________________ 
 
13. Methods that you usually used to handle the opinions and suggestions from your constitutents 
   (1)  Directly submitted them to the staff within LPC or congress deputy groups 
  （2）Submitting them to the staff within LPC or congress deputy groups with own suggestions 
  （3） Dealing with them via related channels on own initiative, such as contacting with related 
government departments, appealing via deputies at higher level and so on. 
   (4)  No response 
   (5)  Others_________________________________________________ 
 
14. What kinds of constituent groups that you have contacted  
  ________________________________________________________________ 
15. Have you carried out a certain of investigations before you reflect the issues from constituents 
to concerned government departments？ 
  （1）Quite often   (2) Fairly often    （3） Seldom    (4) Never  
 
16. Your perspectives on the activities of congress deputies—constituents connection and further 
suggestions on how to promte your accountability as congress deputies. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                ____Thank you very much! ____ 
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